THE

Sreegopal Basu Mallick

Fellowship Lectures

FOR 1930-31.

(A Realistic Interpretation of Sankara-Vedanta.)

BY

Kokileswar Sastri Vidyaratna, M. A.

Lecturer in Sanskrit and Philosophy, Calcutta
University, and author of The Introduction
to Adwaita Philosophy, The Upanishader
Upadesh in three big volumes, The
Adwaita-Vāda, The Outlines of
Vedānta Philosophy, The
Bhagavad Gitā &c. &c.

AND

Savā-Pandit of the "Cooch-Behar Durbar."

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AUTHORITIES QUOTED.

ABBREVIATIONS:

ऋग्बे द—Rg. Veda.

वे• भा•, त्र॰ सू॰ भा•, त्र॰।भा•, त्र॰—Bralama-Sutra-bhāsya.

गी॰ भा॰, गी॰—Gitā-bhāsya.

ड॰ भा॰, ड॰-Brihadāranyaka-bhāsya.

म्॰ भा॰, म॰---Mundaka-bhāsya.

ते• भा•, ते•—Taittiriya-bhāsya.

पास-वोध-Atma-bodha-a poem by Sankara.

स्रो॰ भा॰, स्रो॰—Swetāswatara-bhāsya.

ग्रतस्रोकी—Sata-Sloki—a poem by Sankara.

ছা॰ মা॰, ছা॰—Chhāndogya-bhāsya.

रा॰ ती॰, रामतीर्थ- Rāma-tirtha's Gloss on Vedānta-Sāra.

खप• सा•--- Upadesha-Sāhasri of Sankara.

प्र• भा॰, प्र॰ च॰—Prasna-bhāsya.

शिष्रपास्त्रच-Sisupālabadha of Poet Māgha.

मा॰ गौड का॰ भाष्य, मा॰ का॰ भा॰—Sankara's bhāsya on Goudapāda-Kárikā and Māndukya-upanishad.

पतुर्विप्रकाश—Vidyaranya's Anubhuti-Prakasha.

वे॰ सा॰—Vedānta-Sāra.

केन॰ वा॰ भा॰—Kena-bākya-bhāsya of Sankara.

Ta · u · — Ratna-Pravā — Gloss on Ved. bhā.

वि• भि•--- Vijnāna-bhikshu-

पा• गि•—Ananda-Giri.

देशा । भा -- Isa-bhāsya.

सावानिक्पच-A Poem by Sankara.

PREFACE.

Most of the writers on Sankara-Vedanta have dwelt almost exclusively upon the traditional illusory aspect and have tended to relegate its realistic aspect to the back-ground. I have found it necessary to refuse to accept the traditional ascetic interpretation alone to the entire neglect and inexcusable exclusion of the realistic; because it seems to me that the realistic side was very prominent in Sankara's own mind and I have conceived it to be my duty to try and present a concise account of his philosophy in its realistic and objective truthfulness with constant reference to the original sources. Even if this side is at a discount in the general esteem at the present moment, yet the realistic interpretation cannot be ignored nor evaded, and it is one of great and growing urgency. neglect increases my gratitude to the great founder of this Fellowship whose impartial and enlightened generosity has rendered possible the publication of my studies on the realistic and practical aspect of the Vedanta and I trust that nothing of first-class importance has escaped my attention in re-emphasising this most neglected side of Sankara.

I cannot conclude without mentioning with deep gratitude the names of Brahmachāri Jnāna chaitanya (who has now become Paramahansa) and Brahmachāri Purna chaitanya—two most tearned editors of that excellent Monthly Magazinb—the Vedānta-Keshari—the renowned organ of the Rama-Krisna Matha at Mylapore in Madras, who, by their sympathy and encouragement, almost from the very beginning, helped me a great deal, by opening out the columns of their great Journal for some of these Lectures they so kindly published therein. The present learned editor Brahmachāri Turna chaitanya has placed me under a deep obligation by his kind appreciation of the merits of my Lectures and furnishing me with his valuable opinion on my interpretation which 1 reproduce below:—

"It is perhaps superfluous on our part to express our admiration for the scholarship and originality you have displayed so abundantly in your interpretation of Adwaita Vedānta. In India, especially, (perhaps it may be due to the adverse condition of our social and political life) men have ceased to think originally. To move even a bit from the old groove of thought is considered the climax of heterodoxy, and men have seldom shown that courage of conviction and intellectual vitality so essentially needed to set at naught such conservative forces at work and chalk out new paths of thought. We have profound regard for the strength of your intellectual conviction and originality of mind that have enabled you to give this new interpretation of Sankara's System. Some of our readers, who have taken interest in Vedānta all through their life, also told us that they are egathering many new ideas from your lectures.

We feel that of your lectures, those dealing with Māyā and Prāna are the best. You have clearly brought out that Māyā does not simply mean a magical power causing some sort of illusion, but that it is the Lord's creative power, which is always there either in a manifested or unmanifested condition,

and that it is unreal or illusory only to the ignorant man who views it as separate from and unconnected with its substratum Brahman while to the vision of the knowing one it appears in its proper relation to Brahman and therefore ceases to be un-Máyavada thus interpreted can form a philosophy of life providing an intellectual basis and a kind of sustaining power to man in his daily avocations of life. Your interpretation has shown that Adwaita is not simply a philosophy of asceticism but a gospel of life that can form the basis of dynamic activism. This of course is not stated in your lectures in so many words, but is what seems to us to be clearly implied in them. We do not know whether we have grasped you correctly, but we feel certain that if the implication that we have pointed out is correct, Adwaita, as interpreted by you, can again become a living force in our national life, and form not only a matter for the intellectual satisfaction of the Pandits; but a gospel of life that can inspire and sustain the youth of the land in the various fields of life that are open to them. In many respects this is also the trend of the interpretation given so the Adwaita Vedànta by the late Swāmi Vivekānanda.

Your lecture on 'Prana' gives some clear and definite ideas about a much misunderstood subject. Many regard Prana as some sort of air and others as some sort of energy that is neither spiritual nor material. Your interpretation of it has shown the absurdity of all such ideas that view the Prana apart from its metaphysical significance that you have so ably expounded. In the light of the wide and comprehensive view you have taken of Prana, it is possible to understand in a clear and correct perspective the whole world of meaning underlying this difficult concept in Indian philosophy.

While expressing our appreciation of the view you have taken of Adwaita, we would however like to say that the traditional interpretation of it also has a substantial basis to stand upon. But the point is that Adwaita has in the past been in terpreted in an one-sided manner. Since most of the thinkers

of this school in the past have been assetics, whose one object in life was to transcend all consciousness of relative existence, it is no wonder that this school of thought conceived the Absolute as free from any kind of change either of condition or of entity, and insisted on regarding the world as a totally non-That such an experience is however existent phantasm. possible is evident from the lives of some of our saints and such scriptural passages as the following Mantra from the Mandukya Upanishad: --

"नाना:प्रज्ञ'न वह्नि:प्रज्ञ' नीसयत:प्रज्ञ'न प्रज्ञानघर्नं न प्रज्ञंनाप्रज्ञ'। चटलमञ्जवहार्थमगुष्तामस्वामचिन्यमञ्जयदेश्यमेवात्मप्रत्यम्मारं प्रपञ्चीप्रयमं श्रानां शिवमहैतं चत्रधं मन्यनी संभाता स विज्ञीय: ॥"

But this does not mean that the ascetic's view alone is the correct one. The stand-point you have adopted is equally tenable, being supported both by reason and authority as you have proved by your elaborate arguments and quotations. The difference is that the traditional interpretation is that of the ascetic who tries to identify himself with the Absolute by obliterating the consciousness of relative existence, whereas yours is the view of the practical man of the world who tries to transcend the limitation of the world by regarding it as nondifferent from Brahman, its stuff and substratum". &c. &c.

I wish also to thank Prof. Narendra Chandra Vedantatirtha, M. A., for the great pains he has taken in seeing the book through the press.

SENATE HOUSE.

Calcutta University.

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KOKILESWAR BHATTACHARYYA.

Sreegopal Basu Mallick Fellowship Lectures

FOR 1930—1931.

(On Sankara-Vedanta.)

T

(a) Introductory.

Among the Six main Schools of Vedānta, the School represented by Sankarāchāryya holds a very unique position. It is not only very popular in India, but in the Western world also it has found a number of brilliant and lucid exponents, some of whom have thrown enthusiastic labour into the study of his System and succeeded to correctly seize his main principles. But critics are not wanting both in India and in Europe who have adversely criticised him and are unable, they assure us, to accept his method. But the objections raised by them seems, however, to have been founded on misapprehension of his ideas. These critics have understood Sankara's—"These critics have have understood Sankara's—"These critics have the critics have h

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dividual selves (विषय) and the objects (विषय), and that these, they have thought, are mere reproductions of, or parts constituting, the whole. This, in fact, is an identification of the Absolute with the process of the Actual. In a different way, Brahma of Sankara has been taken by some in the sense of an abstract empty unity in which, "like a lion's den" to use Hegel's phrase,-everything is lost and from which nothing can come out; and Sankara has been credited with the impossible task of deducing the differences of nāma-rupa from such a blank, barren, empty unity. Another consequence naturally follows. As there is nothing but Brahma, the world must be an illusion, a kind of hallucination, a creation of the mind of man. It is simply the mental ideas with which the finite man—the knowing subject—conceives the true Reality—Brahma. The apparent world exists in the mind of man and when the mind of man is abolished, the world ceases to exist. In this way, Sankara's doctrine has been reduced by some of these scholars to a sort of Subjective Idealism.

In the all-comprehensive view noticed above the finite souls which are mere phases of one inclusive unity, appear and vanish with no aim or purpose and are drifted along as the countless waves or bubbles on the bosom of the ocean. The individuals, these authors maintain, have no freedom of action, no responsibility,—and the sole responsibility, if any, is attributed only to the whole which is the only individuality. The personality of the Jivas has no place, they say, in this System.

It is forgotten that the finite soul also participates in the Absolute Self-the Infinite-which is eternally present in him and which is his true self, without which his finititude itself vanishes. • The fact is not noted that the finite self, in Sankara-Vedānta, is both the same (प्रनस्) and not the same (प्रम्) with God. The cultivation of moral virtues, they would assure us, has been denied by Sankara and a sort of inertia preached. The union with Brahma which is sought for in Sankara System is, according to these critics, only an absorption in which all contents and differences are entirely lost and, contrary to the assurance given in the Gitā-"तस्वारं न प्रयश्वामि, स च मे न प्रयश्वति" (i. e. 'I-the Supreme Self-will not be lost to him, nor hethe finite self-will be lost to me'),-the emancipated Jiva, these critics tell us, becomes a total void and an empty abstraction. Even Paul Deusson. the most learned and sympathetic interpretor of Sankara's System has explained the great āchāryya's theory from the point of view of Subjective Idealism, following the theory of Kant and Schopenhaur as understood by him.

It has also been held by some that the Māyāvāda as is found in the Sankara System was the creation of his own fertile brain and it has no sanction and support in the most ancient Upanishads and in the Brahma-Sutras.

We all of us remember the notorious Sanskritcouplet, particularly its last line—"सायावादमसञ्चासं प्रकार वीषमेव तत्"—and you know how Sankara was held to ridicule by some of our own countrymen who represented his great Māyā-vādā as an utila (Asat-Sāstra) and stigmatised him as a utila—a crypto Buddhist. Evidently, the composer of the lines had in his mind Sunya-vāda of a certain sect of the Buddhists. But the man was counting without his host. He knew not what he was about. He not only misunderstood and misinterpreted Sankara, but also signally failed to grasp the true sense of the Sunya-vāda too, which he was led to ascribe to Sankara. The great Pali authority gives the following correct idea of the Sūnya-Vāda—

"सिच भिक्ख इसं नावं, सित्ता ते खड़ मैस्पति केता रामच देवच, तती 'निव्वाय'मेडिसि'' (

The text shows that the Nirvana is not an empty vacuum; it is a state where love and hatred, passion and aversion by which all of us are swayed will never distract our mind; where all strife and quarrel will cease to exist and perfect tranquillity will come to our possession. Sankara himself has used the term Nirvana, but he understood it in quite a different sense than what the versifier tells us-"प्रभितो ब्रह्म-निर्द्धापमत्यन्तं सुखमश्रुते" (Vide. Sankara-bhāsya on it). When the Nirvāna is attained, we would not, he assures us, reach a vacuum but ' — पत्यनां सुखम्—complete bliss and happiness. No suffering will meet us anymore.—"तव को सोडः. कः ञ्योक: एकत्वमनुप्रयत:" (quoted in अ॰ सूं॰ भा॰, 3. 4. 22.) -But we shall see more elaborately if Sankara really deserves such stigma at all,

*Thick accretions of such misapprehension and hasty opinions have gathered round and have almost chocked the spirit of this great philosophy, this glorious Metaphysical System of India.

But if any honest and earnest seeker of truth, purging off from his mind preconceived ideas, tries to find out the true meaning of this philosophy, his success is sure to come. Let him carefully collect the materials from the *original sources* which he will find scattered broad-cast in the writings of Sankara himself and he will experience no difficulty to establish the correct position set forth there-in.

In the course of these Lectures, it will be my earnest endeavour to present before my learned audience the correct views of Sankara-Vedanta as appear from his own writings and to show the untenability of the opinions formed by some of the Western as well as Indian critics of this great and celebrated Māyā-vāda. An attempt will be made to discover the source of this Adwaitavada which I have tried to trace to the Rg-veda itself. An attempt will also be made in the following course of Lectures to show, here and there, the merits of Vedanta as compared with the Western Schools of thought which would, I hope, also throw some light on the place this School of philosophy occupies in the philosophical world, but our success would, I feel sure, only be partial, if we fail to disperse even to a partial extent, the mist which. threatens to throw its brilliancy into the shade. I have, therefore, thrown my main labour in this

direction with a view to draw your special attention to it. It is needless to add that the task is very difficult, but I crave your kind indulgence and sympathetic appreciation.

In bringing these preliminary observations to a close, it is my pleasant duty to invite your kind attention to a most essential fact which I cannot too earnestly impress upon you. To present before you the main features of the Doctrine of Sankara in its various aspects my reliance would, as I have hinted above, be placed mainly upon the Sanskrit texts. To arrive at the correct conclusion, especially in the face of adverse views entertained in some quarters, much attentive and single-minded study of Sankara's own writings is needed. Unlike the great Buddha, Sankara did not make use of the current language of the country. Whatever he wrote, he wrote, as you know, in Sanskrit, and that again in a diffuse and dispersed manner. His doctrine may be collected from the various commentaries written by him on the ten Upanishads, on the Brahma-Sūtra and the Gitā, as also from the metrical works of his own composition which have never been excelled in the exquisite beauty and charm of the beautiful verses and the perspecuity of the ideas embodied there-in. Many of you with the exception of very few, who are so kind as to take the trouble to attend here—which shows how great an interest you take in, and the love you cherish for, the Vedanta, are not, I venture to presume, very well acquainted with the first-hand Sanskrit texts. This imperfect and superficial know-

ledge of the original texts-I mean the commentaries of Sankara as also his Prakarana books, is, to my view, responsible for the inaccurate modern interpretation, both in Europe and in India, of the great Māyā-vāda. To correctly understand Sankara and to reach his inner heart, it is absolutely necessary that we must all of us acquire the firsthand original knowledge of Sankara's own writings. But I see around me some of your faces which are naturally so bright with the illumination of intelligence and learning, growing somewhat darkened at the mention of Sanskrit texts. But, believe me, you have no reason to feel disheartened. Whenever quoting texts from Sankara's writings, it would be my pleasant duty to put before you a faithful and literal English translation. To keep close to the original is what mainly concerns us and I shall try my best to represent the texts as faithfully as in me lies. If you follow this procedure, you will yourself have no difficulty in finding out the true view of this great Indian philosopher.

Another point I should like to impress upon your kind attention is this. Too many abstruse things given at a time may prove confusing and you may grow impatient. I have thought it advisable to distribute the whole theory, specially its metaphysical portion, into some broad heads, and to deal with each of the topics under those heads successively one after the other, but not at the same time losing the thread of connection running through them.

(b)—The Absolute Reality (निर्गुण-ब्रह्म) And God (देश्वर).

(1) Rrahma is absolute and perfect in its nature. Brahma does not undergo any mutation in time, hence it is made up of absolute Being or Reality. There were critics of the Hegelian type who thought Brahma to be a sort of "negative Infinite",—"a not-finite"—an empty, contentless abstraction. There were others who took it as a "void—without consciousness, without activity, a characterless vacuum". But Nirguna Brahma in Vedānta is not nothing—

"प्रतिविधानुपपत्ते:...... चसौत्येवीपलभ्यते" (व्र० स्० भा०, 3, 2. 22.)

[Its negation is not possible.....it is felt as an existence.]

The word Nirguna is a technical term. The term ye is employed to denote what is phenomenal

and hence Nirguna means that anything phenomenal does not constitutively belong to Brahma—

''सम्बरअसमांसि गुणाः, तैर्विर्ज्जंतं निगु पम्'' (गी॰ भा॰, 13. 14.)

Brahma is all-illuminating, all-pervading Reality without change, process or progress. It is the essence of all conscious souls (faval) and unconscious appearances (faval) and it abides independently of, and transcends, the relation of subject and object—

''चिवचेवज्ञी येन जानेन विषयोक्तियते, तत् ज्ञानं सम्यक् जानन्'' (गी॰ भा॰, 13. 2.)

''परस्परोपकार्योपकारकतात् एकस्य.....च।त्मनः संस्थानविशेषौ''

(इ॰ भा॰, 5. 5. 2.)

[That knowledge by which the subject and the object are known i.e. which transcends their cor-relativity—is considered by me to be the true knowledge.]

[They are correlative; and there is thus a higher Principle which makes their correlativity possible.]

Brahma is one Reality consisting of being, thought and bliss (प्राचान्द). Eternal being, consciousness and bliss are not attributes of Brahma, but Vedānta regards them, in their inseparable identity, as Brahma itself. They are so inseparably united that we cannot think of the one without thinking of the other. There can be no separation of these in Brahma, no parting off; for, if there were, they would fall outside of the Divine Essence. The Being cannot be denied. We may think away anything, but we cannot think away Being. or Existence. It is—uata uau—Reality of all-

realities,—Being of all beings. It is presupposed in all forms or existence; as Plato argues in his Dialogue, "the existence of one means the existence of others which share in its being." We ourselves are immediately conscious not merely of our own existence, but as an existence that is conscious. Being is thus identical with consciousness. If one is different from the other, a dualism would arise—two absolute existences would co-exist, which is absurd.—

"निष्ट सङ्गचयमिव ब्रह्म, न वीधल्खयमिति यस्यं वक्तुम् ।... कयं वा नित्यचैतन्यं ब्रह्म चैतनस्य जीवस्य पात्मत्वेन उपिद्य्येत ? नापि बीधलचयमिव ब्रह्म, न सङ्गचयमिति यस्यं वक्तुम्— 'प्रकीत्ये वीपलक्षव्यः' द्रत्यादिसृतिवैद्यर्थप्रसङ्गत् । कयं वा निरस्तसक्ताकं वीधोऽभ्युपगम्तव्यः ?"

(ब्र॰ स्॰ भा॰, 3. 24 21).

The sense of the above is clear: "Brahma can not be defined merely as being, but not as consciousness. How otherwise Brahma could have been instructed as the 'self' of the finite souls? Nor can its definition be as consciousness alone, but not being; for, such *Srutis* as 'it is to be felt as existence'—would then become useless. Consciousness which has no existence cannot be admitted."

While we distinguish these three, we must also see that the whole unity is present and active in each

^{*} We can know the nature of Brahma from 'the nature of our own self--''पालाबिद: तद विद:, 'पालाबलाखातुसारिप:'--

These three are not separable from one another but together constitute the nature of Brahma—

''निष्क् स्वाभाविकस्य लिच्छित्तिः कदाचिदुप-पद्यते, स्वितुरिव षौष्य-प्रकाश्योः''— (इ० मा०, 4, 3, 20,)

["A thing cannot be deprived of its own nature, as the heat and light of the sun."]

We have seen that consciousness or knowledge is not separable from Being. Bliss (पानर) is also not separable from knowledge. For, Sankara says, —"As Bliss constitutes the nature of Brahma, it must be eternally present; it cannot be absent or separate from knowledge. If it be separated or absent from knowledge, it would become non-eternal or united; for, knowledge does not illumine it, being separate or absent from it. And what is non-eternal (पानस्) cannot constitute the nature of the Eternal Self and would be dependent on some stimulating cause for its production."—

''तस पात्राभृतमेव तदिति, उपजित्यस्यवधानातुपपत्तेः, निसामित्यस्तवात् । प्रय कराणिदमित्यस्यते ?—उपस्थित्यवधानात् प्रनात्मभूतं तदिति, प्रमातीऽभित्यक्तिमसङ्गः''। (३० भा०, 4. 4. 6.)

Then, again, says Sankara—"when both have the same identical substratum, one cannot remain

separated or absent from the other; either both must be present or both must be absent."—

- . ''छपखिंस-समानात्रये तु, व्यवधानक्षत्यनानुपपत्तेः ; सर्वदाऽभिव्यक्तिः,
- ्र चनभिन्यतिकां"।

Again he says-

"न च 'समानात्रयाचा'मेकासात्मभूतानां धर्मााचामितरेतर-विषय-विषयिलं सभावति"—

"There cannot be a subject-object relation among the essential properties which constitute a thing." Hence, knowledge and Bliss can be immediately felt, without one of them being the object of the other. For, an object (विषय) cannot constitute the essential property (धर्म or स्वरूप) of the subject. *

• In this manner Sankara has proved that know-ledge (বিৰ্), Being (খৰ্) and Bliss (খাৰন্থ)—are eternally present and inseparable from one another, and they together constitute the nature or হ্লমান of the Absolute ('আনম্বানান্').

Thus, it will be seen that the Absolute Brahma, as pointed out by Sankara has a nature, a east of its own and it is not a vacuum—

''न प्रभावाभिप्राथम्'' (व॰ स्॰ भा॰, 3. 2, 22).

[•] For, the *object* being a partial expression of its subject, there is subordination i. e. dependence, not co-ordination or ভগতাৰ্থিক.

And this nature—মন্-বিন্-মানহ—we find continuously present (মনুগ্র) behind the differences of names and forms (নাম-হুবুঙ) in the world—

''ब्रह्मचोऽपि 'सत्तालचणः' खभावः चाकामादिषु चनुवर्त्तमानौ द्वस्तते''। (ब्र॰ म्॰ भा॰, 2. 1. 6).

["The ether and the like are accompanied by the being of Brahma which is its characteristic nature."]

" 'चिन्याता'तुगमात् सर्व्वत चित्सद्धपता गस्यते" (इ० मा०, 2, 4, 7),

["As knowledge is an accompaniment of all objects everywhere, everything has knowledge as its Swarupa (nature).]

" 'मानन्देन' व्याहत्त्रविषयद्विष्ठाग्य मानन्दः मनुगन्तु शक्यते" (तै॰ भा॰, 2. 7).

["The Bliss Divine is present behind all the joys connected with the mutually exclusive objects of the world."]

(2) Brahma is the cause—

Far from reducing Brahma to a negation or nonentity, Vedānta makes Brahma—Sacchidānanda in essence—the first cause. To strengthen the idea I would quote Rāmatirtha.

^{&#}x27;'जनदुत्पत्तिस्थितिसयकारचं समिदगमानन्दानामेकरसं व्रञ्ज''। (Gless on Ved. Sara),

["Therefore, it is stated that Brahma—truth, know-ledge, infinite, bliss,—one in essence—is the cause of production of the world."]

About the causality of Brahma—सश्चिदानव्ह in essence, the Vedantic idea may be stated as follows :—

The differences of names and forms (नाम-रूप) prior to their actualisation existed in Brahma in an undeveloped and undifferentiated state (पञ्जावद्यायाम्, पनिष्यक्ते नाम-रूपे) indistinguishably blended in its nature ("चिदेवासना निलीनतात्"—रप॰ सा॰). It exists as a whole (सर्व्य) in which the differences are merged, but not obliterated.*

Sankara himself describes this as-

''पपरित्यक्तान्यतमविशेषवदेव तदव्याक्ततं'' (इ० भा०, 1. 4. 7). In मार्व का०, 5 also ''सकीय-सर्व्यविसारसिंदतं कारणापत्रं युक्तं (सुपुप्तिप्रखययो:)''.

As in our own consciousness, our ideas, before being expressed in words, exist in avyakta form—undifferentiated, unmanifested, submerged,—which has been beautifully expressed by the late Upādhyāya Gouragovinda in his Gitā-Samanvayabhāsya, P. 232.—

"ग्रामात् ज्ञेयान्तरे सीक्षते सर्व्यकारयस्य ज्ञामस्य चन्यापेचित्रप्रसंगः, चतो न सिष्यति ज्ञामस्वरुपतः ब्रह्मच इति विप्रतिपत्तिः—चात्मज्ञाने सर्वेषां ज्ञेयामान् चन्यभावितात् निर्मे ्षा। चन्यक्षामां ज्ञेयामां तिक्षम् ज्ञाने चित्रसाविन स्थितिनांतुभृतिविद्यां"—इत्यादि—

^{• •. &}quot;वाकाशादय: छपरमन इसिन् इति 'सम्बोपरमः' ताहम्भावात् सङ्गसुवृत्तिः प्रवयः इति वक्ष 'सम्बेलम्'---(रामतीमै).

"—["Without object there can be no knowledge. Knowledge of Brahma will have then to depend on an object. But as it is independent of all, how can there be consciousness of Brahma? The reply is—"In the knowledge of our Self all objects remain included. We are ourselves conscious of the presence of our own objects in our own consciousness before their manifestation, identically blended with it."]

Here I would call your pointed attention to a misunderstanding of Sankara's position. You must carefully note his idea about Nirguna Brahma. idea is found very explicitly recorded in the Kathabhāsya. There are many by whom Sankara has been supposed to deduce the world of differences from an abstract, empty, barren unity and they have compared his System, in this respect, to that of Parmenides. From the Eleatic abstract one, there can be no passage to the actual world of many. Sankara is credited with the performance of an impossible feat! He does not deduce the world from the unity. object is not to deduce; he takes the world as it is. he only shows that it is the manifestation of Brahma and it has no reality apart from Brahma. Brahma is its presupposition. Brahma is its end-

"बह्रमादिष...भूतानामन्त एव च"—
(गी० ७. २०)

Take the passage.-

—["The Sruti takes the world as it is (ययापास)—the world presented by Avidyá…and consisting of agent, action and result. Sruti begins with the world."]

Sankara thus begins with the objective world as he has found it; he only shows its unity with Brahma.—

> ''उत्पत्तिस्थितिस्यवाक्यानि 'परमिश्वरैकलप्रत्यय'—द्रदिखी, न सावयवांशीश्रत्वकस्थना परमार्थतः।''—

["The statement given in the Sruti about the creation, etc. of the world is not with a view to show Brahma as assuming parts or as an aggregate of नान-इन but to strengthen the unity of the world with Brahma."]

But how does Sankara show this unity? Take this illustration.—

''विक्स् लिंगस प्रागपे ध्वें सात् भग्नेत्रकलदर्भगात्...भग्ने हिं विस्कु लिंगः भप्निरेवैकलप्रस्थर्यार्थः ।''—

[*The scintillation (spark) before it came out of fire, was nothing but fire; after it comes out of fire it is the same with the fire, and so is the world."]

Thus we find, as Brahma is the source of the world and Brahma is the end, so the world is one with Brahma, not separate from Brahma, it cannot be taken apart from Brahma.

We see, then, he does not deduce the world of many from the unity. He begins with the world, as he finds it. And then he arrived at the idea of Brahma through the कार्य (cause) which is intimately connected with the कार्य (effect), he reached the idea of Brahma which is

beyond कार्य-कार्य (effect and cause). We would quote him here—

''पूर्वम्, पसीत्वे वीपस्थस्य पातानः सत्कार्यापाधिकतासित्वप्रत्ययेन **एपस्थस** इत्यर्थः। पद्मात्, प्रत्यसमितसर्व्योपाधिदप पातानसस्त्रसमावः...नित निति स्रुति-निर्द्धिः प्रसीदति...पूर्वमसीति एपस्थवतः"—— ² (कट॰ भा॰ (-३).

—["Atma should be known as existing, as producing effectsthen the true nature of the 'Atma' unconditioned, devoid of indicative marks.....and indicated by Srutis 'not this' not this' faces him who had previously realised it as existent."]

"सर्वीपाधिविभीषरहितोऽपि जगतो मूलिमत्यवगतत्वात् पत्येव कार्यप्रविद्यापनस्य पित्तिक्वापनस्य पत्तित्व-निष्ठत्वात्.....कार्यः स्त्यातारतस्यपारन्यय्येष प्रमुगस्यमानं सद्वृद्धिनिष्ठामिव प्रवगमयित । वृद्धिर्ष्ठि नः प्रमाणं सदस्योग्यार्थावगमे"—(कठ). "बार्य-कार्यस्यत्वावधारणकार्षेष सत्यस्य सत्य त्रभ्र प्रवधार्यते"।— (ह० भा० २-२-१).

—["Though devoid of attributes, he certainly exists; for that into which effects are absorbed must certainly exist. For, the effects traced back in ascending series of subtlety leads only to the conviction of something as existent. Intellect even in the ultimate analysis...is still pregnant with a belief in the existence of something — (कर). "After ascertaining the truth of effect and its cause, we ascertain Brahma which is truth of all truths."]

Sankara, it should be noted carefully, never separated the world from Brahma, both after and before its manifestation; he never separated many from the unity. He repeatedly observed that the world of THE-EQ (name and form) had no existence apart from Brahma. He never made the infinite a mere correlative of the finite. The true Infinite is such which finds expression in the finite.

The theory of सत्कारणवाद is a well-known tenet of Vedanta. There must be a positive substratum

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(অভিন্তাৰ) of the emergent effects, in which the latter existed in potential form (কাৰ্যান্তা)—

''सस्तोक्षेत्र सत्तत्तसुत्राते । यद्याच जायते चिचित् तदसीति हष्टं सोके, तत्मादाकामादिकारणतादस्ति ब्रश्च ।......यत् सर्वविकस्मास्यदं सर्वप्रवृत्तिवीजं, सर्व-व्यिवप्रत्यसमितम्भि 'चसि' तद् ब्रश्च'— (तै॰ भा॰ १-६).

-[It cannot be said that Brahma does not exist; for, ether, etc., of which the cause is Brahma is perceived by the senses. That from which something proceeds exists...He knows Brahma as existing, that Brahma who is the source of all energy and in whom all determinations cease to exist; i.e., which excludes all determinations which would only make it finite].

In his Atma-Bodha, Sankara observes that it is Brahma which must be regarded as the cause of the world, otherwise the absurd hypothesis, viz., from pure negation (पात्) comes something positive (पात्) would have to be admitted. For, says he, an energy to produce something must have a positive substratum for its operation. Energy apari from the substratum is a figment of imagination.—

"कारचमसदिति केचित्, वाययन्यसतो भवेत्र कारचता। पद्भुरजननी मितः, सति खलु वीजे समीत्यते धक्रले:। कारचमसदिति काययन, वन्यापुत्रेच निवेदित कार्यम ॥"

—[Some say that the cause is a non-entity. But the non-existence cannot be a cause. The power to generate a sprout is visible to all only if the seed exists. He who declares the cause to be a non-entity, can manage affairs with the son of a barren woman].

Prior to their manifestation, Nāma-Rupas existed in Brahma in Avyakta form, undeveloped form "जगत् ' ' आगवसायां 'वीजग्रस्थवसम' (ब॰ स॰ भा॰, 1.4.2)"; it has,

therefore, been called in several places as Atma, since it existed indistinguishable from Brahma.—"पासमृते • इति सला, 'पासा' ते कथे ते"—(तै॰ भा॰)

Nāma-rupa could not be separated from Brahma in that stage and hence it was that Brahma's unity was not destroyed.—

''निष्ठ चात्मनीऽनात्मभूतं तत्-प्रविभक्तदेशकालं सूद्धं व्यविष्ठतं भूतं भविष्यदा वस्तु विद्यते ; चतो, नामक्ष्ये सर्वावस्थे त्रद्वायैव चात्मवती''--- (तै॰ भा॰ २-६).

—["There is nothing which is divided from it, either in space or in time, which is subtle, distant, different, that was past, that is to be. Therefore, name and form, under all circumstances, are possessed of Atma only, by Brahma."]

"As the spider produces its thread from its own stores, so Brahma produces the world from its own stores." When the TIM-TIM (names and forms) came out, there is some differentiation; they could be distinguished, but can never be separated from Brahma.

''यदा भाक्षास्त्रे उनिभव्यक्ते नामरूपे व्याक्तियेते, तदा नामरूपे भाक्षास्तरूपापरित्याने-नैव ब्रह्मभा भप्रविभक्तदेशकाली सर्वावस्त्रासु व्याक्तियेते''— (तै॰ ना॰ ९-६).

—["Because they were in the Atma with their names and forms unmanifested, and are unfolded by the Atma, and when so unfolded became the object of the designation 'Shaped' and 'Shapeless' and still they are *inseparable* from the Atma, both in space and time."]

Sankara never made Brahma a logical abstraction, a homogeneous unity. It transcends all, but is not utterly unrelated to the world. Nature presupposes unity of which it is the manifestation; differences have no meaning apart from the unity. The differ-

ences of mu-sq are not to be taken in Vedanta as separate from Brahma, existing outside of Brahma, as mere correlative. In that case, Brahma would be limited by them, would be finite itself.—

''न ब्रह्मणः परं वस्तनारमसीति गम्यते।......भन्यप्रतिषेधेऽसति वस्त वस्तनात् व्यवित्तते इति परिच्छेद एव भात्मनः प्रसञ्चेतः'— (व्र० स्० भा० ३-२-३७),

Brahma includes नाम-रूप. does not exclude them.—

''यस च यस्रादात्मसाम: स तेन भग्रियमतो हष्ट: यथा घटादीनां सदा।न तत एव निर्भिदा यज्ञीतुं शक्यते'— (इ० मा०)

-["What is produced from something, remains undivided from it. It cannot be separated from it."]

The ALL-EQS (names and forms), though they cannot be separated from Brahma, do exist in Him, not as His elements or un or essential properties. For, in that case, Brahma would be qualified by them and He would become composite (unu) or with parts, i.e., sum-total of these would be Brahma in that case; His transcendence would be violated. The differences of ALL-EQ, as soon as they were produced, were produced as the objects of His consciousness, and His consciousness thus stands distinguished from them. How can they be then the essential properties or un of Brahma?

"चालान: खरूपं प्रप्तिः......चती नित्यैव ।.....तथापि......ये ग्रव्हाद्याकाराव-भारा: ते चाताविज्ञानस्य 'विषयभूता' उत्पद्यमाना एव चाताविज्ञानेन व्याप्ता उत्पद्धको ।...चातान एव 'धर्माः' विक्रियाद्दपा इत्यविविक्तिभः परिकस्याको "—— (तै० भा० २-१).

-[The essence of Atma is intelligence, it cannot exist in separation from it, therefore, it is permanent...The sense-impressions of sound and form though presented as knowable objects,

are already comprehended and included in the intelligence. Some ignorant people construe them as the modifications of the Atma, as the essential qualities of the Atma].

They cannot be His धर्म or विकार. Why? Be-

"न डि चौरस्य सर्वीपमद्दे न दिश्वभावापित्तवत्, विराट् सर्वीपमद्दे न एताबान् भास । विं तर्षि ? भात्मना व्यवस्थितस्य वि हि.....भात्मव्यतिरिक्तं मरीरान्तरं वसूव"— (४० भा० १-४-४).

-[As the milk becomes entirely transformed into the curd when it takes the latter form, so the *Virat* did not. Atma remaining unaffected in its own nature changed into a different form.]

We thus see that the immanence of God must not be taken in the sense of Divine identification with the process of the world, and the transcendency also ought not to be taken in the sense of absolutely separating Brahma from the world.

It is the immanence of transcendence. Sankara's remarks must be carefully noted.—

"थयपि ब्रह्म प्रपंचासंस्रष्टः खतन्तं च, तथापि प्रपंची न खतन्तः, चित्र तिखन्ने व ब्रह्माचं प्रतिष्ठितम्—भोज्ञा, भीग्यं, प्रेरितारमिति व स्थमाचं ...विवारा- व्यव्ये प्रतिष्ठितम् व कृदस्यं व्रह्म चवित्र हते।"

[Although Brahma is untouched by and separate from the world, the world is not separate from Brahma; in Him as a substratum the three—the enjoyer (finite self), the nature and God (the controller)—exist. All through, the sustaining ground, Brahma, exists as unchangeable and imperishable as ever].

If Brahma is absolutely separated from the world, if He is not admitted to be the ground (पश्चिम) of

it, the world would be utterly unreal; for, Sankara himself has laid down the proposition that—

"चल महदा यदिक किचित्, तत् चाताना विनिर्श्व तामसत् सम्बद्धते"---

(कड० भा०)

Whatever-object exists in the world, the infinitely minute or infinitely great, would become unreal as soon as it is removed from its connection with Atma.]

Hence, Brahma cannot be absolutely separated from the world. In that case, Sankara's repeated instructions that the differences of changing नामरूप, the world, ought lead us to the knowledge of Brahma (विकार-हारेण ब्रह्माधिगम: बर्मध्य:) would be quite contradictory and purposeless. Though Brahma is निर्णेष, it is not unrelated to the world.—

"न प्रथमनुभवः, किन्तु तत्-साइचर्यात्।" (मतञ्जोकौ)

—[The world of नाम-इव is to be looked upon in connection with Brahma, and not cut off from Him].

For these reasons, Brahma in Vedanta is declared to be both the efficient and material cause of the world. For, if He is not the material cause, some other independent material cause would have to be admitted; but in that case, the world would be quite independent of, and separate from, Brahma and his repeated observation—uzuman विकासणां सम्बद्धं, स्तस्तु प्रत्तः—would be quite inconsistent.

We find from all these discussions that Sankara's idea was that there are indeed statements in the Sruti about the *creation* no doubt, but its object is not to describe creation or deduction of the world from unity so much as to show that Brahma is

present (पनुगत) in the world which is its revelation, and to show its unity with Brahma and its non-separability from Brahma.

- (a) How can the world be absolutely separate (पान) from Brahma? For, if it be absolutely separated, Brahma's knowledge of Himself would be a complete knowledge, and the knowledge of the world would fall beyond it. That is to say, the knowledge of the world would be something beyond the sum-total of Reality, which adds nothing to that knowledge—being complete in itself. Thus a world would be a superfluity and inexplicable, and acosmism would be the result. In that case, the world is not the expression of the nature of Brahma. But Sankara everywhere insists on the fact that the world of The Tay is to be taken as the revelation of Brahma.
- (b) If, again, Brahma be entirely separated from the world, He would be like a human artist fashioning independent and self-existing matter. But Brahma being regarded in Vedānta as also the material cause (चण्डानकारण), He is not like an external cause, but He expresses His nature as it is in the world.
- (c) We find in the Upanishads that the সাম-ত্য is—
- (i) in Brahma or with Brahma—"ते (नामक्षे) यदन्तरा तद् ब्रह्मा" and "श्राक्षच्योति:…प्राणेषु"।

Also the नामरूप is—

(ii) identified with Brahma.—"बाक्सभूते इव नामक्पे" and "बनन्धाः.....कामाः।"

Thus, we find the approx i.e. the world is distinguished from (ua) and yet identified with (ua) Brahma. It means His nature is expressed in approx. It does not mean that the approx is the product of any external energy—as the scientific antecedent. It means—the approx is the expression—the counterpart of His nature, i. e, He became His own object, not something separate. (This is material cause, the objective Māyā).

- (d) The world, according to Vedānta, is declared as neither un, nor unq. It means, if it is absolutely unq, i. e. negative—privation of Reality—less being,—then the world would be a mere illusion; for, all reality belongs to Brahma, and not to the world. To avoid this, the world has some sort of reality (un) given to it which is dependent on Him. Hence Brahma is called in Vedānta as universe. But, nor can the world be absolutely un; for, in that case, it would be independent of, separate from, Brahma, which would destory His unity.
- (e) We see, therefore, that Brahma has invested the content of His Will (used) with a being (util): He is the unconditioned source and back-ground of the world conditioned by Him. He is for this reason called the utilize of the world. As Brahma is transcendent, His being does not swallow up the being of the world. As He is the unconditioned source of the world conditioned by Him, and as it is constantly sustained by His activity, He is also called the utilize of the world.

^{&#}x27; . We quote here what Nilakantha, that faithful

follower of Sankara has stated in his gloss on the section of the $Git\bar{a}$ —

"भवतसास (विकारस) सत्ता-स्नुरणे एव 'मरीये' प्रयच्छानि ; न तु भवतासकी भवानि"।

"There are two portions in the world: the visible changes (विकार) of Nāma-rūpa belong to the world ; and the being and energy—सत्ता-स्करणे—(lying behind the Vikāras) belong to Brahma which He has given to them, upon which the Vikāras stand. For this reason Brahma is called "सत्ता-स्पत्तिपद." If you disconnect the changing Nāma-rūpas i. e. the Vikāras from the Being and Energy lying behind them, they would immediately become unreal; for there would be nothing upon which those changes could stand. Hence we find it stated-"प्रण महदा यदस्ति किचित्, तत् पालना विनिम् त-'मसत्' सम्पदाते" (कड॰ भा॰); i. e. "If the underlying ātmā be removed from the things of the world, however minute or great they may be, they would at once be unreal." Also for this reason it is said everywhere—"If there is no intelligent principle as controller, behind this unintelligent world of Differences, there would be no action at all"—"पचेतनप्रवितः घेतनाधिष्ठान-निवन्धना, प्रचेतनलात् रथादिवत्।"

So, Brahma is described in Vedānta as सत्ता-स्कृत्तिपद.

(f) The object of His will is not outside Himself and He is not limited by anything outside Himself. As He is beyond the spatial and temporal order of the world, it cannot enter into the essence

of His being. He is not, therefore, identical with the totality of things,—His immanent activity directing and controlling the process of the world. And this view does not lend support to the idea of an external designer isolated and standing outside, who arranges things according to his plan. The principle of unity is present in the whole system of the series of 'many' and is immanent in each part—

"समस् विकारजातं अधिदैवतादिभेदभिन्नम् अन्तिस्तिष्ठम् यमयति।"-

(ब्र॰ स्॰ भा॰ १-२-१८).

But this system of parts has its source above and beyond the system itself.—

-- ''निष् नामद्याध्याम् 'चर्चानारं' बद्मायोऽन्यत्'' (ब० स० स० १-१-४१).

["It is Brahma which is always to be distinguished from the Nāma-rūpa".]

All the elements of the world are related to a single source and sustained by it, also are directed to a single end.—

''चरैतज्ञानावसानत्वात्...दैतभेदस्य''--- (३० मा० ५-१-१).

If you ignore this Supreme Principle of the world, the evolution of the world will be a dream.—

'खप्र-माधा-मरीच्यदकवत् भसारम्'।

(3) There are critics of Sankara-Vedānta, who suppose the Vedantic Iswara (God) as an unreality, because Sankara has sometimes used such terms as Avidyātmaka (पविद्यासक), Avidyā-kalpita (पविद्यासकिया)—in connection with Iswara. But this seems to me to be a hasty conclusion drawn from imperfect data. That this is clearly a mis-

conception will appear from the following considerations:—

What Sankara has really done is that he has used the term $Avidy\bar{a}$ in connection with Nāmarūpa—

"विद्यावस्थित-नामद्योपाध्यनुरोधी देवरी भवति।"

We have seen above that Brahma, of its own motion, has manifested its nature in the form of the universe of Nāma-rūpas. This is its immanent aspect. Ordinarily, people take this aspect of Brahma as Iswara. In our practical concerns of life, in our everyday $Vyavah\bar{a}ra$, we are quite satisfied with taking the world as a manifested form of God; as it is the cause itself which transforms itself into various forms—

''सर्वकारवलात् तु विकारधर्यो रिप 'विश्वष्टः' परमेश्वरः''---

(ब॰ स॰ सा॰, 1. 1. 20.)

So, God is taken by ordinary people as an all-inclusive whole— पर्काग्य: पर्काग्य: क्षेत्रच: &c. &c. But to take Iswara (God) in this way is but the effect of avidyā. For, it is our avidyā which imagines the Nāma-rūpas in the self as its essential property or क्ये. That is to say, the ordinary people, as soon as the Nāma-rūpas appear, imagine them to be the essential property of the Self (Brahma)—

''बातान एव 'बन्धां' विकियादपा इव्यविवित्तिः परिवास्त्रान्ते '' (तै॰ आ॰).

It is assumed that because the world of Name-

rūpas is manifested from Brahma, Brahma actually becomes the world—

"विविक्तस्वरूपानिसम्बद्धाः, तदुपरत्तस्वरूपतः, स्त्रीमयो जास्य इतिवत्"। (त्र॰ स॰ सा॰, 2. 3. 17.)

["That the Self is really distinct from, and not affected by, the Nama-rupa is forgotten, and it is taken as deeply tinged with Nama-rupas, as we say 'this fellow is deeply affected by the woman'].

In this way, Iswara is looked upon as something other (पान) than Brahma; as if Brahma, as soon as Nāma-rūpas appear, becomes restricted to them, and thus in their connection is made something quite different (पान) (from Brahma itself). But this is a wrong view. He is indeed the world, but yet He is something more;—this fact is quite forgotten by people under the influence of avidyā—

"एतावानिव पात्मा परमिश्वरी वा, नातः परमसीति, ईहमं ज्ञानं (तामसानामिव सर्वात)³⁷.— (गी॰ सा॰, 18. 22.)

- ["i. e. The finite Self or God (Iswara) is this much i. e. restricted to particular effects,—and there is nothing beyond it, higher than it;—such a view is fit for the ignorant people."]
- Invara is sufficient for ordinary purposes of life, still the other side of the question ought not to be forgotten or ignored. As Brahma is transcendent and perfect, no one of its determinations or forms can exhaust it; no one of its actualisations can fix it in a final or rigid form. The true view of the thing is that Iswara, though the cause of the world of Nāmarūpa, does not thereby become restricted or entirely

reduced to the effects created;—but as it has also a transcendental nature which remains unaffected by these, it is no other than Brahma itself—

''सर्व्यात्मस्त्रात्...'तदान्' भवति । सिश्च ततोऽपि 'चित्रस्तरम्' एतइविति' (तै॰ भा॰, 1.6.)

["As he has become all......He is composed of the Nāma-rūpas of all. But still He is more than these Nāma-rūpas."]

If, then, we restrict Iswara to the Nāma-rūpas, and thereby take *Iswara* as something quite different—un—from Brahma itself, such a view of *Iswara* must be declared as *unreal*. That is to say, the immanence of God should not be taken in the sense of Divine identification with the world.

We thus see now that Iswara is not really something different (प्रम्) from Brahma itself. Though He has assumed the form of the world, He is the same Brahma in reality (प्रमाधित:). This is the correct view, according to Sankara-Vedanta.

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WHAT IS MĀYĀ

AND

Why is it Anirvachaniya—पनिर्व्धचनीय ?

(1) Māyā is the 'Seed'* of the world of differences—

The universe, prior to its modifications or differentiations into names and forms (नाम-रूप) was in an undeveloped, undifferentiated (प्रविक्रत) condition. This Avyakta state of the world is called Māyā (माया) by Sankara who defines it as—

"षयता हि सा 'माया', तत्त्वाचलस निद्यम्थाशकालात्.....जगतः प्रागवस्ता

परमित्रराधीना' । (त्र॰ स्० भा॰, 1. 4. 3.)

["This undeveloped prior state of the world which is inexplicable because it is the same and also not the same, is called Maya, and it is dependent on God (Iswara)."]

The Panchadashi repeats the same idea in its own way thus—

"चिष्वत्यशक्तिमीयैषा, अञ्चल्याकताभिषा। चित्रियमञ्जलिष्ठा"॥

(13.63.65.)

In calling it to be 'seed', it is not to be understood that the original entity is completely exhausted when it assumes the form of the world. It is not like an organic development, but a manifestation of the Reality without affecting its integrety.

["The 'unmanifested' refers to the indescribable force of Máyà inherent in Brahma which transcends all modifications."]

This Māyā has been identified in the Vedānta with Prāna and Prāna being a sort of energy, it cannot exist and operate independently; it must have Brahma for its substratum. An energy apart from its substratum (আৰুষ্ট) is a figment of imagination. Sankara has not made the mistake of our Scientific teachers who have, like Herbert spencer. reduced things and qualities and every object to particles with perpetual motion. Sankara makes it -प्रसिद्धराधीना, dependent on Brahma. This prior undifferentiated state of changing नामकपुष्ठ we now perceive, is sometimes called in Sruti non-being or जसत. But non-being does not imply anything unreal but it really means the undifferentiated prior state of this world. An earlier world had been withdrawn into that condition out of which it sprang and the latter world was not yet proceeding into being-

"न हि चलनासस्वाभिप्रायेष प्रागुत्पत्ते: कार्यस्य चसदापदेश:। किं तर्हि? स्वाक्तत-नामक्पत्वात् धर्मात् पत्याक्षतनामक्पत्वं 'घर्मान्तरम्' (व० म्० भा० 2.1.17.) "चसदिति व्याक्षतनामक्पविशेष-'विपरौत'मविक्रतं त्रद्य उच्चते......न हि चसत: स्वान्य पति'।

["The employment of the term Asat does not signify that there was absolute non-existence—negation—of the effects previous to their production. What then? The difference lies only in two conditions. In the prior state the MINER was non-developed (MINER), whereas in the present state it is developed."]

["The term Asat means Brahma as non-differentiated which is opposite to—different from—the particular differentiated () condition of Nama-rupa. From pure negative something positive cannot be born."]

The commentary on the Chhandogya is more explicit in its: description of this condition—

"तदसच्छन्दवाचां प्रागृत्यत्ते: सिमितमनिष्यन्दमसदिव,—सत्-कार्याभि सुखं देभदुपनात-प्रवृत्ति ("एतेन वीनस्य सञ्जूनतावत् कारयस्य 'सिस्चावस्यां' दर्णयतिः' -चा० गि०) सदासीत्। ततीऽपि सम्परिस्यन्दं तत् समभवत्...चडुरीभृत-मिव वीनं; ततीऽपि क्रमेय स्मृतीभवत्'। (द्या० भा०, 3. 19. 1.)

['That which, prior to its appearance, was called 'non-existence'—being dormant and inert—as if non-existent, became turned towards an existent effect, having its activity (प्रकृत) aroused a little, and thus became 'existent' i. e. mobile. It grew by means of a slight manifestation of name and form just like a sprouting seed. It then became further materialised &c. &c."]

(a) Brahma is behind this seed (ৰাজ), not affected (নিজিকাৰ) by it, and it has no reality apart from Brahma.—

This prior undeveloped state is the seed () of the world-tree. This undifferentiated condition is the sum-total of the powers of organs and organisms—an aggregate of the possibilities or potentialities of all material existences.—

"नगती वीजमृतमध्याक्ततमामद्यं सर्व्यकार्य्यकरणग्रात्तसमाद्वारद्भपमव्यक्तं परमात्मनि भोतगीतमावन समावितं वटकविकायामिव वटकव्यक्तिः"। (कठ० भा०, 3. 11.)

["The Avyakta is the seed of all the universe, the unmodified state of name and form, the aggregate of the potentialities of all powers of organs and organisms, entering or woven into the Self, as warf and woof,—as the potentiality of a fig-tree in a fig-seed."]

 the dissolution of the world, the modifications of the Nāma-rūpas (Vikāras) became undifferentiated, submerged in it.—

''श्रयाहाताख्यं.....तिश्व परमं व्योम.....गुष्ठा, तत्र निमग्नाः सर्वे पदार्थाः तिशु काखेष, कारणलात्'। (तै॰ भा॰, 2, 3.)

"प्रागवस्थायां परित्यक्तव्याक्ततनामरूपं वीजशक्त्यवस्थन् चन्यक्तश्रन्दयोग्यं दर्भयति" (व० स्० भा०. 1. 4. 2.)

["This is the highest Akasa and it must be Avyakrita—because the highest Akasa has been used elsewhere in connection with Akshara. We may take Guha—the Cavity—in apposition to Akasa and construe "the cavity of the Avyakrita Akasa". In this cavity are hidden—exist submerged—all the substances in all time, because it is the Cause and it is exceedingly subtle."]

["The prior state is known as 'Avyakta'. The modifications of নামহুৰ disappeared and they took the form of 'Seed' (বীল) or Potency or seminal form."]

This undifferentiated seed has Brahma for its substratum (प्रमेखरात्रया). Brahma is, therefore, called through this seed of the world, itself a seed—

"बीजं मां सर्व्वभूतानां सनातनम्" (गी॰ भा॰, 7. 10.)

and Sankara explains the term समातन as—'बोजान्सरा-दत्त्पवम्'—as an ultimate Cause. Both the Nirguna Brahma and Máyá, being undifferentiated (निब्धिय), are indistinguishably blended ('चिद्रेकाञ्चना विज्ञीनलात'— छए॰ छा॰); and we find the illustration of "honey and its flavour inseparably mixed, the butter and its sweetness, the Ganges falling into, and remaining inseparably mixed with, the ocean, with its name and form dropped."— "मध्रान रसवत्, छते माध्य्येवत्, समुद्रप्रविष्ट-नद्यादिवत् (भिद्योते तासां नान-रूपे, तासामसंगतानां......'तदभेदेन' समुद्रदृत्ये वं प्रोच्यते—प्र० 6. 5) विवेका-नर्षाः सञ्जताः संप्रतिष्ठिताः भवन्ति......एकीभवन्ति......पविशेषतां गच्छन्ति'

This Maya, Sankara points out, is not negative (पसत् or "प्रभाववस्त") but is positive (स्वद्यवत्)—
ज॰ स॰ भा॰, 2. 2. 26. But as there is, between the Māyā and Brahma, a Swarupa or Tādātmya relation ("व्यवादिन: क्यमिति चेत्? तस्य 'तादाक्या'-लचणस्वन्धोप- पसे:—ज॰ स॰ भा॰, 2.2.38)?, the Māyā has no reality or Swarupa apart from Brahma. Although inseparably blended, Brahma still remains untouched, unaffected by Māyā.

"अध्याक्ततात् तु यत् परं परमात्मास्य'.....अनामदपक्षमीत्मकं 'नेति' 'नेति'' (ह० मा०, 1. 3. 2.) *******नामदपविखचणं नामदपास्थामस्पृष्टं, तथापि तयोर्निवींदृ एवंखचणं ब्रह्म''

(ভা॰ মা॰, 8. 14. 1.)

(No HIO. 4, 1-2,)"

["What stands beyond this 'Avyākrita'—this undifferentiated seed, is the highest Self..... distinguished from nama, rupa and karma and stated in Sruti as 'not so' 'not so' &c."]

["It is different from name and form, is not touched by the name and form, yet it unfolds both; such is the character of Brahma."]

This seed of the differentiated Namā-rupa is itself changeless, as it is the cause of all changes. The substratum of this causal seed of the world—this Avyakta, is Brahma who is the Cause of all causes, the Ultimate Cause; and being the Ultimate Cause, He must be devoid of modification—changeless.—

"'तखादस्थकात् परः...... चर्ळकारच-कारचलात्"। (कड॰ आ॰, 3. 11.) "न च त्रख्राचीऽपि विकारल निवतुमर्छति,...... मूलप्रक्रत्यनस्थुपनमी चनवच्या-प्रसक्तात्"। (त्र॰ स्० आ॰, 2. 3. 9.)

["Brahma is beyond this Avyakta (seed).....as Brahma is the Cause of all other causes."]

["Brahma must be devoid of change, is not subject to modification; for, in this unbroken line of causal series, your reason cannot find satisfaction until and unless you hit upon a Cause which is Itself an uncaused Cause and hence not modifiable by any antecedent. To avoid this regress, Brahma must be held to be the changeless ultimate ground of the Avyakta seed of the नामका."]

''अचरमव्याक्ततं नाम-६प-वीजयित्ता६पं..... ईत्ररात्रयं । सर्वेसात् विकारात् पर: योऽविकारः, तसात् पर इति सिदीन व्यपदिशात् परमास्मानं (अचरश्रव्होत) दर्शयिति''। (त्र० स्० मा॰, 1. 2. 21-22.)

["This power or energy of the seed of names and forms is itself changeless, as it is the cause of all (phenomenal) changes. Its substratum is God. As the cause of the differences of many, it is itself undifferenced and hence it is known as Akshara. But the Ultimate Reality behind it is also called Akshara. This is the true Cause, not subject to change, and it lies beyond the Akshara—the causal seed or Māyā."]

As the Māyā has no Swarūpa or reality of its, own apart from Brahma, it is not an independent principle like the Pradhāna of the Sānkhyas. It is not really different from Brahma. For, it is Brahma as अनुवाद्योभिमुख (इ. ३. १९. १), as अमीमुख (र॰ प्र॰, १. १. 5.), that is to say, it is Brahma about to manifest itself. It is Brahma as आविकाधितावस (स्, १. १. १) i. e. as desiring to differentiate itself. It is Brahma as 'आयमानप्रवृतिकेन निर्देश:' (स, १. 2. 21),

as "प्रकृतिबद्ध्यमानानं" (हा॰ 8. 14. 1); i.e. it is Brahma only looked upon as the material cause of the world. It is Brahma as डपचोयते, as डच्छूनतां गच्छित (सु॰ 1.1.8); that is to say, it is no other than Brahma about to show itself as growing or somewhat inflated—as a seed appears inflated when about to produce its sprout. It is Brahma inclining to act or with its impulse aroused (ईपद्यजात-प्रहृत्ति—हा॰, 3. 19. 1).

This state is very beautifully described in the Mundaka Upanishad * thus—

This is Māyā. It is Brahma itself under a particular state. Hence how can it be different from Brahma? Because a slight distinction arose, a separate name—Māyā—was given. But a change of state cannot effect a real change to the nature of the Absolute. For, it was not a complete expression of the Absolute. The Absolute Brahma distinguished itself as its object from itself as a Subject. This object is known by the designation of Māyā in the Vedānta. T

Sankara asks-

''किं पुमस्तत् 'कसं', यत् प्रागुत्पत्तेरीयर-म्रामस्य विषयो भवतीति'' ?

[•] cf. also चेताचतर Text—''यत: प्रवत्ताः प्रस्ताः प्रस्ता

[†] It is to be noted as Brahma appeared in subject-object telation, it stood at the same time beyond this cor-related subject-object form.

He thus replies-

''तस्वायलाध्यामनिर्व्यचनीये नाम-इपे प्रव्यातते व्याचिकीर्षिते इति मू मः''।

(वर् स्र भार, 1. 1.5.)

That is to say,—The undifferentiated causal seed of the world of differences was what constituted the 'object' of Divine knowledge. How can it, then, be something absolutely different from Brahma? It is Brahma finding expression gradually in the differences of नाम-इव in the world.

At the present moment also, when that undeveloped seed has actually differentiated into the modifications of nāma-rūpas, they still remain in Brahma—

''न इ इदानीमपीदं कार्य्य कार्यात्मानमन्तरेय 'खतन्त्र'मेवासि । कार्यात्मना तु सक्तं प्रागुत्पत्तेरविश्रिष्टम्'' । (व्र० स्० भा०, 2. 1. 7.)

["Even now, the effects—the my-sys—do not exist severed from their cause. Both before and after, the effects always_stand related to the Self."]

''बात्मखद्यापरित्यागेनैव सर्व्वावस्थासु (नामद्ये) व्याक्रियेते''।

''पाता-तादासोरनैव.....पातानीऽहितीयल' न विवध्यते''।

["They unfold, in all their conditions and stages, without being separated from Brahma."]

["As they have no reality apart from Atma,.....the unity...
of the Atma is not affected."]

- (b) Brahma desired or willed (संतस्य) to be many, and then प्रमृत्ति (action) arose in Him. Sankara describes it as "working of Divine knowledge ("यस्य ज्ञानविकारमेव तपः"—
 - We quote him fully :-

''विज्ञानं ब्रह्म.....प्रथमजलात्, सर्व्यप्रहत्तीनां वा तत्-पूर्व्यकलात् प्रथमजं विज्ञानं।.....सर्व्यक्तिज्ञानानां महत्त्वं कारणम्'। (ते० सा०, 2, 4-5.)

["All impulse, all activity is preceded by knowledge: Divine knowledge first arose; it is the source of all knowledge."]

This fact can also be proved from what Sankara has remarked in the Brahma-sūtra-bhāsya, 2. 2. 28—

''बभावात् भावोत्पत्ती चनीहमानानामपि श्रभिप्रे तशिव्धिः स्थात्''।

Sankara's idea is-

["Unless you desire something and exert" yourself, you can not obtain a desired result or object. Hence, a non-entity can not produce an entity."]

Here, to support this idea, we may quote what Ananda-giri said in his gloss on the Māndukya-Kārikā-bhāsya—

["The potter, when he wants to produce an earthen pot, must first have the *idea* of the pot in his mind, then he puts that idea into practice, and when the pot is produced, it is the mental *idea* (स नित्) which is converted into action (क स्तित्या जनयित). It is the ordinary people to whom only the action appears as real and as separate from the idea of the potter." (4.54)]

This involves the idea that it is Brahma which sets in motion— सत्ता-स्कृति-मद—this existent but not yet differentiated germ of the world, though unaffected by it.

^{&#}x27;'नामक्पयोरिप निम्बं इसं न ब्रह्मचीऽन्यत समावति''। (ब्र॰ स्ट भा॰, 2.3. 41)

[&]quot;न निरध्यचय जगती म्याबरणं कथते, जगत् साध्यचं न्याक्रियते"।

^{&#}x27;'पविकार्य ब्रह्म..., दुर्म्य विकारहेतुलात्''। (तै॰ भा॰, 2, 7,)

["None but Brahma can cause the unfolding of the Nāma-rupa—the seed of the world."]

["Unless there is an intelligent principle to control, how can there be brought about the unfolding of the world in Namarupas? And this intelligent principle which sets the world in motion, being the cause of all modifications, is itself beyond modification."]

Thus, the underlying inner Self which contains within it the undifferentiated seed of names and forms, unfolded it by its own Power. The Māyā is, therefore, the creative Power of Brahma. For this reason, Sankara in Taittiriya remarks—

''बातास्त्रे प्रचाकृतनामरूपे, पनार्गतेन पाताना न्याक्रियेते'' (2.6.)

["The Nama-rupa which is contained in the Atma in undeveloped state (implicit), the Atmā which is behind it makes it differentiated (explicit)."]

(2) The Māyā, considered from two view-points.—Pāramārthic and Vyāvahāric.—

It is the universal (सामाख) which assumes a particular (विशेष) form. The universal is the cause and its particular transformed state is its effect.—

"चपास्तविशेषं सामान्यात्मकं कारणमेव विशेषवद्वस्त्वान्तरमापद्यमानं कार्य्यसंश्चां सभते"। (व्र॰ भा॰, 2. 2. 5.)

"सर्वे स विकार जातस्य नाम-द्रपाध्यामेव व्याक्ततस्वात्"। (त्र० म्० 1.3.41)

The universal remains identical with itself in and through its transformed states and all changes or modifications involve differentiations into names and forms. In this way, what is the true cause underlies its effects which may be regarded as its expressions.

The Māyā is two-fold: In its undifferentiated causal condition, it exists undivided (प्रविभक्त) in. and indistinguishable from, Brahma. It is real-सत्—in this state; for it is not then looked upon as separated (पन्य) from Brahma. This is its सामान्याagil, its universal aspect. But when it appears differentiated in the form of effect or family, it is unreal—qua—in this state; for, it is now viewed by us as different or separated (प्राच) from the Universal or Brahma. This is its— विशेषावस्था, its particular aspect; and this is the ordinary Vyāvahāric view of the world of नाम-क्रवः. In its सामान्यावस्था. the world is identical with Brahma and indistinguishable from it. But when the modifications of nāma-rūpas (विकारs) appeared, it is its विश्रेषावस्था: -the world of Nāma-rūpas is now taken as something—Separate (श्रन्योऽयं भिष्म इति—त्र॰ 2. 1. 19) from the underlying, hidden universal, i. e. from Brahma, and is regarded as a self-sufficient entity. After the manifestation of the changes or the unfolding of the differences of nāma-rūpas, some distinction or वैल्चा or विशेषावस्था, i.e. some particular modification (Vikāra) appeared which was not present prior to its manifestation. With this fact in view the Mündaka-bhāsya observes-

"विलक्षणं सलकणञ्च..... अकरात् सन्धवति जगत्"। (1.1.7.)

The Brahma-sutra also speaks of this वैश्वस्थ in the Aphorism 2.1.4—

"न विलचणलादस्य, तथालच पब्हात्"।

For, all finites are divided (faum) like a waterpot, piece of cloth, pillar and the like. Modification (विकार) is the characteristic (स्वभाव) of the divided (or finite) things, and it is this characteristic which separates one finite thing from another. This characteristic was absent prior to manifestation.* Brahma, as well as the world-seed, was devoided modification (विकार) in that stage, and therefore it (the world) is called as its सामान्यावस्था. As soon as there is manifestation, the changes or विकार involving nāma-rūpas appear: But prior to manifestation, they were in सामान्य or unmodified, universal form.

"सर्व्यस विकारजातस्य नाम-रूपाभ्यामेव व्याक्षतत्वात्" (ब्र॰ भा॰, 1.3.41),

i.e. "All modifications are differentiations into names and forms."

In the Taittiriya, we find it stated that before its differentiations (विकार) appeared, the unmanifested or undeveloped world of nāma-rūpa may be designated as Atmā; for, it was indistinguishable from, and identical with, Atmā in that condition. But as soon as it was differentiated, as soon as it manifested in visible form and modifications of nāma-rūpas appeared, it was now called as—मूर्ताम्स, shaped and shapeless. That is to say, previously the nāma-rūpa in seed-form was identical with (पन्य) Brahma and therefore it was Sat (पत्), because unseparated, indistinguishable, from Brahma. But as soon as it came out of Brahma in the shape of modifications (विकार), as there was some distinction—some

This fact is brought out in त॰ त्, 2.1.7. "वावविभागस्तु विकार:".

Anya (पान) and unrelated to Brahma,—as if self-sufficient and independent.* The modification or family is distinguished from its cause or unfa, but it cannot be separated from it; for, Prakriti lies hidden behind the Vikāras always—

"प्रकृति-विकारयो भेंदिन व्यपदेशात्"। "'वस्ति चित्रयये प्रकृति-विकारोच्छे द-प्रसङ्कः"।

["There must be distinction between Prakriti and its Vikara; between the cause, and its effect; otherwise both would become synonymous."]

There must, no doubt, be some difference between the cause, and its modification in the form of its effects. But there cannot be absolute difference between them. Yet, we, in our 'Avidyā-vasthā—waaaaa, under the influence of Avidyā in whose grip we always are, look upon the particulars of nāma-rūpa, the fanas,—as absolutely separate from the underlying universal or the underlying universal o

"षविद्यया.....षन्यदिव.....वस्तमारमिव प्रत्युपस्त्रापितं भवति"। (इ॰ भा॰, 4. 3. 31.)

["It is our Avidya which (falsely) presents the world as something quite different, as a separate thing, an independent entity."]

But even in our Vyāvahāric view, the changes really stand connected with their Sāmānya—the underlying hidden Reality—

^{*} विनैव 'विश्रेषेच' (characteristic of modifications) प्रविव्यादिखों क्षितिरिच्यनानं (Divided) नभः सद्यवत्, स एव विश्रेषः प्रागृत्यक्षेनांसीत्। एवम् चासावादिसभावेन न सभावधत् अक्षः' (Sankara).

"सामान्यमात्रासास्पप्रहानेन विश्ववान् विभक्ति , ... सब्बे विश्ववाः सामान्ये छन्नाः"

(To MO, 1. 6. 1.)

["It is the Universal which sustains the particulars by giving them its own nature or reality......All Particulars are woven into or comprehended in the Universal."]

It is not possible, therefore, to separate the nāmarūpas from Brahma which is their sustaining ground, without which they cannot stand even for a minute. This is Sankara's Pāramārthic view. By this, vikāras as such, do not become unreal; only they are not to be conceived as something separated (प्रच) from the Reality, as self-existing and independent—

"न दि स्थिताविप कार्थं कारकात्मानमन्तरेण स्वतन्त्रमिलं"।

(ब्र॰ स्॰ भा॰, 2, 1, 7,)

["The effects do not even now exist severed from the essence of the cause, independently."]

Sankara remarks in the concluding portion of his elaborate discussion about the relation between the cause and its effects thus—

"स्वकारोऽपि 'परमार्थाभिप्रायेष' 'तदनवाल'माइ" (त्र॰ भा॰, 2. 1. 14.)

["The author of the Sutras declared the effects as non-separate, non-different from their cause, from the Pāramārthic stand-point."]

To declare the world of musq as unreal is to make it separated from Brahma, to make it was or different, or to put it outside of Brahma. In this view, the Infinite would become simply as not-finite. But such an Infinite is a false infinite. For, in this case the opposition between the world in time and space and the Eternal Brahma would be absolute and the Infinite would itself become finite (***)

"तें (नाम-क्पे) यदन्तरा तदु ब्रह्म" (छा॰)

i.e. Brahma has within Him the nāma-rūpa i.e. the principle of multiplicity, limitation— भावा.

Again-

"वसुमावस्वरूपेय हि.....विशेषित्रयानितानि विशेषणानि व्याप्नीति"।

(इ॰ सा॰, 1. 4. 1.)

["It is the nature of the thing which permeates and comprehends within it all its adjectival differences i. e. predicates."]

(3) The Māyā is प्रनिकंचनीय (Anirvachaniya)—

Now, in this connection, I should like to invite your attention to a very important observation—made by Sankara in connection with the Māyā. He has everywhere called the Māyā or nāma-rūpa as धनिकीचनीय (inexplicable)—

'तत्त्वान्यताभ्यामनिन्दं चनीये नामरूपे...मायायक्तिः प्रकृतिरिति...स्रथ्येते'' (त्र० स० भा०. 2. 1. 14 and 2. 1. 27.)

This Māyā which is manifested into the differences of nāma-rūpa is known in Sankara-Vedānta as परिणासि-नित्य, because it is liable to change. And Brahma is described as क्रूट्य-नित्य, because it transcends all, it is subject to no change or transformation.

Parināmi-Nitya (परिणासि-नित्य) has been thus described—

"विक्रियनायमपि तत्-प्रत्यानिहत्ते निंत्यं। द्रय्यस्य अवयवान्ययायितिरितेष विक्रियात्पपत्तेः"। (इ॰ सा॰, 1. 4. 7.) [Also, Vide—इ॰ स्॰ सा॰, 1.1.4,] [i. e. "Unless one part or state of a thing becomes another, the *change* of the thing cannot be conceived and that is called Parinami-Nitya which through its changes of states or parts retains its identity."]

Sankara describes Kutastha-Nitya (क्रूटख-नित्र)

''इदन्तु (ब्राज) पारमार्थिकं क्टछानित्यं.....सम्बेविक्रियारहितं...निरवयवम्''। (व्र० भा०, 1, 1, 4,)

["Brahma is Kutastha-Nitya, the highest reality, free from all changes..... having no parts &c." *

Keeping these two kinds of Nitya in view, Vedānta makes Māyā as the direct material cause (उपादान) of the world, and Brahma is indirectly the substratum of the world. There is the transcendent Brahma behind the Māyā which constitutes the material cause of this changing world of nāma-rūpa.

When the Māyā came out of Brahma, when the Avyakta stage grew into Vyakta stage, it came out as universally pervading *Prāna-spandana—"qिश्वन्दाद्धा—*, कत्वं प्राण्य"—which gradually developed into three forms of energy—

"कार्य-करणवतीनां प्राणैकदेवताभेदानाम् चध्यात्माधिभूताधिदैवतभेदकोटि-विक्रस्थानाम् चध्यचतामात्रे च नियम्बीभूरः" ६ (छा०, 5. 1. 15.)

[i.e. "All the causes and effects, the external and internal organs, &c.—are only different manifestations of the single deity of *Prana* differentiating into the cosmic (ম্বিইৰ), physical (ম্বিয়ের) and Psychic (ম্বান্ম) energies, and God supervises over these".]

In Vedantic nomenclature, the first manifestation of Maya as प्राच-स्वन is known as Hiranya-

^{*} We shall treat these points more elaborately subsequently,

garbha (हिर्ण्यगर्भे). In कठ-भाष, it is described as— "हैर्ण्यगर्भेतस्व' वोधावोधाक्षकं (i. e. विज्ञान-क्रियाणितमत्) महानुका" (3.10). For, it contains all the subsequently evolved external and internal senses and five elements. The finite selves derive all their elements of comprehension and action from this universal Prāna or the world—

"सदात्मन: प्राण-सम्बन्धमात्मनिव......जीवलभेदकारणं......न च प्राणैवियुक्तस्य जीवलसुपपदाते"! (का॰ भा॰, 5. 10. 2.)

This Māyā or Prāna is not simply material or physical, but something more. It is with a view to present this important fact before our view that Sankara has described it to be—

"तत्त्वान्यत्वाभ्यामनिर्ळेचनीये"—

That is to say, "the Māyā is neither तत् nor भ-तत्;" or in other words,—it is itself (त्) and also not-itself (भ-तत्).

The true significance of this has been very beautifully brought out by the great poet Māgha in his immortal work "Sishupāla-badha", by an illustration.

We quote here the last two lines—

"तिरोक्षिताका शिश्वपालं-संज्ञया, प्रतीयते सम्प्रति—"सोऽप्यसः" परेः"।

Take the words—"सोऽपि, प-सः"—

"He is the same man, yet he is not the same".

The story of Sishupāla is well known to you all. The same man took three successive forms and names in three successive births. The poet is describing Sishupāla in his last birth, who in his immediately

preceding birth appeared as Rāvana, and this Rāvana was no other than Hiranya-Kashipu of his former birth. The poet says that this Sishupāla is the same Rāvana, although to the ordinary people, he, in his present guise of Sishupāla under which form and name he has now appeared, seems to be not the same. Sishupāla is the same man known as Rāvana, but he seems not the same man because he has now concealed himself (failfaim) under his present form of Sishupāla.

This is exactly the Vedantic idea as propounded by Sankara. Poet Māgha seems to have been very well acquainted with the Doctrine of Māya-Vāda. *

The world of nāma-rūpa is always changing, always developing, from one stage to another—

"ज्ञानैयर्थाद्यभिव्यक्तिरपि......परेष परेष भूयसी भवति.....ऐयर्थ्यथिक्तिविश्रेषैः" (व्र० भा०, 1, 1. 11.)

["In successively higher and higher forms, the wealth of wisdom, power &c. is manifesting itself...by God's ऐवर्धमित." This ऐवर्ष्यमित is God's Máyà, as Sankara himself states elsewhere in his sentence—"परमेवरावया तदेवर्ष मृता".]

Now, the world of nāma-rūpa is constantly changing; but what does the 'change' signify? The world of nāma-rūpa is finite, i.e. incomplete; hence it is always changing to complete itself; it is moving towards something beyond it which would make it complete,—to make it what it really is. The world

^{*} The poet even uses the term क्लना in his Stanza, which represents माया. The poet also employs the illustration of शेलूव प्य—as an actor, just as Sankara himself uses the term नटवत् in 'मूखकारवर्मन, पा—पन्यात् कार्यात्, तेन तेन कार्याकारेष, नटवत् &c. &c. (क. 2. 1. 18.)

of nāma-rūpa is, therefore, not merely physical but something more; it is itself, no doubt, but it is also not itself: not itself i. e. it is self-transcendent—going out of itself towards self-completion. It is because benind the world, a transcendent element is present. Hence, self-transcendence is the characteristic of every change, every stage, through which the world is passing. Therefore, every stage is what it is and also something other than what it is. Apart from this co-existent transcendent factor, the world is nothing. This self-transcendence implies the presence of a transcendental element. Behind Prāna, there is the inexhaustible (प्रथम) Nirguna Brahma.—

''प्राचयन्दितं वीजमजातं ब्रह्म सङ्गचणं तदात्मनिति यावत्। तदीवमचीतनं सन्धः' जगत् प्रागृत्पचे: वीजात्मना स्थितं, प्राची वीजात्मा जनयतीति वाक्यमेषः''—

(मा॰ का॰ भाष्य,--गिरि's gloss.)

["The term Prāna is the world-seed, and the unknown Brahma is defined as 'Sad-Brahma' (মহ-সন্ধ) in relation to, in identification with, this Prāna. This non-intelligent world of differences existed in the form of this seed (বীসামানা) out of which it is produced. It is this seed of Prāna which developed or became manifested as this non-intelligent world."]

''मया चपक्रष्टं परित्यक्षं निरातींकं यूत्यं (चसत्) तत् स्थात्...सम्बंभूतानां 'बीजं' तदश्मव्यंन'। (गी॰ भा॰, 10. 39.)

["Anything into which 'I' have not entered would be without self (could not exist) and would be void (प्राप्त). Therefore, everything is of My nature i. c. 'I' am the 'Seed' (Essence) of everything".]

The appearance of life and consciousness at the last stage of the development would indicate the source of the whole process of development. The

lower cannot create the higher out of its own जड़ीय resources; in that case, the Naiyáyika Asat-vāda (जसत्-काव्यवाद) would arise. Hence, the life and finally consciousness must have been present from the very beginning. For this reason, the Vedāntanahas placed Nirguna Brahma-chaitanya behind Māyā or Prāna-seed.

We see, therefore, that the Prāna controlled by चिद्राका (Chidātmá) contained within it life and consciousness which subsequently appeared. The world, in its continuous transformations, remains as it is; for, its content is always the same (i. e. the प्राप-वोज). "विक्रियमाणमपि तत्-प्रस्थानिष्टात्तः" *. For this reason, it is called as परिणामि-निस्तः. But as there is a transcendent element behind it, it is also other than what it is; for, it contains within itself the condition of all else which is to be in every succeeding stage; and this transcendent element is—करश-निस्त (Vide. इ॰ स॰ मा॰, 1. 1. 4)—

'तित्र किञ्चित् परिणामि-नित्यं...तदेविति बुज्जिन विष्ठन्यते ।... इदञ्च क्टस्य-नित्यंसर्व्वविक्रियारिष्ठतम् &c. &c.

—And this element is moving the world continuously to newer and newer stage—

''वह खां.....प्रजायेयं... 'प्रकारीं नाम-- मूर्व्यक्षादाधिकाम्' ''--विदारक्य in the Anubhuti-Prakash. †

Ultimately, this Prāna is, therefore, nothing but Brahma itself at the source and is nothing but Brahma in the end.

^{*} विकिथन। चनिष &c. &c.—It means, in and through its changing states it preserves its identity of content.

[†] वह सां &c. &c.—It means, the particle 'म' in मजायेयं is significant. It brings out the fact of inexhaustible 'new additions', i.e. novelty and creation not present in the earlier stage.

III & IV.

One End works in Nature

AND

in Finite Self.

Sankara has drawn out distinction between the respective characteristics of the Intelligent Self (चेतन) and the non-intelligent elements of Nature (भचेतन). you are particularly requested to bear in mind this point that Sankara has characterised the Intelligent Principle (चेतन) as Swārtha (खार्छ); that is to say, it exists for itself and it has the reason or purpose of its existence in itself. Chetana is described as tan: fut i. e. it is self-sufficient and does not depend for its existence on any other thing. In contrast with this characteristic marks of chetana. the achetana (श्रचेतन) material elements are described everywhere as Parārtha (प्रार्थ), i. e. 'existing and working for something else which is other than their own nature, or in other words-which exist and work for the 'purpose' (End) of something other than these elements. Sankara points out the fact that achetana (श्रचेतन) has no purpose of its own—

[&]quot;भवितने खार्थानुपपत्ते: &c." (ह॰ भा॰ 4. 3. 7).

^{&#}x27;'इवं तर्ष्टिं खार्यस्व' वितिमस्वात्...न परेच प्रयुक्तासे'' (उप० सा० गदाांग)

["The non-intelligent (matter) can serve no purpose of its own &c."]

["You, being intelligent, constitute an end or purpose in yourself...you are not impelled by others".]

(1) Sankara has thus described the nature of 'Purpose' inherent in Brahma—

'स्वात्मनीऽनन्याः कामाः...नहि कामयिष्ट अचेतनमिता' (तै • भा०.) ...

["The Atmā is identical with its Purpose or THE; i.e. its purpose is non-separate from its own nature. Non-intelligent things cannot desire, cannot have any purpose in themselves".]

Divine desires (कामा:) are prompted by no extraneous stimulating causes or motives, nor is Brahma influenced by them. For, its purposes are not separable and different (अनन्या:) from it.

Sankara thus observes in the Brahma-Sutra (1.4.14):—

"All the passages setting forth creation and so on subserve the purpose of teaching Brahma..... Creation is described, merely for the purpose of teaching us.....as a means for the cognition of the Absolute Brahma but does not bring about an independent result."

The manifested nāma-rūpas are to be taken as a means for the realisation of the Purposes (संकल्प) of God. God is best known by our mind through His

* ''सोऽकामयत' इत्यादिश्र तिभि: मद्याय नगत्कारणे कामयिद्धलादि'रद्यान'कार्यस्य स्थायाख्यात्...विना तस्य 'मद्यानाश्रयत्व' क्टस्यस्य न कामयिद्धलादि'' (मद्याय नगत्-कारचलादिनिन्द्योद्धकमद्यानं 'माध्यायस्वाच्य'...पद्गीकर्त्तयं। नच विन्यायस्य प्रकाशलात् पद्मनाश्रयत्वविरोधः, भनःकरचपरिचानोपिहतस्यै च वेतनस्य पद्मानविरोधिलात्। '' (रान-तीर्ष),

self-manifestations—through the manifestation and expression of His will (times) in the created world. These Samkalpas (times) are but Divine Ideas existing as potential powers in Brahma—but they realise Tremselves in the particular individual objects which they evolve and sustain. The phenomenal objects are the expressions in time of the Ideas which are not in time and the Ideas can express themselves freely in time—

''नामप्रकाशवशा हि क्षाणां विक्रियाव्यवस्था'' (ह० भा० 2. 4. 10).

''स्ति च इप-म्याकरणे, विधय-प्रतिलक्षात्, नाम व्याक्रियते''

(ब्र॰ भा॰, 2. 4. 20).

["When general 'Names' or Ideas express themselves, the changing particular 'forms' follow."]

["As the particular forms are manifested, the general names or Ideas also finding them as their dwelling place, express themselves."]

And again-

''स्वितिषु उत्पद्मनासु चिष पालतीनां नित्यलात्'' (त्र॰ भा॰, 1. 3. 28). ["On the production of the particulars, the universal Akrities or Ideas are constantly present."]

These creative Ideas are a plurality of causes and they are the constituent elements of one Supreme Reality, and these are behind phenomena. All particular changes are but the modes of action by means of which the causes realise themselves and thus the particulars cannot serve any independent purpose of their own.

Similarly, all the particular elements of human organism work together for the realisation of the purposes (মুখ) of the Self which controls and directs them.—

''सर्घा डि कार्य-करणिक्तिया क नित्यचैतन्यात्म-सर्घे.....स्ये व भवति। तश्च 'एकार्यक्रत्तित्वे न' संइननम् भन्तरेण चैतनमसंइतं न भवति।'' (तै०, 2.7).

["The functions of the senses and the organism are seen when there is a combination of physical and psychical elements. together. Such co-operation or combination for the purpose of a common object (एकार्यहान) is not possible without an independent intelligent principle not so combined."]

Take the following also-

"दिहिन्द्रियमनी बुद्धीनां संइतानां, चैतन्याता-'पाराधें न' निनित्तभूतेन, ... यत् खद्भपशर्यं तत् चैतन्याताकतमिव" ﴿ गी॰ भा॰, 13. 22).

["The body, the senses, the mind, the intellect which are combined or organised together to serve the *purpose* of an intelligent Self, and which are what they are, only as *made* by that intelligent Self."]

You are to note here that it is not a passive adaptation of inert matter which submits to the influence of its environment merely.

Sankara elsewhere remarks-

"The Director is inferred by a logical necessity from the activity manifested by the ear and others combined, inured for the benefit of something distinct from them all (i.e. the Self). As things combined or organised for a common end (universal a) exist for the use of another thing not so combined, we argue, therefore, there is a director of the ear &c, and for whose use the whole lot exists and has been combined."

^{*} About the बार्य and बरण, __they would form the subject- 'matter of our next day's Lecture, .

Each of these fulfils a purpose, a function, and in fulfilling it, each contributes to the realisation of the purpose (अर्थ) of the cause within.

In the Madhu-vidyā (Aufasi, 3°, 2.5.1—19), the great truch is emphasised, viz., there is a reciprocal relation among all the elements of the world. Sankara shows here that the world is a whole of interconnected parts and their reciprocal Auga consists in the fact that there is not only an intimate relation amongst phenomenal things themselves but they mutually determine each other—

''भूतानां ग्ररौरारश्वकत्वे न उपकारात् म्धुत्व', तदन्तर्गतानां तेजीमया-दीनां करणत्वे न उपकारात् मधुत्वम् &c. &c. &c.''

There is mutual determination between the external elements (श्राण) and the body, and between the physical and the psychical elements. The activities characteristic of a particular species (जाति) are, Sankara suggests, what determine and dispose (श्राण) the particular way of working of the elements of the animal organisms—

''धम्मः' चित्रयादीनां नियन्ता। धर्म्य-सत्याध्यां 'प्रयुक्तः' कार्य्य-करण-संघातः,...स येन जातिविशेषेण (Species) संयुक्ती भवति... शरीरिभिः संवध्यमानः...मध्त्वेन उपकरोति'' &c. &c.

We find from the above remarks that the elements are mutually determined in the interest of Species (sufa); that is to say, the whole working has a reference to the racial ends. We may conclude, therefore, that the development of organic forms in a body is purposive to the interest of the typical result (sufa).

This is the truth we find everywhere inculcated. In the Katha-bhāsya, the following important sentence occurs—

''न स्त्रेषां 'परार्थानां' संइत्यकारितात् जीवनहेतृत्वसुपपदाते । 'द्विष्टें ने' ससंइतेन परेख केनचित् अप्रयुक्तं संइतानानवस्थानं न दृष्टं, यथा ग्रहादीनां खोके । तथा प्राणादीनामपि संइततात् भिवतुमईति । अतः इतरेणेव संइत-प्राणादिविलस्त्रणेन तु सब्वें संइताः सन्तो जीवन्ति प्राणान् धारयन्ति ।... यिखन् आत्मानि सति, एतौ प्राणापानौ चसुरादिभिः संइतौ स्पाणिततौ ; यस्मासंइतस्त्र 'सर्थे' प्राणापानादिः सर्व्यं व्यापारं क्ववंन् वर्णते संइतः सन्, सत्तोऽन्यः स्नृतः इत्यभिप्रायः'' (काठ० भा०, 5. 2).

["It may be urged that 'the body becomes destroyed only by the exit of Prāna, apāna &c. and not by the exit of the Atma distinct from these.' This is not so. These acting jointly for the benefit of some other cannot be the source of life. The existence of houses &c. composite in their nature, has not been seen to be undirected by some other not connected with them, for whose benefit they exist; so also it should be in the case of the combination of Prāna and the rest. Therefore, it is by some other alone dissimilar to the combination of Prāna and the rest, all these combined maintain their life. On which 'Atma', dissimilar to those combined, these two Prāna and apāna combined with the eyes and the rest depend and for the benefit of whom (not so combined), prāna, apāna and the rest perform their functions in combination, he is established to be other than they."]

We find, therefore, that there is an End or purpose present in nature and within the organism, which works.

(2) Non-intelligent blind Energy is incapable of producing order and adaptation (रचनानुषयत्तेश्व नानुमानम्, ब्र॰ स्॰, 2.2.1). It is supposed, for this very reason, that the natural world is adapted to the ends of the

Spirit. The forces, if unarranged, uncombined, unutilised by a presiding consciousness or mind can not give rise to a single orderly system (रचना) of the universe. In the adaptation of the organism - (2) to the external circumstances, animal life makes the best use of the external environments. throws off disadvantages and utilises the conveniences and thus builds up the organisms. There is, therefore, present in nature the End which nature has to reach. It is operative through the whole field of nature forcing it to particular forms—a selfrealising idea. Such an end, such an idea,-must be at the beginning. We are obliged to refer this 'idea' to an infinite mind which as its subject must be distinguished from the object in which it works. "An idea busy in the world, but present to no subject is a contradiction", as Martineau observes.

The Sānkhva idea of Prakriti is different. According to Sānkhya, Prakriti is the "condition of equilibrium consisting in a uniform diffusion of three tendencies-power of doing work counter-balanced by resistance (of mass)." The world in this view is something given in its complete form and is selfexistent and independent. It is a complete whole given in its totality; it is eternally complete-unchangeable. Development within it discloses no new property which is not to be found in the pre-existing elements. The manifestation of effect is therefore. only its passage from potentiality to actuality. Evolution is the development of the differentiated within the undifferentiated—"liberation of energy stored up in a collocation, by overthrowing the arrest

which goes on to a fresh collocation." Hence, only the collocations change.

But the Vedantic conception is quite otherwise. Satwa, Rajas, Tamas—सन्त-तमः—owe their mutual relations of equilibrium together to some controlling influence of a whole which brings about connection and combination of interacting elements so that each and all co-ordinate to realise a final end or purpose. Such interaction and reciprocal adaptability and sympathy of objects and of different parts (प्रस्थरोपकार्योपकारकलं) cannot be the result of mechanical working of blind energy, but it proves the presence and working of an immanent purpose has brought about and connected which elements, so that a purpose (पुरुषार्ध) may realised.*-

> ''यद्धी यत्-प्रयुक्तास्त्र...चे टा: स: मन्यः सित्तः।'' ''सं इतानां परार्थल' हटम''। (तै०, 2, 7,)

["For whose purpose and by whom urged or moved.....these activities work, he must be other than these."]

["It is seen that those which are combined together serve the purpose of some other for whose sake they are combined."]

Prakriti, from the Vedantic position, is not, therefore, an irrational power independently working out effects (परिणास—विकारs), but it is a rational creative power of Brahma—''जगत: उत्पत्तिप्राकाले अधातिरिक्त' वस्तु नास्तीति दिर्घितं; धविद्यायाच (सायाया:) अध्ययक्तिले न तत: पार्थगर्थायोगात्'—रासतीर्थं in वे॰ सार॰. ["Since साया is a power of the Spirit, it cannot be an entity

^{*} निष्ठ अचीतनं चीतनानिष्ठितं किखित् कुन्वंदुपप्यति" (वे॰ सा॰—रामतीर्षं)। cf. ''तद्भिध्यानादेव तक्षिक्षात् सः" (त्र॰ स्॰)।

distinct therefrom."] We can, therefore, never understand the universe "as becoming merely, but as being that is becoming." Vikāras (famits) are not mere charges, but movements to a definite End or goal, a progress.—

''एकद्वपसापि.....उत्तरोत्तरमाविष्कृतस्य तारतस्यम् ऐश्वर्था ब्रिकिविशेषै: श्रूयते' (अ॰ स्० भा०, 1. 1. 11).

["Although identical in its nature.....there are degrees of its progressively higher and higher manifestations—by the splendour of His glorious power." [This 'glorious power'— ऐत्रधायित—is Maya, as Sankara himself explains in another place "वहात्रया तदेश्योम्हा."]

''प्रादित्यादिषु हि सत्त्वमत्यन्तप्रकार्य... प्रतस्तते व पाविसरं न्योति: ...न तु तत्रेव तदधिकमिति। यथा तुल्येऽपि सुख्य स्थाने..... पादर्शादी तु खच्छे खच्छतरे च 'तारतस्येन' पाविभ विति तहत्'' (गी० भा०, 15. 12).

["The better manifestation of consciousness in the sun &c. is due to a higher proportion of Satwa.....To illustrate, the same face of man is reflected in a mirror in a greater or less degree of clearness, according as the mirror is more or less transparent."]

' उत्तरीत्तरविशिष्टतरानेव ब्रश्लाकाशान्तान् जोकान्... पेरं परं वरीयो विशिष्टतरं जीवनं इस्थ विदुषी भवति" (क्षा॰ भा॰, 1. 9. 1).

["He wins gradually higher and higher worlds up to Brahmakasa (মুলাকায়) in order of merit—which is the highest and best supreme.....he gains gradually higher and higher forms of life progressively."]

''इदमचात् परम् इदमचात् परं—इति पुरुष एवैश्वः सर्वेश्वः परः प्रतिपद्यते इति युक्तं ।...पुरुष-प्रतिपच्यर्थेव 'पूर्व्वं-पर-प्रवाहोक्तिः''—

(র০ ২০ মা০, 3, 3, 14).

In this quotation the phrase 'पूज-पर-प्रवाह' is significant:—

["'It is higher and better than this', 'it is higher and better than the former'—in this way, the Supreme Self is the Highest of all, the best. In this unbroken series of the degrees of higher and higher orders, the Highest Self is to be gradually realised in the higher and higher forms of objects'.]

(3) Our idea of the conditioned is composed of —(1) some kinds of being(unital) and (2) the limits or conditions (fairs or fairs) under which they are known. All the definite beings are qualitatively distinct in our consciousness and are all relative realities. These relative realities can be conceived only in connection with an Absolute Reality—'arra-wartan argumater (1) one 2.16). Successive changes are determinations of a single substance; it follows therefore, that there is a plurality of substances producing series of changes which are the outer expression of those active essences which must be many, though ultimately constituting the nature of One Reality, and the changes cannot be conceived apart from those essences or causes.—

'दिधि-घट-**रभकादार्थि**भि: 'प्रतिनियतानि कारणानि' (Essential causal substances) छपादीयमानानि लोके दृश्यन्ते ।...निष्ट् दृध्यर्थिभि: यश्चिका छपादीयते, न घटार्थिभि: चीरम्'

(व्र॰ स्॰ भा॰, 2. 1. 18.)

''सम्बं स्य वस्तुन: 'स्वे न स्वे न रूपेष' भावातानैव उपस्थमानलात्''

(2. 2. 26).

["Those who want to produce certain effects such as curd, jars &c. employ for the purpose certain determined (i. e. corresponding) causal realities such as milk, clay &c. He would not employ clay for the production of curd; neither would he employ milk, if he wants to produce a jar".]

["Every object has a positive determined 'nature' of its own". "Each causal substance", Sankara says, "has a certain capacity for some particular effects only and not for other effects; this capacity is a certain power of the cause".]

Sankara, it will be seen, never separated the effects or the manifestations from their causes which contain them within themselves. "The cause", he remarks, "is always found to be larger in extent than the effects, and what is smaller in extent is included within the larger"———

''कारणं हि लोके कार्याद्ध भूयो दृष्टं, यथा घटादिश्यो सन्।...यन् यस चनार्क्षा तदल्यं, भूय इतरन्'' (का॰ भा॰, 7. 12. 1).

He brings out this non-separability, this essential fact, in various ways:—

(i) In distinguishing between unreality and reality, he observes in his commentary on the Gitā, that the effects cannot be known *apart* from their causes; as soon as you separate them from their causes, they would at once be unreal.

''कार्य्य घटादे: बदादिकारणस्य च, तन्-कारणव्यतिरेकेण भनुप-लक्षे:,...कारण-व्यतिरेकेण भनुपलक्षेरसत्" (गी० भाँ०, 2. 16).

"The pot is a particular thing; it is one form of clay which is universal, is regarded as a reality. The pot is a mere form or guise under which the universal clay (भूत्), is hidden". But clay is sensuous universal; it is again dependent on, and a manifestation of, pure universal behind it. The same universal appears in many different shapes and remains identical with itself in all its forms. The clay is not confined to one particular form—pot (भूट)—but goes beyond it to others and hence transcends these.

Thus, each distinguishable object has a nature—a universal—of which it is the expression and which is present in it hidden behind.

(ii) Commenting on a passage in the Chhān logya-Upanishad, he thus concludes—

> ''नायहिषया चिप मानस-प्रत्ययाभिनिहं ता एव ; मदीचाभिनिहं त-तेनोऽवन्नमयत्वात्...सं तत्वसमूला हि लोकाः'' (का॰ भा॰, 8. 5. 4).

This is an observation the importance of which cannot be too prominently emphasised.

["All sensible objects (সামারিখন:) এই determinations of intelligible principles (of Divine Mind)—নানধ-মন্ত্রা:—which contain them. As we find in the Sruti that they are embodiments of Fire, Water, Food— কল:—খন — কল—the universal constituents—which are again determined by Divine Purposes (ম'কল্মঙ) i. e. the Universals of Thought." We thus find that behind the plurality of phenomenal objects, Divine Purposes (ম'কল্মঙ) are present on which the former are grounded"].

The same truth is more pointedly stated elsewhere—

''बम्बादीन (Phenomenal objects) परमार्थ-सदूपान् वदित, बोऽविज्ञानन् वदित। न तु ते रूपवयव्यतिरेक्षेण परमार्थत: सन्ति। तथा ताम्यपि रूपाणि सद्पेश्वया नैव सन्ति।' (का॰ भा०, 7, 17, 1).

["One who speaks without understanding, takes the phenomenal objects, fire &c. as real truths; while as a matter of fact, these objects have no real existence apart from the three universal constituents or forms, viz: Fire, Water, Food—বৈজ:—মন্—
মূল, Even these universal forms have no real existence apart from Sat (মন্) i. e. they are included in Divine Purpose or Thought."}.

Brahma is the Supreme form related to all other forms.

(iii) Again elsewhere-

''सामान्य-विशेषवानर्थो नामव्याकरववाको विविध्यतः ।......धनेके हि विलघ्यः।...सामान्य-विशेषाः.....तेषां पारम्यय्यं गत्या एकखिन् सहा-ध्वामान्ये धन्तर्भावः प्रज्ञानधने'' (ह० सा०, 2. 4. 9.)

["In the Sruti describing how the process of the evolution of the differences of nama-rupa took place, objects are described as consisting of universals and particulars. There is a plurality of distinguishable universals with the particulars contained in them. All the plurality of the Universals (with their particulars which they include), in their progressive order (पारव्यान्त्या) is included within the Supreme Universal Intelligence."*]

We find from this description of the Evolution that behind the plurality of phenomenal particular objects, there is a plurality of universals (universals on which they are grounded and of which they are the expressions. All objects have thus a double character—the universal and particular—and they are inseparable.

Elsewhere we find Sankara remarking—
''सामान्यमात्मस्वरूपप्रदानेन विशेषान् विभक्तिं,.....विशेषाः सामान्ये सप्ताः, न
तत एव निर्भाद्य यहीतुं श्कान्ते '' (इ० ४१०, 1, 6, 1).

* cf. ''विश्रेषा: सामान्ये कल्पिता:। तथा च द्रव्यलादीनां सामान्यविश्रेषाणां सामान्य-मानक्षायां सत्तायामन्तभावः। सत्ताया प्रापं स्कृरणविरक्षितायाः कापि सनुपक्तात् स्कृरणमानले युक्तः। स्कृरणच न्नन्नेवः (सामान्यस्य विचार्यमाणे न्रञ्चसद्पानितिकात् स्वीतनलक्ष्मेतीसन चप्रवृत्तिः)'—रामतीर्थं in वि॰ सा॰. [''All particulars (or individual things) are surmised in the universal. The various universals must be included under existence which contains all universality. As existence is never cognised without 'Sphurana', it is rightly regarded, as consisting only of such 'Sphurana'. (Universality is not different from 'Brahma and therefore the argument is a unconsciousness does not apply to universality.)'' Gough's Trans.] ["The Universals are the sustaining principles which contain the particulars...the particulars are interwoven into the universal and they cannot be severed from them."]

The Universals include the particulars in their own being ("विशेषाणां सामान्ये अन्तर्भावात्" 1. 6. 1.) and it is the universals (निविशेष) which give reality to the particulars (विशेष). There is no essential difference of kind between them; the one is the expression of the other. Yet they are arbitrarily separated. Kant separated Thing-in-itself (सामान्य) from the phenomena (विशेष). Rámánuja stated, we had no knowledge of the Nirvisesha (विविशेष).

These Samānyas or universal causes may be looked upon as Secondary causes, ("प्रवान्तर-प्रकृतिs"—रामतीर्थ in वे॰ सा॰) and Brahma is the Prime Cause including them. This we find from the following passage—

''एवं क्रमेण स्यां स्वातरं, धनन्तरमनन्तरतं, कारणमपीत्र, सर्वं कार्यज्ञातं —परमकारणं परमस्याय ब्रह्मायं ति। न हि खकारणयतिरेतेण, कारण-कारणे कार्याययो नायः'' (व० भा०, 2. 3. 14.)

["The pheromenal objects or the effects cannot at once directly merge in the Final Cause—Brahma. They must merge successively in their own preceding causes, in reverse order. In their ascending series in the reverse order, the earlier is more and more subtle than the latter into which each successively disappears. Observing this order, the objects will merge in their own subtler and subtler causes, in succession, until at last the most subtle, the most inward Final Cause—Brahma—is reached".]

The universals, according to Sankara, are ultimately Divine Purposes (संकल्पड)—"जायदिषया अपि , मानसप्रस्थयाभिनिईसा एव, सदीचाभिन्धिईसतेजोऽवसमयत्वात्

''तानि एतानि संकल्पात्मकानि.....संकलं क्रतवत्याविव दावा-पृथिन्यो, समकल्पेतां वायुष भाकाणय.....तथा भाषय तिज्ञसं न रूपेष नियलानि खत्त्यन्ते.....सर्वं जगत् संकल्पमृतं...सं न स्पार्थितिष्ठतानि....स्वते, एवसुत्पत्ती,...प्रवये च''।

["All these abide in the Divine Will: Heaven and Earth willed, the air and ākāsha willed.....the whole universe willed in its immovable form, abides in the Will during origination, during continuance &c. &c." (7.4.1.)]

As the external world is the expression of the Purposes of the Absolute Self, it conforms to, and serves the purpose (परार्थ) of the Finite Selves—its opposition is only apparent.—

(4) In Lecture II, it was pointed out that the characteristic of the world is Self-transcendence. As the world is grounded on a transcendental Supreme Purpose which is present behind it, it reveals higher and higher purposes i.e. the realisation of more and more, higher and higher, forms implied in it, from the very beginning. It has evolved the five elements, and the higher contains the properties

^{*} Quoted and translated at P. 61.

of the lower. Akāsha comes first and has the property of sound, but the last—the earth—contains the five properties of each preceding series (Vide. 1900) 100. The same reality is seen more fully in man than in beasts and insects. Four gradually higher and higher forms or types—stan, as, as, as, as and suga—have come out. When the evolution reached the species man whom it has supplied with organs of knowledge and action (Vide 20 11), tis seems as if its further business is to perfect the man. For this reason, man is not satisfied with the mundane objects merely; he is ever and ever striving to realise higher and higher goods—purposes—which the world is gradually revealing.—

''पूर्व-पूर्व-प्रवित्तिनिरीधेन उत्तरीत्तरापूर्व्ल-प्रवृत्तिजननस्य प्रत्यगाताभिसुर्व्वा न प्रवृत्तुगृत्पादनार्थवात्'' (गी॰ भा॰, 18, 66).

''भगवत्-कर्मकारिको ये बुक्ततमाः....ते उत्तरोत्तरहीनपाल-त्यागावसान-साधनाः'' (18.66).

["By restraining the first natural activities one by one and thereby gradually inducing fresh and higher activities it (Sruti) serves to create an aspiration to reach the innermost Self".]

["Who are most devout, rendering services to the Lord, they will resort to the last path, gradually abandoning the successive lower and lower paths in their descending order."]

But as no stage of mundane development is intrinsically perfect and not vitiated by evil, the human desire or purpose is not being fulfilled or completed in any of these stages under earthly conditions. The goal must, therefore, be supramun-

^{* &}quot;विषयस्थै व स्वात्मयाइकाले न संस्थानानारं करणं नाम' &c. &c. Vide: Lect.— "Why is Màyá called so?"

dane transcending the earthly order. For, a principle of goodness (साध्य) is the presupposition and condition of the manifestation of a good developing in the world.—

''माधु-श्रन्द-वाचीऽर्धः ब्रद्ध वा सर्व्यवापि खोकादिकार्धे चनुगतं ; यथा घटादि-दृष्टि सं दादिहचानुगतैव सा.....'साध्यर्थस्य' खोकादिकार्धे व कार्यस्य चनुगतलात्, स्वहादिवत् घटादिविद्यारेषु'' (का॰ भा॰, 2. 2. 1).

["The word "good" signifying the cause, extends to the effects in the shape of the world; just as clay does to its modifications—jar and the rest. Just as wherever we have a notion of the jar, it is always accompanied by the notion of clay, so, in the same manner, the notion of the world is always accompanied by a notion of the "Good"?

Man must participate in that Good Purpose ("सार्व्य of Sankara)" * which is fulfilling itself in the Universe. As God is acting behind the process of the world, the world is moving perpetually to realise the Divine Purpose. The Gitā calls the working, in the world, of this Divine Purpose as—"मत्-कसे" ("ज्ञ क्यें च मे दिख्") †. The Gitā wants us to participate in this Divine Action or Purpose, so that in our lives we may not be led captive by sensuous desires and forget the Transcendental Purpose or Goal—"मत्कसे-परमो भव"—"Participate in my Divine action" (गी॰ मा॰ 12. 10). We must embrace the Divine Good as our own good and see that it is fulfilled. The Gitā looks

^{*} cf. "सर्वेक्ट्यायानामतिययेन कल्यायं" (त॰ भा॰, 5. 15. 1)—"The Highest Good of all other Goods". Also, सर्व्यपदार्थे व वरेषु प्रतिशयेन वरं" (सु॰ भा॰, 2. 2. 1)—"Among all other Goods of the world, it is the Supreme Good".

[†] Vide : Gita, 4.9.

upon the Divine Purpose or action as—"utili wind"—the establishment of Righteousness in the world. But, there is the other side of the shield. The good cannot be attained unless you overcome evil, oppression and suffering—"farinia = दुष्कृतां।" This is the "establishment of the Righteousness." This is the Message of Vedānta.—

''परिचाषाय साधूनां, विनाशाय च दुष्कृतां। धर्मासंख्यापनार्थाय समावासि युगे युगे''॥ (गौ, 4.8.)

["For the protection of the virtuous and the good, for the destruction or overcoming of evil, for the firm establishment of Righteousness or Good, I am born in every age"].

We are all parts of the system of nature, members of the universe. The parts belong to the whole and the whole is in the parts undivided. We do not exist apart from the world and we cannot, therefore, have any good which is separate and isolate from the good revealed in the world, which is not the good of the whole. We are not independent of, separate from, the world or the whole. For the whole is present in each part ("समोऽइं सर्व्वभूतिष्") and we must see the fulfilment of every part in the whole. The false view of Anyatwa (মুনুর)—Separateness—must be supplanted by the idea of Ananyatwa-non-separateness. Each of us, we must remember, is the same (पन्य) and yet is not the same (पन्य) with God or the whole. Our non-separateness is the true idea—the solidarity —the 'लोक-संग्रह' of the Gitā. We must all identify ourselves with the good purpose operating within the world as well as in us.

From what has been stated above, it is clear that

between matter and mind, between particulars and universals, between parts and the whole. They are not two different entities, as in the System of Aristotle and in Kartesians. Nor can our self be an addition, from outside, to matter. The Self is rather the goal which nature had to reach by continuous transformations,—which Bosanque calls "the soul-making business of the world". It has brought about what it had in itself—

"सत्त्वाचावरत्य" (त्र॰ स्॰ 2. 1. 6).

"बारवातानेव कारवे सत्तमवरकालीनस्य कार्यस्य व यते" (शहर-भाष)।

["What is to be produced subsequently must be present implicitly in the cause".]

The phrase 'Mataralaw' is to be particularly noted here. The sense of the Aphorism is that the higher is contained implicitly in the lower. Nature must have contained life and consciousness in it, otherwise they could not have emerged afterwards from it. There is always a continuous transformation of nature or Prāna and for this reason; it is known in Sankara-Vedānta as—utumu-and the consummation of the human form was the End which nature had in view. It is an important tenet in Vedānta that—

''यब यदाखाना यम न वर्तते, न तत् तत उत्पदाते, यथा विकताश्यक्ती लं'' (म॰ स॰ भा॰, 2. 1. 16),

["What does not exist in 'implicit' form in the cause, can not become 'explicit' in the effect, and what subsequently becomes explicit must have been present in the earlier stages in implicit form (कार्यासना)".]

Thus there is no dualism between matter and mind; both are aspects of a single reality which has taken innumerable forms in the world. This truth has been beautifully brought about in the story of Swetaketu in the Chhandogya Upanishad. What is called as matter in its triplicate forms—(तेजीऽवस) can give rise to the most exquisite manifestations of psychical functions—speech, Prana and mind—ara, प्राच and सनः। The essence of Food (पन) &c. taken by us produces thoughts, memory &c. There is no causal relation between the two. There is the one everlasting Principle hidden in everything ("augu-विकारे: इसं") having names and forms which manifests itself in manifold forms, as breath, speech thought &c. from the lowest progressively to the highest, as salt is hidden in water. All these are but the functions of a unity which is the fundamental basic principle of all functions-

"प्रमिश्वर एव तेन तेन चालाना चवित्रहमानी चिभाष्ट्रायन् तं तं विकारं स्वति" (त्र॰ भा॰, 2. 3. 12.)

["It is the same Iswara—the Fundamental unity—who assuming innumerable changing forms on Himself has manifested Himself".]

This beautiful truth the Chhandogya has placed before us.

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The Vedantic Prana:

ITS CHARACTER.

Part I.

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(1) What is Prána in Vedānta? Let us see how Sankara himself speaks of this Prána. "The term Prana is the world-seed (बोजाबाना खिलं) and Brahma is defined as Sad-Brahma (सहस्र) in relation to and in identification with (तदाबाना) the Prāna. It is this Prāna which before its manifestation existed as a seed; it became manifested—as this non-intelligent world" (मा॰ का॰ भा॰ 1.2). Prior to its manifestation, this world of Nāma-rūpa is called as Avyakta. Sankara informs us that the Prāna-vija exists in Pralaya—dissolution of this world, and also in Susupta—deep slumber of finite Self, in undeveloped or Avyākrita condition i. e. not yet differentiated in space and time order—

''ष्याक्षतस्य देशकालविशेषाभावात्...ष्याक्षत एव प्राप: सुषुप्ते (प्रख्ये प)
...सर्व्यभावानासुत्पत्ते: प्राक् प्राय-वीजात्मनैव सत्त्वम्' ।

''समस' जगत् कार्यकारचलच्यं, सह विश्वानाताना, परिवासचरे समुप्तिकाले संप्रतिष्ठते, सामर्थात् प्रलयेऽपि...तत एव च उत्पदाते इति च सिक्''' (प्र० भा॰, 6.1).

''प्रागवस्थाधां परित्यक्त-व्याक्तत-नामक्ष्णं वीजशक्त्यवस्थम् अव्यक्तशब्दधोग्यं दर्शयित'' (त्र० भा॰, 1. 4. 2).

["In the dreamless sleep (and in the Pralaya) the Prāna was non-differentiated. Before their birth (i. e. appearance in developed forms of Nama-rúpa) all objects had their being in the form of potential (মআরুর) Prāna. It then became gradually developed or manifested in space and time".

["All the universe in the nature of effects and causes, together with the knowing Self, enters into the Supreme, undecaying Self during sleep...and by necessary implication even in Pralaya...and that is produced from thence".

["(The world) in its prior condition was fit to be called as Avyakta (not manifested), as it was reduced to the state of 'rower of Seed' devoid of differentiated nāma-rúpa''.]

This Prāna in Avyakta stage is synonymous with Māyā. The Brahma-Sutra-bhāsya says—

''वीजशक्तिरव्यक्तशब्दनिहें ग्या...भायामधी महामुप्तिः'' (1. 4. 3.)

["This seed indicated by the term 'Avyakta'.... is like deep slumber consisting of $M\bar{u}\eta\bar{a}$ ".]

The Māndukya-bhāsya states-

''बब्याक्तत एव प्राणः सुवृत्ते, प्रचयं च...प्रावश्चरत्वमध्याक्ततस्य'

(লা০ লা০ মা০ 1. 2.)

["In the deep slumber and in Pralaya the Prana becomes Avyakta.....the Prana is known by the term Avyakrita"].

Behind this Prāna or Māyā, there is Brahma as its substratum. This Avyākrita (non-manifested) Prāna is not a self-existing entity, but it cannot be explained without referring to the Being of Brahma whose energy it is.—

''सया चपक्रष्टु' परित्यक्तं श्र्यं तत् स्थात्...सन्दं भूतानां वीजं तदहसन्तुं न'' (गी॰ भा॰ 10, 39.)

f "Anything into which 'I' have not entered, from which 'I'

am removed, would be without Self (could not exist) and would be void". ?

Again-

''तमावीजस्य स्वातन्त्रीय प्रकृतिश्वद्धाः स्वात्, तथा सति सांस्वसिद्धान्तापात इति 'बाययं' (Substratum) दर्भयति'' (रामतीर्थं in एप॰ सा॰, 17. 27).

["Some one might think that this 'Seed of Tamas' i, e. Prāna-vija acts independently and in that case our theory might resemble the Sānkhya Prakriti; to disarm such suspicion the author (Sankara) shows its Substratum (মানুষ, মধিষাৰ)"].

This seed of Māyā or Prāna existing in Brahma in undifferentiated- state, identically blended in it, distributed itself gradually into three forms,—the gross (खूज), subtle (सूझ) and the causal (कारण) conditions of the Prāna.—

''तदेवेकं विधा ची यं मायावीजं पुन: क्रमात्। मायाव्यात्माऽविकारोऽपि बङ्घेको जलार्कवत्' ॥ (उप० सा॰, 17. 27.)

["One seed (of Māyā) gradually divided itself into three forms. The intelligent ātmā which is changeless, though one, appeared as many in connection with the three-fold Māyā, like the Sun appearing as many when reflected in the rippling surface of a lake".]

These three forms of the Prāna may be compared with the three states of the finite individual Self in its wakeful, dreaming and slumbering conditions respectively. The differentiations into gross states are the product of their subtler condition. The subtle differentiations are again the product of the causal state which is called as the undifferentiated causal form or seed-form of the Prāna (प्रशासन-प्राणावस्था). All these states were merged in Brahma in Avyakta form.

(a) But what is the relation between Prana and its Substratum Brahma?

The Avyakta Prāna is really the Swarupa (nature) of Brahma itself.—

''मम परमेश्वरस्य विचो: 'स्वभूता'...माया'' (गी॰ भा॰, 7. 14.)

["This Māyā is inherent in Me, Vishnu, the Lord".]

"नामक्पनीजभूतात्...स्विकारापेचया परात् 'श्वचरात्', परं सन्त्रीपाधि-विर्धातम्, 'श्वचरस्त्रे व' सक्पम्" (सु॰ भा॰, 2. 1. 2.)

["The Māyā or Prāna, the seed of all names and forms, is termed 'Akshara', and this being the source of all changes does not itself change. The Brahma which is devoid of all determinations and limitations is the real 'Akshara'. The former Akshara—the Māyā-Seed—is, in reality, the Swarupa i. e. the nature of the Akshara Brahma."]

There is thus a Swarūpa or Tādātmya relation between the Avyakta Prāna and Brahma in which it is submerged but not obliterated. What is $T\bar{a}d\bar{a}t$ -mya? Sankara defines this Tādātmya (तादाबा) in his commentary on the Brihadāranyaka thus—

तत्-लक्पव्यतिरिकेष भगइणं यस, तस 'तदावाल' हष्ट' खोके" (2. 4. 7).

["Something which cannot have any being or action apart from that of the other is in Tadatmya relation with it".]

Prāna then has no being or activity apart from that of Brahma which is its substratum. In all its successive forms, the Prāna works not apart from but in identity with Brahma.

"(नाम-इपे) 'बाला-तादान्ते उनैव'...सर्व्वावस्थासु व्याक्तियेते" (तै० भा०, 2, 6).

["All its differentiations and developments are, in all conditions, in intimate relation with Brahma, not apart from Brahma,"]

- '''यदात्मकं' नयि वर्त्तते स्थितिकाचे'' (३० भा॰, २. 1. 20),
- ''प्रखये च कलानाम् 'भावाभावागमनम्'' (प्र॰ भा॰, 6. 5).
- ''(अगत्) ब्रह्माच खीयते—'तदात्मतया' श्लिचित...तद्यातिरेकेच अग्रह्मात् ; तस्मात 'सर्व्यमिदं ब्रश्च'—(का॰ भा॰. 3. 14. 1.)''

["The world of Nāma-rùpa exists not apart from Me, but in identity with My Swarupa (सहस्)".]

["When it disappears, the ten-fold Kala (i. e. all the differences) are merged in My nature and thus existed in identical relation with Me".]

["In an order—reverse of that of birth, all this dissolves into Brahma—becomes identified with it.....thus at all periods of time this universe remains one with Brahma and is never cognised apart from it, consequently this universe is Brahma itself, in reality."]

We find then that the Prāna or Māyā, when existing unmanifested in Brahma has no being or activity * apart from Brahma. "The Prāna had no independent being of its own or activity apart from Brahma and for this reason, the Frāna though existing cannot violate or interfere with the unity—nonduality—of its substratum" †. When the differentiations gradually develop under space and time limitations, they do not arise separated from or independent of or apart from "Brahma, and when these differences go on operating ((), we cannot say that they have made Brahma something else (), Brahma remains, unaffected, the same substantial being under the appearance of differences.

^{*} cf. 'नाव्यत् किञ्चन मिषत्''--''न किञ्चिदपि व्याफरवत्'' (ए० भा०, 1, 1),

^{† &#}x27;'खत:-सत्तावत्त्वे खव्यापारे खातनामेव खात्,...चत: भानानीऽवितीवस्र न विरोध:---चानन्दनिर्दाः ऐतरेय-भाष्यः।

These differentiations again stand in Tādātmya (বাহালা) relation to their cause Prāna, as the latter is related to Brahma—its source, its substratum—in the same Tādātmya relation. They cannot make the causal substances something different (মন্ত্র); because, they are, in reality (ম্বাইব:) not something different but express the nature of Brahma.

(2) To the Sruti, this Prāna, as soon as manifested, is known as Sutra (सूत्र).—

''तदितत् हिरण्डमर्भेष्य स्वातानी जन्म ;—यदन्याकृतस्य ज्ञनती न्याकरणम्' (व॰ भा॰, 5.5.1).

["The differentiation of the undifferentiated world is the birth (or first manifestation) of *Hiranya-garbha* which is Sutra".]

It is called Sutra, because it weaves into itself all the differences of the world. It is this energy which related together all the beings, all the determinations (विशेषs) in the world. It passes through all, it sustains all, as a piece of thread passes through and contains in it, all the flowers of a garland.

''बन्धवा सन्तुसुष्टिवत् विशीय्ये त'' (ह० भा०, 3.6.1).

["Otherwise, if it did not sustain,—all the differences of the world of nāma-rǔpa would have been torn to fragments, scattered, like a handful of fried ground grain (सजु)"].

But we have seen it cannot act independently; it has Brahma as its Substratum, as its source, as its sustaining ground. With a view to impress this fact upon our mind, the Sruti calls Brahma as—"सबस्य सूत्रं, तस्त्रेव नियमारं" and "प्राचस प्राचः"——

["Brahma is the thread of all threads, it is the controller—the guide—of this thread". "It is the Prāna of the Prāna"].

"मधि सर्विमिदं प्रीतं श्वे मिष-गणा इव" (गी॰, 7. 7).

Nilakantha thus explains-

''सामान्यरूपे मिय सन्दें विशेषाः प्रोता दुन्दुश्यादिहणानैः ।...रसतन्त्रावरूपे मिय सन्दें भव्-विशेषाः प्रोताः—इत्यादि,.....स्ववत् सन्देत भनुस्ति निय सन्दें परस्यरत्यावनं तत् प्रोतं,...भतः प्रपञ्चातौतोऽन्त् ।''

["Strike a musical instrument, the strike will produce a general undifferentiated sound—पन्तपन ! Then strike it more and more, varieties of sound would now be produced upon it. But all these varieties—these various degrees—high and low—of different sounds would all be heard accompanied by the general united first produced. As a piece of thread enters and touches all the different flowers in a garland, so "I", the Self, have entered and kept constantly touching all the mutually exclusive (आवन) finite objects of the world. As the continued Identity (भागन) remains distinguished from, and unaffected by mutually exclusive objects;...so, I transcend the world".]

Each of the objects of the world is finite and it arises from its negative relation to others *; as Plato

^{*} Sankara's idea in this respect is identical with Plato's.—
'A finite is that which has a limit. If something is limited, it follows that beyond the limit, there is another something. Hence to be finite means to be limited by something else and so on'.—''मञ्चलाम' गोलगित चनवदेव भवति। स च चनो (Limit) भिन्नेष्ठ वस्तुष्ठ दृष्टः '' Thus arises a complex system of many inter-related finite things. But limit, according to Sankara, always involves negation (निवत्तेकल)—''यतो यस्य वृद्धे 'निवृत्तिः', स तस्य चनो भवति, यथा गोलवृद्धि-रचलात् 'विनिवत्तेत' (ते॰ भा॰ 2. 1). "The idea of the 'cow' negates or excludes the idea of the 'horse'. This is what keeps one thing separate from another thing. Each one negates or excludes the other ones from it." Thus one finite object negates another finite object. There are, therefore, series of finite objects—many.

says—"in their distinction from each other, things are limited and hence many". But as Brahma is present, as Sutra, in each, contains everything, the many are also one—Infinite. We thus find that the phenomenal objects are the expression of the active non-phenomenal essences (शासाबा) behind them, and these latter are all involved in the Ultimate Essence—Brahma.

''क्रयमवगयते पद्माने (i. e. प्रव्याक्षते प्राचे) तम:-प्राधान्यम् इति तवाह... जाखाधिकादर्भनात्, सत्ता-स्कू तिं प्रदलेन चैतन्यसापि ईपद्नुविधे सञ्ज्यति'' (रामतीर्थं in वे॰ सा॰).

["Why there is prevalence of Tamas in their cause ? the author implicates from seeing non-intelligence in the effects; there is also in all products some degree of intelligence (ভাবৰ)".]

Now, then, this Prána is the germ, the energy (আরি) of the Supreme, from which perishable things take their rise. This is the imperishable (খলং), undifferentiated, seed (ৰীজ) or germ, with Brahma behind it as its source—the real seed.—

''वीजं मां सर्व्य भूतानां विश्वि पार्ध सनातनम्'' (गी॰, 7. 10).

And

"चचरात् परत:, पर: (चचर: ''-(सु॰, 2. 1. 2).

It is that which causes the growth of all things that germinate and this endures as long as Samsāra endures. Nothing springs up without a seed, and since growth is constant, the continuity of the seed never fails.—

''नित्यच प्ररोष्ट्रवर्षनात् वीजसक्तति में व्ये ति'' (गी॰ भा॰, 9. 19).

["I am the manifested which manifests itself in relation to the cause; and I am the reverse, the non-existence i. e. the unmanifested, the cause"—"सत्—यस्य यत्-सम्बन्धितया विद्यमानं तत्, तिह्यपरीत'मसच' चहमेव''—गी॰ भा॰ 9. 19.]

This causal power (বীল)—is subject to God, subject to His control—

"तदात्रया तदैष्वर्यभूता"—

- —and existing in Brahma, this causal Seed—Prāna—developes into differentiations of Nāma-rūpa, the world.
- (b) Brahma is the source and regulator of the

We have seen there is $T\bar{a}d\bar{a}tmya$ relation between this Prāna and Brahma, and through this Prāna, Brahma is the cause of all.

The Gitā says—

"When Brahma is said to be not accessible to the thought or word of सत (existence), one may suppose • it to be असत (non-existence). To prevent this supposition, the Gitā declares its existence as manifested in the upadhis, through the senses of all living beings (13.12-13)". "There must be some selfconscious principle behind the insentient principles in activity, such as physical body; for, we invariably find self-consciousness lying behind all insentient objects in activity, such as a carriage in motion." Brahma the sentient principle is not actually engaged (व्यापाराविष्टतया) in the particular activities:—and in that supposition Brahma would be as if reduced to uted or assuming the character of that with which it is connected. We should understand Brahma manifests itself through the Upādhis or limitations of the senses, through the functions of all the senses; that is to say, the knowable Brahma (a) functions as it were, through the functions of all the senses ('As it were'—i. e. not actually engaged, only seems to be so engaged).

Sankara elsewhere observes—

"विक्रियादिविशेषरहितस्य भातानः मन-भादि-प्रवृत्तौ निमित्तलम्"

(केन वा भाव, 1. 2).

["Atmā is not subject to modification or change, and remaining unaffected in its own nature, it is the director of the intellect, senses etc".]

And again-

''सब्बंधितनप्रहत्तीनां चितनाधिष्ठानपूर्व्यक्तलात्, तस्मिन् चितने सर्व्याचितन-वर्ग-प्रविचित्ती नास्ति नास्तिलगद्धा'' (गी॰, 13. 13).

" न हि अचेतनं चे तनानिधिष्ठितं खतन्तं प्रवर्तते प्रवर्त्तयति वा"

(अ० भा०. 2. 2. 12).

["The existence of an intelligent principle cannot be doubted behind the non-intelligent objects in activity, as their source, inasmuch as, wherever there is activity of any non-intelligent objects in the world, that activity must have an intelligent principle as its controller or regulator."]

["A non-intelligent thing cannot act or cause others to act of its own accord and independently, without being presided over by an intelligent principle".]

Compare what Rāmatirtha says in Vedānta-Sāra—

"'प्राचा: खातिरिक्त-खानागैतचे तन्याधिष्ठानपूर्व्व कप्रवत्तयः अचे तनलात् रथादिवत् ।"

["The vital airs have, as the antecedent of their activities, superintendence of Intelligence other than themselves but residing in themselves, because they are unintelligent like a chariot."]

During the dissolution of the world, the Prāna merges with all the varieties of its actions, in Brahma. And this Prāna is, in Vedānta, not an independent

principle, and as it is non-intelligent and always acts in combination with senses and others, it cannot be held to be independent in its activity and must be held to be acting for some Sentient Principle, as is stated in the Brahma-Sutra, thus——

"संइतलाचेतनलादीन् प्रा**षस्य स्नातन्त्रानिराकरणहेतृन् दर्भयति"** (2. 4. 10).

Prāna may, therefore, be called to be the creative energy of Brahma, and Brahma for this very reason, called in Vedanta as—"प्राच्य प्राच्य:". It is not anything which can exist and work separated or divided from Brahma. It has not any independent Swarupa or nature of its own like the Pradhāna of the Sānkhyas, but is in constant and living relation with Brahma.

"यदि हि प्राणादयः प्रागुत्पत्तेः 'स्ते न श्राक्षना' (i. e. as an 'independent principle) सन्ति, तदा अष्ठ प्राणादिमत्त्व' भवेत्। न तु ते ... स्त्रे न श्राक्षना सन्ति ; श्रतः श्रप्राणवान् पुरुषः" (सु॰ भा॰, 2. 1. 2.)

In this quotation, 'श्लेन बाक्सना' can be explained in the light of what Sankara stated in क्र॰ स्॰, 2.3.7. He states there—all finite things are divided (विभन्न), like a water-pot, piece of cloth, pillar and the like. Each of these is characterised by particular modifications or vikāras and such characteristic modifications of each can be said to be the 'सद्ध्य' or the characteristic nature of that object and this swarupa separates one finite thing from another finite thing: "निर्धि 'पविक्रत' किश्चित् क्षतिखत् विभन्नस्पन्नस्वते! ……येन 'विभिष्य'

व्यतिरिच्यमानं (i. e. विभक्त') घन्छेभ्य:, तेन "खरूपवत्" सविशेष: प्रागुत्पक्तेनीस्ति" (ब्र॰ 2. 3. 7).

In the light of this hint, the words 'a न पालना' occurring in Ho HIO quoted above would mean that such particular modification, by which Prana characterised as Prána and is distinguished from other particular modifications characteristic of other objects, was not present in Brahma, prior to manifestation. Hence, in that stage the Self (पुरुष) can be called as अप्राणादिमान पुरुष : - Gintflarly in ब्र॰ स॰ 2. 3. 7. Sankara's conclusion is—"पाकाशादि-खभावेन न खभाववत ब्रह्म।" Hence, we can conclude that prior to manifestation. Prana existed in Brahma not in the form of modification but in identity with Brahma, as non-modified seed or power. We thus find that in Vedānta, Prāna is looked upon as a Universal, all-pervasive, quasi-material energy. It is a Self-constructive Divine Energy working from the Centre and gradually evolving differentiations. the cosmic (श्राधिदैविक), physical (श्राधिभौतिक) and psychical (पाध्यात्मिक) forces and activities are to be traced to this Energy which first appeared as Universal Pari-Spanda (Vibration)—

"प्राणस्य परिस्पन्दात्मकत्व'-वागादिव चन्यादिव च भनुगतं (४० भा०, 1.5.23)."

And

''निष्ठ प्राचादन्यव चलनात्मकलोपपत्तिः''।

["It is the vibration of Prāna which is contained in the Cosmic Fire &c. and in the Psychic Speech &c."]

And

["There can be no vibratory motion anywhere apart from Prāna".]

''एतावित इटं सर्व्व' व्याक्षताव्याकृतच यदुत नाम-इपं क्रम्ये ति,..चध्यास्माधि-दैवताधिभूत-भावेन व्यवस्थितमेतदेव'' (ह० भा०, 1, 6, 3).

["It is this Prana which, without forfeiting its own nature, divided itself into those three main forms of activities everywhere in the world, and it works as varieties of names, forms and acts".]

And-

''स प्रायमस्जत...तदुपाधिहारा त्रात्मिन सम्बे विक्रियालच्चः संव्यवहारः''। ''यहं प्रायः...सर्व्य परिस्यन्दक्षतः'।

["He created Prāna.....By this Prāna all practical concerns of life consisting of all changes are done by Atmā."]

["I am Prana.....the active source of all vibrations".]

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The Vedantic Prana:

ITS TWO-FOLD MANIFESTATION.

Part II.

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The Prāna-vija existing in Brahma in unmanifested avyakta form exhibits from the moment of its manifestation two phases, one concomitant of the other—

(3) Every manifested form of Prāna shows two inseparable sides—কবোম (Energy or motion) and কাঠোম (Matter). The Sruti declares—

"उभयात्मको हि प्रजापित: ; उपकार्य्योपकारकदर्शमात् भत्ता, भदाञ्च । नहि कार्य-करवप्रत्याख्यानेन संशरोऽवगस्यते ।...कार्य्यकरपानासात्मा-प्रापः ; प्राप्य-स्थितिकरं सत्-भन्नः, न स्वातन्त्रे गण भन्नसम्बन्धः * (३० आ०, 1.3.18).

["As there is always interaction and inter-relation between the two-motion (or energy) কৰেছ and matter কাৰ্যায়, the Prajāpati (the Universal Prāna) is two-fold in his nature—composed of these two concomitants and inseparable of factors.

^{* &#}x27;'अन्न' पूर्तिभावनापयाते ऋते प्राचात्। प्राय: अन्नेन विना न शक्तोति चात्मानं धारिवतुं (इ० भा०. 1. 5. 20).

[†] We find two other terms for Anna, as रिष and सोम; for Annada, two other terms, as परि and प्राप (Vide. प्र॰ ट॰, 1. 4—5). The manifestation of the Prana from the Supreme Self (प्रवात प्रकात) is considered as an प्रतिपन्न; for, it lies beyond the province of logical argument and rational demonstration; it is hard to know (Vide; प्र॰ ट॰, 3. 2-3).

The Prāna is the essence of both. $\sqrt{4}$ (Matter) is the basis or support of $\sqrt{4}$ (Energy or motion); and thus there is concomitance of the two. If you leave off these two factors there is no Samsara—

"चन्नि-जीमात्मकं जगत्—प्रजापति: (प्राण:)"— इ॰ भा॰, 1.4. 6.]
Again—

''नामक्पे सत्यं—कार्थात्मके शरीरावस्ये । क्रियात्मकस्य—प्राचसयोदपष्टक्यकः वाद्यास्यां शरीरात्मकास्यां क्वः अप्रकाशीकृतः'' (वृ० सा०, 6. 6. 3).

"वाद्यय कार्य्यवचयः उपजनापायधर्माकः * त्या-जुध-मत्तिकासमः" (2. 1. 1).

["The nama-rúpas are true;—these nāma-rǔpas are কাঠাৰ or material portion; it becomes gradually developed into the form of organism and it is liable to growth and decay. The Prāna-portion appears as motion (জিয়া) which nourishes or supports the former. It is by কাঠাৰ or matter that the কৰ্মাৰ — motion or energy lies concealed".]

["The কাৰ্ফায় is its exterior and কৰ্মায় interior."]

The change from a diffused, imperceptible state to a concentrated, perceptible state is dissipation of motion and concomitant integration of matter †. The loss of energy or motion is accompanied by a gain in the volume of matter. When the loss of insensible motion—we call heat, light, sound—proceeds, the particles of diffused matter becoming more and more concentrated will be followed by liquefaction—fluidity—तारस, (अप—जस), and eventually by solidification—hardness—(काडिक्य—पृथिवी).

As there is radiation of heat and light (तेज:) into space, there is dissipation of motion (বায়) therein. And it is followed by concentration of its

[•] cf. "धत्पत्तिप्रख्यात्मके हि नामक्पे" (ह॰ भा॰ 2. 1. 20).

[†] Herbert Spencer's First Principles.

concomitant matter in the form of liquefaction (গৰ);
—for the Veda instructs—

''बातस्य सर्गः अभवत् सरीमणि (अग्ने:)''—ऋग्वेद, 7. 1. 34. 11.

"चखनस्य वायुपूर्व्वकालात्" (सा० भा०, 4. 3. 1).

["When the Fire speeds on, the any is implicated therein".]

["All movement is preceded by any or vibration."]

Then-

''चग्नेरापः'' and---

''चपां यः शरः स समहत्यत, सा प्रधिवी समभवत्'' (ह० भा०,)

[i, e. "The radiation of heat and light is followed by lique-faction (पप् or तारख)"]

and-

["What constitutes the essential substance of water became integrated and the result was solidification—(ঘূৰিৰী, কাত্তিৰ)".]

We thus find the manifestation of sound (भ्रष्ट्) and heat and light (तेज:)—on the part of motion; and consequent appearance of liquefaction (जल) and eventual solidification (पृथिनो) on the part of its concomitant matter. About भानाभ or space, the Aitareya-Aranyaka says—

''षावपनमाकाशः, प्रायः छव्यतेऽस्मिन्''

[i.e. "It is 'the space into which the Prana-vibration is interwoven".]

The Upanishad also similarly describes the space by saying it as—

''वायुर' खम'' *

[i. e. "the space containing any (vibration) can be said to be qualified by it".]

It is in this way that from the करणांग and the कार्यांग respectively, of the Prāna-vija,—the five

^{* &#}x27;वायुद्दिव शब्दवस्त्रसम्भवात् विस् भावाशिन ?—इति भितप्रसङ्गात्, यतः स्रुतत्वात् वायुद्दिकारण्यते न भावाश्यत् भागनुकत्ते न &c. &c.''—रत० प०, 1, 1, 5.

elements have come out; i.e. from the करणांश (Energy or motion), the sound (नाइ, स्पर्ध), heat and light (तेज:) come out; from the कार्यांश (Matter), the liquefaction (अप्) and solidification (पृथिनी) come out. Space (आकाश) is the container of all these.

This also holds good in the case of animal organisms. It is the Prāna which builds up the body in the mother's womb and distributes the sense-organs and its other parts. In the Protoplasmic cell, the fertilised ovum does not petrify (\$\overline{a} \cdot \overline{a} \cdot \over

''प्रथमो हत्तिलाभः प्राणस्य चनुरादिस्यः…गर्भे पुष्यति प्राणः''

(इ॰ भा॰, 6. 1, 1),

''कार्थ-करणान।मासा प्राण:..... पङ्गानां रसः''

(इ॰ भा॰, 1. 3. 19 & 8).

["It is Prāna which first manifests itself in the ovum in the womb of mother and it gradually builds up the sense-organs and owing to its presence and activity the ovum does not petrify".]

"Prāna is the essence of both the কৰোম and কাঠায়ে ……it is the essence of the limbs of the child's body in the mother's womb."]

The phenomena of growth, circulation of sap and blood, nutrition, arrangement of cells, unfolding of the structure of the fœtus—are due to the agency of Prāna. Even the power to heal injured organs by the growth of flesh ("देष्टं पापः ग्रस्तादिशियां पुनर्मां- सन पाप्रयति" —ह॰ भा॰ 5. 13. 4.) is due to the activity of this Prana. It maintains (देक्टिय-रचा) and nourishes (देक्टिय-पृष्टि—ज॰ भा॰ 2. 4. 11.) the animal life

—"याबदिसान् देहे प्राणो वसति, ताबदायु:—त्र॰ भा॰ 1. 1. 29. As from this Prāna, both cognitive and active powers within the organism are produced—this energy is termed in the Sruti as cognitive and active—'ज्ञानित्रयायित्रमत् or वोधावोधात्मकं' (कर॰ भा॰). It is called the collective प्राण, because it possesses power of action; and इरिष्यगर्भ, because it possesses power of cognition;—or it may be described as—

''ष्यवा जानक्रियामक्रिमत्-समस्प्रिमणेन्द्रय-समुदायात्मक' समस्रिलिङ्ग्यरीरं'' (रामतीर्थ).

[i. e. "The collective subtle body consisting of the aggregate of all the vital airs and organs, possessing all cognitive and active powers in the form of Buddhi, Manas and Prāna."]

The Prāna within the body is the modification of the Sutra (सूत्र)—"मुख्यप्राणोऽपि वायोवीश्वस्य स्त्राक्षरूपस्य विकार" (रा॰ ती॰ in Ved. Sára). It is called Antahkarana when emphasis is laid on the cognitive powers, and the same is called Pràna when emphasis is laid on the active powers. In this way—Buddhi (वृद्धि) stands for cognitive power, Manas (सन:) for desire or feeling and Prāna for active power or willing;—and all these are but the वृद्धि or modifications of this same Prāna or Sūtra. *

Here it will be instructive to bear in mind what विज्ञानभिन्न has explained about this $Pr\acute{a}_{na}$ —''महत्तन्नं हि एकमैव प्रकृते:—
(i. e. षव्याकृतात्) उत्पद्मानं, ज्ञान-क्रियाशक्तियां वृद्धि-प्रावश्च्दायामभिन्नव्यते इति स्मृतिषु प्रवधारितं'। ''यो वै प्रावः स प्रज्ञा, या प्रज्ञा सा प्रावः इत्यादि यु तिषु च।

पत्रव महत्तन्नव्यक्षेः प्रथक् प्राव्यक्षिः यु तिक्षृतिषु प्राययो न यु यते......यद्यपि प्राव्यानःसर्वयोरप्येकव्यक्तित्वमैव, तथापि क्रियाशकोरवान्तरभेदाः पद्म, ज्ञानशकोरवान्तरभेदास्
चलारः'' (वि॰ भि॰ in व॰ तृ॰ भा॰, 2. 4, 11—12). It was the Prakriti
(or the Máyá or Avyakta Prúna) which appeared first as
महत्तन्न (or Sutra) and this is called as वृद्धि (भनः कर्षण्) or प्राय—
with reference to its cognitive and active powers exhibited

In the Samvarga-vidyā (संवर्गविद्या) it is stated that the activities of the external objects-the sun. the moon, the light, the heat &c. derive their respective functions from the Prana, and that when their respective activities cease, they merge and disappear undivided (प्रविभक्त रुपेण) in the Prana. The different functions of several internal sense-organs also merge during sleep in this Prana within us and when we awake it is this Prāna which sends forth these organic activities again to their It is not a resultant of the operations of all the forces in the organism, as the Sānkhyas hold, but a separate Energy which is at the root of all kinds of activities going on in the creation. It is this Prāna which has brought the finite selves and all finite existences into relation; it is the common medium in which they interact and out of which their organisms differentiate-

''परस्परोपकार्य्योपकारकभूतं जगत् सब्बं पृथिन्थादि । यच लोके परस्परोपकार्थ्यो-पक्षारकभूतं, तत् एककारचपूर्व्यकं 'एकसामान्यात्मकं' (Common medium), एकप्रखयच दृष्टम्' (ह॰ भा॰, 2.5.2).

"भूतानां श्ररीरारस्थकले न उपकारात् 'मधुलं'। तदन्तर्गतानां तेजीमयादीनां करवले न उपकारात् 'मधुलं' (2.5.'5)".

"[There is reciprocal sympathetic interaction among the elements of the world. And this reciprocal action of the elements presupposes unity of some kind; they belong to a whole—a common medium—in which the elements interact, from which source they come and in which they disappear."]

by it. Both the sta and sid—constitute one principle. Though one in substance, it is modified into 4 cognitive acts and 5 active or vital powers.

"The external elements help in building up the organism; and the organs—the result of Tejas &c.—act upon the elements;—"

i. e. "Between the inorganic and organic world, a constant interaction goes on, and elements from the external world are absorbed and are made to function as constituents in the life of living beings. This presupposes adaptation and sympathy".

But this whole or the principle of unity continuously present in and differentiating and determining all the elements of the world has its source or fixel ground in a transcendent Reality. We have pointed out previously that the characteristic of the world (or the common medium of Prāna) is self-transcendence. This is, as stated above, due to the transcendent element behind the world which is its ultimate ground. That the transcendent Supreme Self is the Director (\$\overline{\pi}\vec{\pi}\) of the activities of the Prāna has been beautifully described in Sankara's Sata-Sloki (\$\overline{\pi}\vec{\pi}\)

''व्यापारं देहसं स्थः...प्राणः सब्वे न्द्रियाणामधिपतिरनिशं,...यस चिद्रवनस्य सत्त्वा कुरुते,...प्राणस्य प्राण एषः'' (89)

["The Prana, residing in each body.....master of all the senses, incessantly carries on all the activities.....by a *Power* which belongs undoubtedly to the Self that is pure consciousness;—it is the life *behind* all life (शापस भाष:)"].

Again-

"वचक्केरे कुठारः प्रभवति यदपि, प्राचि-नोयसयापि । स्वातन्त्रा' नश्वरिक्षन् न हि स्वस् घटते, 'प्रेरको'ऽसान्तरात्वा' ॥ (84)

["Although the are is able to fell a tree, it is nevertheless wielded by a living being;......Yet the axe cannot do it independently; it is impelled thereto by the inner Self."]

Sankara in his commentary on the following Stanza of:the Gitā—

''नयाध्यचेष र प्रक्रति: स्यते सचराचरं । इतुनानेन कौन्ते य जगदिपरिवर्ष्तते''॥ (गौ॰, 9. 10).

thus explains-

"दिश्रमावस्वरूपेण भवितियाताना 'भध्यचे प' जगत्...व्यक्तात्रत्रत्रक्तात्र्यक्तात्रक्तात्र्यक्तात्र्यक्तात्र्यक्तात्र्यक्तात्र्यक्तात्र्यक्तात्र्यक्तात्र्यक्तात्र्यक्तात्रक्तात्रक्षत्रक्षत्रक्तात्रक्षत्रक्तात्रक्तात्रक्तात्रक्षत्रक्तात्रक्षत्रक्तात्रक्तात्रक्तात्रक्तात्रक्तात्रक्षत्रक्तात्रक्षत्रक्तात्रक्षत्रक्तात्रक्तात्रक्तात्रक्तात्रक्तात्रक्तात्रक्तात्रक्तात्रक्षत्रक्तात्रक्तात्रक्तात्रक्तात्रक्तत्रक्तात्रक्तात्रक्तत्रक्तात्रक्तात्रक्तात्रक्तत्रक्तात्रक्तात्रक्तात्रक्तित्रक्तित्रक्तित्रक्तित्रक्तित्रक्तित्रक्तित्रक्तित्रक्तित्रक्तित्रक्तित्रक्तित्रक्तित्रक्तित्रक्तित्रक्तित्रक्तित्

["Because 'I' am the witness, I preside; this Universe comprising the manifested and the unmanifested moves on in all stages".]

Here Anandagiri—"कार्य्यवत् कारणस्यापि साम्बधीना प्रवृत्तिरिति 'श्रव्यक्तल'मार्ड"—

[i. e "The term 'Avyakta' has been employed to show that not only the modifications of nāma-rùpas at present perceived, but also the *Causal seed* of this world were impelled or *moved to action* because '1' presided".]

Then Sankara adds-

'सर्व्वासु भवस्थासु 'इशि-कर्यात्वापित्त'निमित्ता हि जगतः प्रवृत्तिः,— 'भइनिदं भोस्ये', 'एतदर्थमङ्गिदं करिष्यामि'...इत्याद्या भवगतिनिष्ठा 'भवगत्य-वसामा' एव''।—

That is to say-

["All activities of the world arise by way of forming an object of consciousness", i. e. all activities have their value only in the fact that they may be used by the Drisi (হিম)—the rational 'I' for his own purpose, that they may be utilised for his own end; that they may prove useful to him (কৰ্মনাথিন or ভ্ৰম্ম). Otherwise, all these movements and actions (মহান) will lose their value, and thus the realisation of Drisi (ইমি) is its final end—its খ্ৰমান, its प্ঠান'.]

Elsewhere he has brought this important fact in a slightly different way, thus—

^{*} cf. "प्रेरविता हि पत्ती भीग्य-भीक्यी:"--- म॰ मा॰, 1. 1. 1.

''चप्रसिद्धे हि चाक्रानि, खार्थाः सर्व्याः प्रवत्तयः व्यर्थाः प्रस्केररन्...दुःखं दःखार्थमेन सुखं सुखार्थे''—

["If no Atma is present behind these activities and movements, they would prove useless; for, in that case the activities would be for their own sake;—as pain exists for pain, pleasure exists for the sake of pleasure; but this is quite absurd"].

''निष्ट चन्दनकर्द्धकाते दुःखे चन्दनकर्यकार्थे मतः तिहस्रातुर्भेम चन्दनादिक्रतोऽर्थः, मर्ड हि ततोऽन्यः'' (खप० सा० गर्यात्र)।

["The pain produced by a thorn cannot be for the sake of the thorn itself; which is non-sense. It must be for me who feels the pain, and 'l' am distinct from the thorn as well as from the pain."]

These remarks are important. They show that the intelligent Self (चेतन) has his own purpose of being in himself and his purpose is realised in these activities, and it is he who utilises these actions for his own use in which lies the value of these actions.

From all these discussions the fact stands out very clear before us that urged on by the Infinite within, the Prana or the world is constantly moving towards the realisation of an End and this End is the transcendental Brahma itself. For this, the finite world ever keeps on transcending its finititude until it will reach its own End. The world is a sort of self-working system with Prana—the vital principle. for its maintenance. It is composed of several members among whom functions are distributed. so that each member with the co-operation with other members exercises its own function in the place alloted to each, and the unity of the whole system is maintained by the vital principle-Prana. We would quote the whole passage here''तिकान् कात्मतस्त्रे सित नित्यचैतन्यसभावे...मातिष्या वायुः (प्राचः) सर्व्यप्राचश्चतृतियात्मको, यदाययाचि कार्य-करचकातानि यिकान् कोतानि प्रोतानि च, यत् स्वसं ज्ञकं, सर्व्यस्य जगतो विधारयितः, स मातिरिया...प्राचिनां च डासक्यानि क्रम्यादित्यपर्व्यानां न्यसन-दहनाभि-वर्षचादित्वचचानि दधाति 'विभजति'। ''सर्व्या हि कार्य-करच-विक्रिया नित्यचैतन्यप्रात्मसद्ये सर्व्यास्यस्भूते सस्ये व भवति'।—ईशा० भा०, 4.

["It is because the Atmā whose nature is eternal intelligence is constantly present (behind), it has become possible for the Mātariswā *—the Prána which is the essence of all activities of those who possess life and in which, as the substratum, all the material and psychical elements are woven as warf and woof, and which under the designation 'Sutra' † sustains the whole world,—to allot and to distribute various functions of burning, lighting and raining to the respective objects viz, the fire, the sun and the clouds and to allot various functions to the living beings also". "All the physical and psychical activities (of the world) are maintained, because there exists behind them the Atmà whose nature is eternal intelligence and which is the ultimate ground of all".]

It is for this reason that the Prāna is called as an instrument of the Self for the accomplishment of all purposes or ends in—

''प्राची राजमन्तिवत् मर्व्वार्धतरयासूतः, न स्वतन्तः'' (ब्र० स्० भा०, 2. 4. 10).

["The Prana is not an independent principle, it is an instrument which the Self employs for the realisation of all its Purposes or Ends (पर्थ) as a minister is employed by a king."]

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^{*} मातरि चनरीचे असिति-इति।

[†] It is "Sutra"—because like a piece of thread it passes through all the elements of the universe and binds them all.

VII

The Vedantic Prana:

Part III.

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The Prāna is identified with the Ajnāna (प्रजान) or Avidyā, and hence Ajnāna in Vedānta is not a mere Subjective notion.—

(4) We have found that the term Māyā is used in Vedānta with regard to the world, both in its undeveloped and developed conditions. But there is another term Avidyā or Ajnāna (false knowledge) which is often employed in this connection. But this has, unfortunately, led to a serious misconception. There are people who regard the world to be due to our Ajnāna—a subjective idea of the individual Soul.

A distinction is to be made between the Individual sense of Avidyá and the cosmic sense of Avidyā. The individual Avidyā or Ajnāna is what Sankara has called as fundamental Adhyāsa (प्रशास), under whose influence we superimpose the world of nāmarūpa on Brahma, and Brahma becoming thus concealed from our view, we look upon the world of nāmarūpa as a Self-sufficient, separate (प्रशास स्वतन्त्र) and independent entity. As Sankara has observed—"नाम-इपोपाधिदृष्टिये भवति साभाविकी" (Vide: व्र॰ भा॰,

3.5.1). But Avidyā has got another sense in Vedānta. It is used in the sense of आवरण i. e. self-concealment or self-limitation of Brahma. The Supreme Self has partially concealed Himself by creating or manifesting the world of nāma-rūpa, as the Upanishad declares—"देव: एक: समाद्यणोत् तन्तुभि: प्रधानजे:)",—and Sankara explains—"नाम-इप-कर्मभि: पाद्यानमा-द्वतवान्" (Vide. खे॰, 6. 10); i. e. "by names and forms and actions the Self covered Himself.". It is the 'cosmic Avidyā' and it is equivalent to Māyā (माया) or the Frāna (प्राप) described in Lecture V.

Now, take the following passages-

(1) ''ईयरस भावाभूते इव 'भविद्या-कल्पिते' नामक्ष्मे संसार-प्रवश्यवीज-भूते...सामायिता: प्रक्रतिरिति...भिनलप्ये ते, ताभ्या भन्यः' * सर्व्येत्र ईयरः।'' (ह० सा० 2. 1. 14).

["The names and forms are constructed or produced (কৰিবন, কন) by Avidyā. They are, as it were, the self or nature of Iswara…are called Màyà-sakti or Prakriti…Iswara is "distinct from these names and forms."]

(2) ''...'पविद्यात्मिका'हि सा वीजशक्तिरव्यक्तशब्दिनिर्देश्या प्रसियरा-श्रया सावासयी'' (त्र० स्० सा०, 2. 2. 8.).

["The seed-potency (vija-sakti) of the world whose self or essence is Avidya, is indicated by the term Avyakta (unevolved) and its substratum is the Supreme Iswara."]

In the two passages quoted above, Avidyā cannot be taken as the 'Individual Avidyā'; for, the Avidyā inherent in an individual Soul cannot be held to produce nāma-rūpa, cannot be the cause of the whole material world including our body, senseorgans etc. Here, avidyā must denote the 'cosmic'

^{*} Also cf. ''नामरूपाध्यामात्मनोऽन्यलाध्यपगमान्त्''...''इत्पत्तिप्रलयात्मके हि नाम-इपे, तहिलच्च अञ्चा' (३० भा०, 2. 1 20).

avidyā or Māyā which is the cause of the material world.

The term avidyā has, thus, two different uses in the Sankara-bhāsya. The 'individual avidyā' is what Sankara has called as 'fundamental Adhyāsa' under whose influence we superimpose the differences of the world of nāma-rūpa on Brahma. But avidyā has also been used in the sense of what may be called 'cosmic' avidyā or Māyā or Prakriti, as we have stated above. The former is false and may be destroyed by Vidyā (true knowledge); but the latter is not so. The Vidyā or true knowledge annihilates the avidyā or the ignorance of an individual and sublates for him the world imposed on, or identified with, Brahma—

"श्रविद्याध्यस्तः ब्रह्मणि एकस्मिव्यं प्रपश्चः विद्यया प्रविनाप्यतं" (ब्र॰ भा॰, 3. 2. 21.)

But this Vidyā is quite powerless with regard to the 'cosmic avidyā' which is the causal seed of the world of nāma-rūpa, which latter continues to subsist after the Mukti of the Jiva or the individual Soul. *

This distinction in use between the 'individual avidyā' and the 'cosmic avidyā' or Māyā shows conclusively that the world born of the latter is not a mere Subjective appearance. The world does

^{*} In a letter addressed to the author, Dr. H. Jacobi of the university of Bonn, Germany has rightly pointed out this distinction of cosmic and individual Avidya, but he has drawn from it a conclusion entirely different from the conclusion reached here.

not vanish into nothingness the moment the individual Soul attains Mukti. All that is involved in the attainment of Mukti is the displacement of the false outlook (Natural) by the true one, and not the annihilation of the world. The final realisation of Bāmadeva who declared his inner conviction by saying—"us untual way" &c. &c. does not show that Manu, Suryya &c. disappeared from the world. But since the world is not due to our individual avidyā, its only locus is Brahma;—the false error of 'independent being' of the world—what may be called the 'fundamental Adhyāsa'—this alone disappears in the Mukti and not the world itself.

Here, in the quotation of the passage marked (1), the world of नामरूप is described as श्राकाभूत of Iswara: but Iswara is described different from. distinguished from, and independent of, the world of nāma-rūpas—"ताभ्यामन्यः पळेत्र देखरः।" This part of the commentary clearly shows that the world of names and forms cannot be our subjective construction. What does our mental construction really signify? It means that in the place of the Supreme Self our mind and our senses have constructed a world of nama-rupa, that there does not appear to us the Supreme Self at all, that it is completely concealed by the distorted view which has taken possession of us, that the Supreme Self is entirely reduced to the world of names and forms. Such is the influence of our 'individual avidyā' or false knowledge. Everywhere, before us and behind us, only the differences of nāma-rūpas

appear and Brahma becomes concealed from our The world of nāma-rūpa is thus viewed by us as something separate (खतन्त्र), self-existent, self-sufficient, independent entirely ("नामरूपोपाधि-दृष्टित्व भवति स्वाभाविका")। But it is not a real view. The world is not really the construction of There is the Supreme Brahma who our mind. underlies the differences of nāma-rūpa, without being affected by them. * The differences of namarūpa cannot really conceal Brahma. These are to be taken as the manifestation or expression of His nature and they cannot, therefore, be taken as something different (श्रन्य), as some self-existent, self-sufficient entity †. Brahma is distinct from them. since they cannot be taken as a complete expression of His nature. He stands beyond the world of nāma-rūpa; He transcends it, yet he is immanent in it. This is the significance of the sentence-'ताभ्यामन्य: सर्वेश देखर:"। If the world of nāma-rūpa were simply the mental construction of the finite Self, no distinction in that case could be made between Brahma and the world. The fact is, while it is neces-

^{*} Maya in Vedánta is to be looked upon as ábarana (Indi vidual sense) and Vikshepa (cosmic sense); i. e. both as concealment and projection. In Mukti of jiva, the former only disappears, while the latter remains.

^{&#}x27;'पावरण-विचेपमित्रहाविमिष्ट'मजानं'--क्टख्ख नगत्कारणलोपाधिः''--रा• तीर्थं in वि• सा• ।

^{ं &#}x27;'चत्पच्यादिश्वतीनामैकात्मप्रावगमपरलात्...न बासां निराकाङ्गार्थप्रतिपादनसामर्थ्य-मस्ति' (ब॰ भा॰ 4. 3. 1 क्षेट

cf. रामतीर्थ in the Vedanta-Sara—"बालायिताले न तत: पार्थनर्थ प्राचीनात् ... प्रवक्षणाऽसीनान्" ।

sary to distinguish the world from God, it is equally necessary to distinguish it from illusion or Subjective phantasm.

(a) Rāmatirtha's view on Ajnāna (ignorance)—

In commenting on the celebrated Vedānta-Sāra, Rama-tirtha, that most learned interpreter of Sankara has established the important position that Ajnāna (पदान) must not be understood in the sense of subjective notion—of an individual Soul. What he says, I shall quote here—

"निष्यात्रानजन्यसं खारः अज्ञानं, असत्प्रकाशनशक्तित्वे न असिहा—इति सतद्यं निरस्यति"।

["Two doctrines about the Ajnāna are to be rejected; viz. that Ajnāna or ignorance is an *impression derived from false cognition*, and that it is non-existent (i. e. something merely negative)".]

["The author", says Ramatirtha, "now rejects the alternative that ignorance (মহাৰ) is an erroneous cognition and a quality of the Soul"].

His argument is stated below—

''मच्च-रज-समीलचयास्त्रधी गुपा:, कारयमव्याक्रतात्मकम् 'पद्मानं' विद्येष विग्रुपात्मकं। तथाच, गुणस्य गुणवच्चानुपपत्ते ने मिथ्यात्रानम्—'पद्मान'मित्यर्थः।''

["By reason of the three constituent elements—Satwa, Rajas and Tamas—in the products, the cause—Ajnāna—also is composed of these three constituents. Since, therefore, a quality cannot possess qualities, the erroneous cognition which is a quality of the Soul cannot be ignorance (i. e. Ajnana); for, it possesses the three constituent elements (i. e. objective and not a quality of the Soul.)"]

Thus, refuting the opinion that Ajnana is a subjective quality of the mind, he now goes on to show that it is positive (भावक्षं) and not mere negation; thus—

''जानाभावीऽज्ञानमिति मतं निरस्यति''।

[i. e. "He refuses the view that ignorance is mere absence of knowledge"].

Then giving reasons in favour of the positive character of Ajnāna, he establishes the fact that it is a sort of relative entity and thus concludes—

'दिवस स्वयंप्रकाशस्य पात्मनः शक्तिमत्-परवन्नां स्वयुणेः सस्तादिभिः निगृदा-मालिङ्गितां...पपश्यन्...वद्यणो स्वप्रकाशत्वे न 'पत्तिः 'प्रकाशते' इति, तदिपरीत-स्ववहारस्य पाक्षनि 'पावरण'मन्तरेण प्रतुपपत्तिः'

That is to say-

["They beheld the power (यात्र) of Atma self-illuminant, subject to its possessor, embraced by three constituent—satwa—rajas—tamasunless the Soul were enveloped (याद्य), there could not exist the practical assurance—'It is not', 'It shines not'—contradictory to another assurance—'It is', 'It shines'—in the constant self-illumination of the Supreme Spirit" (Gough's translation)].

This 'आवरण' or पञ्चान is explained as तम: with a slight admixture of रज: and पञ्च.

(b) Sankara's own view on Ajnāna -

Now, I shall show that Sankara himself identified Ajnāna with the Prāna-Sakti in his Māndukya-bhāsya. And this, I think, would be a conclusive proof about the objectivity of Ajnāna. In describing the condition of Pralaya (and the dreamless susupta state of the finite Self), we find the following observation in Sankaya's Brahma-Sutra-bhāsya:—

''निष्याञ्चानप्रतिवद्या विभागयितारतुमास्यते—पपौताविप ; एतेन सुक्तानां पुनदत्पत्तिप्रसङ्गः प्रतुप्रक्तः, सन्यग्ञानेन निष्याञ्चानस्य पपौदितत्वात्'' (त॰ स्॰ सा॰, 2. 1. 9).

["So in Pralaya (at the dissolution of the world) the presence of a causal potency of differences—with which the Ajnana

or false notion is bound up—must be inferred. By this, the possibility for the re-appearance of those who have already been released is precluded, since their 'false notion' or Ajnana (which binds to samsāra and causes difference) has been destroyed by true knowledge'].

But let us see how Sankara expresses himself in describing a *similar condition* in his Māndukyabhāsya:—

"वीआत्मसत्वाभु प्रगमात् सतः। जीवप्रसव—(सर्व्यपदार्धं नातस्य उपस्थयं — मा० गि०)—वीजात्मसत्वमपरित्यज्ञीव प्रावशब्दतः सतः।... निवीजतयेव चित्, सित प्रसीनानां सुष्ठप्ति-प्रस्वययोः पुनवत्यामानुपपत्तिः सुन्नानाश्च पुनवत्पत्तिप्रसङ्गः, वीजाभावाविश्रेषात्" (मा० गीष्-का० भाष्य, 1.2 Karika).

["We are to understand the term Sat (ঘন্) as containing the causal seed. The term 'sat' denotes prana, without leaving out the sense of its causal potentiality which is productive of all objects......If we abandon the idea of this causal seed, then the possibility for the re-appearance of even those who have already been emancipated will arise, along with those not emancipated; since no productive causal seed exists."]

In comparing the two passages quoted above it would be seen, what Sankara described by the term Ajnāna-Sakti in the Brahma-Sutra-bhāsya, is the same as what he called by the term प्राप-वोज—Prāna-vija (the causal seed of Prána) in the Māndukya-bhāsya. The Ajnāna or ignorance being bound up with the causal seed of Prāna, it is clearly an objective matter and not merely a Subjective notion. This aim is the cosmic seed or the Prāna-energy of the Sat. Thus we find that according to Sankara the world cannot be a subjective notion of the mind of man. It is called Ajnāna, because it is the other i. e. opposite (faula) of with or the absolute Knowledge.

In this connection it would be instructive to mention what रामतीर्ध has said about this Ajnāna in his gloss on the वेदान्ससार—''समष्टाचान'मञ्चासतं', तदुपहितः देखरः; तदुभयात्रयम् भनुपहित'मचरप्रव्याख' विद्यान' प्रवासतात् विद्यात्यः तत्साची विद्यातः"। We give here Gough's translation of this passage—

["The avyākrita (the undifferentiated world) is the collective aggregate of Ajnāna; what accompanies this Avyākrita (or the collective Ajnāna) is (called) Iswara. And the substratum of both (i. e. of the Ajnāna and God), viz, Pure Intelligence designated by the term Akshara is the witness of that which is undifferentiated (Avyākrita)"].

Here, I should like to call your attention to the concluding remarks of Sankara—

''सवीजलासुग्रपगरीनैव सतः प्राचलव्यपदियः, सर्व्यसुतिषु च कारचलव्यपदियः। ...जीत निति च वीजवस्तापगर्यनेग च व्यपदियः'।

Sankara also adds further down there that—

"इतरान् सळ भावान् राषो बीजात्मा जनयति" (6 Karika).

''चे तींऽयवी ये तान् पुरुषः प्रयक् स्कति विषय-भावविक्षचणान्''।

["It is this causal seed of Prana which is the productive cause of all objects of the world"].

["But the finite Souls have come out from the Absolute Spirit directly".]

We see from all these that the Ajnana is not a Subjective idea, but an objective seed or matter

which is described by Rāmatirtha as "coloured by the potentiality of all effects" ("समस्तवाध्यसंस्कारीप-रिश्वतम्")।

(c) Ananda-giri's view—

Anandagiri first of all raises the following very clear objection—

''ननु भनायनिर्व्याच भज्ञानं' संसारस्य 'वीजभूतं' नासीयन, निष्याज्ञान-तन्संस्कारायामज्ञानगन्दवाचालात्" ?

["If some one urges the objection that since the word Ajnana means false mental conception and its impression, there does not exist Ajnana as the beginningless causal seed of the world"].

Anticipating this objection, Anandagiri gives his own conclusion on the subject thus—

''बत: 'खपादानले न' बजान-सिडि:--

["Thus our conclusion is that—the beginningless Ajnāna is established as the material cause of the world and it is not a subjective mental idea"—Gloss on Mandukya bhasya 1.6.]

That there is a matter which is transformed into the differences of the nāma-rūpa of the world is thus stated by Anandagiri in another place on another occasion—

''परिवामित्वात् तस्य 'परिवाम्युपादानं' वत्तस्य । तत्र वियदादेः परिवामित्व-मङ्गीतस्य चन्याक्रतं 'परिवास्युपादान'मिक्ति' ।—

["As the world is always modified, it must have a modifiable material cause. Taking into consideration the fact that the Ether and others are always transformed from one state to another, we hold that there exists a transformable material cause of the world in the state of Avyakta (prior to its differentiations or transformations."]

Another argument in favour of Ajnána being the matter of the world is—

^{&#}x27;'ज्ञानदाख्य'वीजा'सावे ज्ञानानर्थंकाप्रसङ्कः

[i. e. "If the existence of a 'causal' seed which can be burnt by (the fire of) perfect knowledge is not admitted, all instructions about the perfect knowledge (विद्या) would become useless".]

In bringing this discussion about the Prāna to a close it may not be out of place to mention here an important fact in this connection. In some places in the commentaries of Sankara, we come across two kinds of Nitya (निख)—the one is called परिणासि-विख and the other क्रम्थ-निख। The Parināmi-Nitya is defined as that which while changing incessantly in its states retains a kind of continuous identity of being, as in the following passage—

''विकियमाणमपि तत्-प्रत्ययानिक्तिनित्यं'' (ह॰ भा॰, 1. 4. 7).

["That is called final which can be recognised as identical with itself through the successive changes of its states".]

But the Kutastha-Nitya is what stands beyond change, eternally existing without changing its nature. This is the Supreme Self—

''इदछ कूटस्त्रनित्यं सर्व्वविक्रियारहितं निरवयवम्'' (ब्र॰ भा॰, 1. 1. 4).

["It is devoid of any change, without parts".]

In Sankara's commentary on the Chhāndogya Upanishad the remarks made by him about the Prāna leaves no doubt in our mind that he considered it as a Farināmi Nitya, and the Supreme Reality which constitutes the truth of the Prāna and stands beyond it as its ultimate Principle is the Kutastha Nitya.

Thus he describes the Prana here-

''मुर्ज्ञ' क्रिया-कारक-प्रलभेदजातं प्राय एव ; न प्राचाद वहिम् तमिस्र'

(EIO NIO, 7, 15).

["It is Prāna consisting of all varieties of differences bound up in the relation of cause and effect which may be described as বিভাগেষ্যায়, and outside of this Prāna nothing exists".]

The Prāna is not the ultimate reality, since all phenomenal changes take place within this Prāna, and to this Prāna "are fastened all differences, as the spokes are fastened to the nave (of a wheel)". But "there is a Spirit greater and higher than this Prāna", and "he who realises this Spirit is the true Ati-vādi (प्रवादो), not he who knows merely the nature of the Prāna".

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VIII

Why is Maya Called So?

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According to the Vedantic theory, no cause exhausts its nature in its effects or the changes which the former successively produces or undergoes. No effects can, either collectively or individually (university of the cause; or in other words, the cause cannot be resolved into its effects or the sumtotal of the effects does not constitute the nature of the cause. The cause evolves the changes, it lives in each of its effects, it supports them, but cannot be identified with any of them. The cause, because it is universal, cannot be confined to any particular effect, but passes beyond it to other effects—

''न कारणस कार्यात्मलं'' (त॰ भा॰—2. 1. 9.)

In its explanation, the author of the Samkshepa-Sāriraka points out that, as the universal cause is present in other particular effects also, any of the particular effects cannot restrict it to itself only—"कार्यस्य परिक्षितस्य, सार्योन्तरेष्वपि वर्त्तमानेन कारणध्येष्य सम्बन्धाभावात्।"

The effects are, in fact, its modes of activity which but imperfectly and incompletely reveal or represent the nature of the cause.—

"षय मन्यरी सुवेदिति 'दस्र'मेवापि नूनं लं वेत्य त्रश्चाणी दणं, यदस्य लं यदस्य देवेषु'। (केन॰ 2. I).

''न केवलमध्यात्मीपाधिपरिक्तित्रस्य पस्य ब्रह्मणी रूपं लमल्पं वेद, यदस्य पिंदैवतीपाधिपरिक्तित्रस्य रूपं देवेषु वेत्य त्वं तद्पि नृनं दस्तमेव वेत्य'' (भाषा) ।

["Whether in cosmic or psychic objects, the manifestations of Brahma are all limited. These objects, therefore, represent the nature of Brahma very inadequately. Brahma cannot be known in its full form in any of these particular manifestations".]

The cause, therefore, cannot be the sum-total of its effects, but something more.

When the changes appear in the cause; they are sustained by it, and they ultimately merge in it.

The causal Reality is thus the bond of unity of its effects and is distinguished (प्रन्य) from them—

- '' 'पविभक्त'' विभक्ते यु, विभक्तमिव च स्थितं'' (गी॰, 13. 16).
- र ''यदा भूवप्रथग्भाव'नेवस्थ'न नुपन्यति'' (13. 30).

["It is undivided in different bodies, still it appears to be different in different bodies",]

["All the various classes of beings abide or are centred in the One—in the Self".]

In fact, the effects or the changes are but its reactions produced in the causal Reality in consequence of its relation (संसर्ग) with the external environment.—

^{&#}x27;'भूतमावास'सर्गस्त प्रस्य भवति⁹'

^{&#}x27;'संसर्गाभावे च तत-क्रतस्य विशेषविज्ञानस्य प्रभावात्'

⁽ ब्र॰ स्॰ भा॰ 1. 4. 22).

[&]quot;'उपाधि-सम्पर्क-जनित-प्रमुध्यमान-(Aroused/)-विभेषात्मानः"

⁽ इ॰ भा॰, 2. 1. 20).

["It (Self) comes into relation with the external elements".]
["In the absence of its relation with the external objects, it cannot have its particular state stimulated by them in it".]

["Its particular states or activities are excited or stimulated in it in consequence of its connection with the things which set a limit to it".]

We find thus that no actions can be produced in an object in the absence of an operative cause (कारक); for, it is the operative cause which stimulates particular activities in an object.

Now, Sankara informs us that what is produced by an operative or stimulating cause (कारक) cannot be the *real nature* or the essence of a thing; these are its modifications or predicates (विशेषण); and these predicates are the effects of the thing, and these are change-able.—

"न दि कारकापेचं वस्तुनसत्त्वं। सतो विशेषः कारकापेचः, विशेषस्त्र विक्रियां": (तै॰ 2. 9.)

And-

"विषयादिसाधन-सन्बन्धवमात्...भनवस्थितः सन्यदाते" (तै॰ भा॰, 2. 8).

The relation between the cause or the nature of a thing and its effects is this:—The effects produced are all आद्भ or mutually exclusive of one another, but the cause remains identical with itself—अनुगत—behind each of these effects which it permeates or includes within itself.

''सर्वास्त्रे व भवस्थासु प्रत्यभिज्ञावलीन भन्तव्यविच्छे ददर्भनात्''

(# HI+, 2, 2, 22,)

["In and through its changing series of states, the real cause without break, runs on connected with each state, whose identity is easily recognised".]

It is the cause or the real nature of the thing which pervades its states or qualities which are its predicates; and these predicates which we call effects fall far short of, and are incomplete expressions of, the real Swarūpa of the thing. Take the following passage—

"क्षत्स्रो हि घसी खेन वस्तुरूपेण रुष्ट्रामाषः। घिस्तन् हि प्राणाद्युपाधिक्षताः 'विश्रेषाः' प्राणादिकस्रैज-नामाभिषेयाः ••• एतानि कर्मनामानि न क्षत्स्राक्षवस्तु-वद्योतकानि" (व्र॰ भा॰, 1. 4. 7.)—

"In its essential nature, the Self or the Cause is complete. But certain particular activities are produced in it in consequence of its relation with the conditions or limitations (suffe) of Prāna and others. But these particular activities by which we generally designate it cannot express the full nature of the Self". Those who restrict the infinite Atmā to any of its activities or predicates—which are its incomplete expressions—and think them to be the real and complete nature of the Self do not know what the Atmā really is. But we usually, in this way, take the world of nāma-rūpas as the complete manifestation of God's nature. But this is wrong. It is done by us under the influence of Māyā.

We shall now proceed to collect the passages where and how Sankara has found occasion for declaring the unreality (भायामयत) of the world of Nāma-rūpas—

(1) "हष्ट-मष्ट-खरूपलात्···खरूपेण शतुपाख्यलात्" (त्र॰ स्., मा॰ 2. 1. 14).

We have seen generally that the effects or the Nāma-rūpas cannot be independent entities; for, they cannot appear separated or divided from their cause. The names and forms are the modifications or transformations of the causal reality. modifications we call as effects. The modifications or changes are the characteristics (and or atq) of all Nāma-rūpas (Vide: ब्र॰ स्र॰ भा॰, 2. 3.7). But these modifications are perpetually changing. They have no independent and self-sufficient Swarupa—खरूपेष प्रमुपाख्यलात्। The names and forms are seen one moment and vanish in the next: they are, therefore, perishable, not constant (पनित्य)*. these characteristics declares changing Nāma-rūpas as—इष्ट-नष्ट-खद्प। Elsewhere he characterises them as — "कदलीस्तमावदसारं।" What persists in these Vikāras, what is constant behind these modifications is the being of the causal reality. which finds its expression in them; and these forms are not to be perceived apart from the being of the causal reality—"व्यतिरेकेण प्रभाव:"। But as the being of the causal reality lies hidden from our view. we take these modifications of Nama-rupas, these vikāras, as self-sufficient entities. We forget that the vikāras cannot be self-sufficient 'things'-"a f 'वस्तृष्टक्ते न' विकारो नाम कश्चिद्दस्ति" (ब्र॰ भा॰ 2.1.14). Looked in this way, separated from the underlying, hidden. causal reality,—the modifications of changing Nāmarūpas must be unreal, false.

प्रतिचवप्रध्य सान् ... कदेवीगर्भवद्वारान् '--- स्॰ सा॰, 1. 2. 12.

(2) "मायामात्रनेतत्...यत् परमात्मनः ... चवस्याचयात्मना ष्यवभासनम्, रज्वा दव सर्पादिभावेन"

(ब्र॰ सु॰ भा॰, 2. 1. 9).

Under the influence of Avidya, we reduce the underlying Reality into its three states— स्टि-स्थित-स्य-in which it appears. Or, we entirely reduce the underlying individual Self into successive states, namely-waking, dreaming and dreamless slumbering states—which it undergoes daily. We forget the independent existence of the underlying Self which, without being affected by them accompanies these states. By ignoring forgetting the Reality of the ever-present, underlying, hidden Brahma of which the process of the world of nāma-rūpas is a gradual manifestation or appearance, and by severing the connection of the world with the underlying Brahma, we always come to exclusively occupy ourselves with the continuous process (परिणामि-निख) merely, imagining a kind of causal relation among the changing antecedents and consequents (क्रिया-फलाक्षक:) among them ; or a relation of means and ends (साध्य-साधनलच्या:). But it is a law of phenomenal or scientific causality-here the cause is external to the effect. In this way, forgetting the real cause which lies deeper down, we fix our look upon these changing namarūpas alone and call some nāma-rūpas as the cause and some others following the former as its effect. But the modifications or Vikāras when thus severed from their connection with the underlying Self and looked upon as something having independent reality, cannot be real in themselves; we erroneously call that to be real which is unreal.

''पात्मखदपात् 'पन्यत्'...'वस्त्रॄन्तरं'...खप्र-माया-मरीचुदकवदसारम्'' (इ० भा०, 3. 5. 1),

"सती'त्यले' भरतलम्" (का॰ भा॰, 6. 3. 2).

["The nāma-rùpas, when separated from the Atmā and regarded as something self-sufficient and as an independent entity (ৰন্ধ), as something quite another (খৰ) from the Atmā,—become as unessential as a dream, as an illusion, as the appearance of water on the shining surface of a desert".]

["When looked upon as something quite other than the Sat (i. e. the underlying Reality), the Vikāras become false".]

Thus, under the influence of our Avidyā, we take the effects separated from, outside of, the causal reality underlying them and working among them,—as something other (पन्प). Sankara would call it a wrong view. This view arises either by separating Brahma altogether from the world of Nāma-rūpas as an unkowable and unknown something (as has been done by Herbert Spencer), or by entirely reducing the nature of the cause (Brahma) to the nāma-rūpas, taking the latter as all in all and ignoring the separate life of the underlying Brahma, altogether (as the Pantheists of the types of the Vrittikāra do);—this is reducing the cause to the effects, against which Sankara has raised his warning voice; thus—

"न कारपस कार्यात्मलं (भनगलं ऽपि कार्य-कारपयो:)"—त्र॰ स्॰ भा॰, 2. 1. 9.

(3) "ज्ञखरूपाविशेषेऽपि, इतरेतरव्यभिचारात् असत्यत्वं ··· सर्व्यव अव्यक्तिचारात् ज्ञखरूपस्य सत्यत्वं ।"

(मा• भा• 7).

["The changing states (of consciousness) are always variable, liable to perpetual transformations—one state continuously supplanting the other state—but what invariably runs through them all is constant. The variability is the mark of their unreality and persistence is the mark of reality."]

Consciousness is present in each state (of our consciousness), because consciousness is common to all its states. One state excludes the other, but none of the states can exclude consciousness which is present in each of these states. Thus the states being variable are unreal; but consciousness is constant and is therefore real.

Compare in this connection the remark—"ब्रन्यथा-भवत्यपि जात्रथे, न जातुरन्यथाभावोऽपि, वक्तभानसभावत्वात्" (ब्र॰ भा॰, 2. 3. 7).

We find the following observation elsewhere—

''सर्वेत हे बुडी सर्वे राज्येते समानाधिकरणे ;—सन् घटः, सन् पट इत्यादि । तथोर्घटादिशुद्धिवाभिचरति, न तु सहुद्धिः'' (गी० भा०, 2. 16).

["Every fact of experience involves two-fold consciousness (ज़िंच)—the consciousness of the real (ज़्—Universal) and the consciousness of the unreal (ज़्ज्—particulars). Now, that is said to be real of which our consciousness never fails; and that to be unreal of which our consciousness fails".]

Hence, what is fleeting must be unreal, and what is constant must be real.

In this connection, I would draw your attention to the following definition of unreality—

''यदिषया बुद्धियं भिचरति तत्—'चसत्' (गौ॰ भा॰ 2. 16).

Also-

''यदू पेश यदिश्वतं तदू पं व्यक्तिचरत्—'शवत'मितुग्चते'' (ते॰ भा॰ 2. 1).

''पतः विकारोऽकतम्"।

["That is 'unreal' of which our consciousness fails i. e. which is fleeting, not constant".]

["That is 'false' of which the character, determined as it is, fails i. e. which changes in its pre-determined character; therefore, change-ability is falsehood".]

We find, therefore, that change-ability is the mark of unreality.

(4) There is another way in which Sankara has declared the world as an unreality. Brahma is the sustaining ground—signa—of the world of Nāma-rūpa. If the world of nāma-rūpa is taken as a mask concealing the sustaining ground Brahma, if our view is fixed only upon the Nāma-rūpas, such a world Sankara would call to be unreal.—

''नाइ' प्रकाश: सर्व्य योगमाया-समावत: ।

मूढ़ीऽयं नाभिनानाति" ॥ (गी॰ भा॰, 7. 25).

["I am not manifest to all, veiled as I am, by Māyā.; the deluded people know not my real nature (Swarúpa)".]

"दृश्यं माम विकारो, दर्भनार्थत्वात् विकारस्य। न दृश्यम् पदृश्यं-्पविकारः। प्रविकारस्य ब्रह्मा"— (तै॰ भा॰, 2. 7).

Thus when our view is fixed exclusively upon the changing names and forms which conceal Brahma, and when in this way they are looked upon as something other (पाना) than Brahma, they become unreal, false. But if we can take these nāma-rūpas as uniform as expressing the characteristics of Brahma, then such a world of nāma-rūpas cannot be charac-

terised as unreal, because such a world would help us to realise the Absolute Reality—Brahma—'ब्रह्मदर्भनोपायत्वे नैव विनियुच्यते……… न स्वतन्त्रफलाय'। "स्वष्टृत्वादि……नामरूपनिवेष्ट्याभिधानादेव……'ब्रह्मालिक्न'-मभिष्टितं भवति" (व्र॰ स्व॰ भा॰, 1. 3. 41.)

How does the world of Nāma-rūpa conceal the Absolute Reality? Sankara explains it in his commentary on the *Brahma-Sutra* (1.3.1.); thus—

Brahma is the ground (आयतन) of the differences of Nāma-rūpa. When we reduce the ground entirely to the world of names and forms, the ground to our view loses its independent existence and takes the form of the world, and is present now in the form of Nāma-rūpas. In this way, Brahma becomes—"स-प्रपच"—i. e. something composite—"इश्च' विक्रियासकं सावयवञ्च स्थात" (काउ॰ भा॰). That is to say, Brahma would now appear as an aggregate or sum-total of the differences of nāma-rūpa merely. This is His विशिष्टा When this happens, only the names and forms are present before us and not anything else. This erroneous view Sankara explains thus in his commentary on the Brihadāranyaka-Upanishad—

''केनचिदस्पृष्टसभावमि सत्, नामद्दपक्षतकार्ध्यकर्रयोपाधियो विने केन नावधार्थते, नामद्दपोपाधिदृष्टिरेव भवति स्वाभाविकी, तदा सब्बेडियं 'वस्तनरास्तित-स्ववद्वारः' ;—प्रक्षि वायं भेदकतो निष्याव्यवद्वारः'' (3. 5. 1). "सप्रपञ्चलं मञ्जयः प्रसन्तेता' (त० स्० भा०, 3. 2. 21).

["When the Absolute Reality which is always unaffected by anything cannot be discriminated by us from the adjuncts of the finite material and psychical elements produced by the Nāma-rúpas, then it is that our view becomes naturally fixed exclusively upon these finite names and forms and all these

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differences of names and forms appear to us as so many independent entities. Thus arises our erroneous view of the differences of the things of our practical life'; "and in this manner the underlying Reality is taken as a composite whole."]

But if, instead of such a view, we can feel and recognise the presence of Brahma everywhere in the world, if the objects are not looked upon as something other than Brahma but as manifestations—expressions—of the nature of the highest reality, this, according to Sankara, is the real view of the world. The idea of Anyatwa (प्रचल) would be supplanted by the idea of the presence of Brahma in all things—as the expression of Brahma everywhere. This is the correct view of the world—

''यदा तु परमार्थेष्टण्या, परमतस्तात् 'प्रन्यत्ते न' निरूप्यमाणे नाम-रूपे ... 'वस्त्वन्तरे' तस्त्ततो न सः,...तदा परमार्थंदर्भनगोचरत्तं प्रतिपद्यते'' (Ibid, 3. 5. 1.)

Also-

''स्वादिमपञ्चस्य बद्धाप्रतिपच्चर्यतां दर्भयति'' (व्र॰ स्॰, सा॰ 1. 4. 14). •

''परिचामश्रुति:...वज्ञात्मभावप्रतिपादनार्था'' (ब्र॰ भा॰, 2. 1. 27.)

["All the Srutis describing the creation of the world of names and forms, all the Srutis describing the changes or modifications are to be taken only for the purpose of the knowledge, through them, of the nature of the Absolute Reality."]

(5) The differences of pāma-rūpas are called Māyā, since these are all described as भागमुक (accidental), in as much as they are produced by some stimulating cause (कारक), in the absence of which they do not appear—"भागमुकीन नामक्षेष" (अ॰ भा॰, 4. 4. 5).

As the differences of names, and forms are unaga (agantuka) or accidental, they appear for a time, work for some time and then disappear and are supplanted by others, in connection with their external causes. But the real nature of a thing is not of such a character;—it is constant, abiding in its own Swarupa or nature which is uniformly the same, as Sankara declares—

''भागन्तुकं हि वस्तु निराक्तियते, न सक्पं। न हि भाका भागन्तुकः कस्यचित्, स्वयं सिद्धलात्'—

(व स् भा । 2. 3. 7.)

["What is due to some external cause which stimulates it or brings it into being, can be easily repudiated; but not so with the real nature of a thing. The Self is eternally abiding in its own nature and as such, it cannot be got rid of".]

I can put aside the notion of reality of all other things, but I can never be relieved of the sense of my own reality. The differences of nāma-rūpa are the result of the activity of something beyond them; they change their forms with the change of their stimulating cause (कारक-व्यापार). This change-able character of their forms marks them, according to Sankara, as unreal.

In this connection, we must note an important fact. These particular differences which are produced by the action of some accidental (पागनुक) cause, must have a 'nature' underlying these particular differences. For, Sankara tells us in another connection, the production being a sort of activity, it implies the agent of this activity—

"खत्पत्तिय नाम क्रिया, सा सक्तृंकैव भवितुमर्छित। क्रिया च नाम स्थात्, चक्तृंका चैति—विप्रतिषिध्येत" (त्र० ६० सा०, 2. के. 18).

["An activity is there, but there is no one who acts,—is contradictory".]

We cannot, therefore, conceive of activity without thinking of something which is active; and activities are referred to definite centres to which they belong and do not fly to and fro. If you resolve the centre entirely into its activity, it would have no nature or character of its own, in virtue of which it maintains a continuity between its past and present. A reference to that which is other than itself (i. e. its arta) implies a reference to its own Self or its own nature (asq). Thus this two-fold relation, to Self and to other-than-Self i. e. asq and array is essential to all objects (Vide. as as a vie. 2. 2. 17.)

(6) The world of nāma-rūpa—বিষয—we represent to us in terms of our own mind and the senses (মম:ক্ৰেড্ডা). The one involves the other; for, both are of the same nature. Sankara tells us—

"विषय-समानजातीयं करणं मन्यते स्रुति:, न तु कात्यन्तरं । विषयस्य व स्वात्मयाद्दकले न संस्थानान्तरं करणं नाम ।...सर्व्यविषयविश्रेषाणामेव स्वात्मविश्रेष- • प्रकाशकले न संस्थानान्तराणि करणानि" (३० भा०. 2, 4, 11).

["The Sruti regards our subjective senses as of the same nature with our experienced objects, and not of different essence. The senses are but another form or phase (w' will) which the experienced objects have assumed with a view to come to a comprehension of their own nature as the objects of senses. For the manifestation of, or with a view to give expression to, what infinite wealth the objects contain in their own nature,—the objects have taken the forms of the subjective senses".]

The Mundaka also states the same thing in a different way—

''दर्भनयवयमनशैविज्ञानाद्युपाधिधयौ राविर्मू तं सत् कस्यते इदि गुडायां —चनःकरणे कोधे —सर्वप्राधिनां' (2.2.1 & 9.)——

["In the inner and exterior senses of the finite

Selves its nature is expressed through the cognitions of sight, hearing, reflections and intellect—"simesquivelle exercises of its expression."]

We thus find that there is no difference in kind between the physical and the organic world. same reality is present in two different aspects, which are distinguishable from each other, but essentially identical. It appears then that whenever our outer senses and our inner sense (সন্তঃক্রে) are more and more developed the aspect of the world (favu) will change its feature. The world, therefore, as it appears to us at the present moment cannot be taken as rigidly fixed and final in its form. The appearances of the world, as we take it, must therefore be unreal. Our knowledge works with the subject-object relation-"ग्रयमद्वमिति विषयेण विषयिणः सामानाधिकरखोपचारात्" (ह॰ _No. 1. 4. 7), or in other words, we are concerned always with Adhyāsa as Sankara would say. Our thought cannot go beyond this relation. It attributes 'what' to 'that'. But that is not the true nature of the In this way, in Sankara-Vedanta, such relative view of the Empirical world may be called unreal.

Now, all these arguments can be brought to a focus and the conclusion arrived at as the result of this discussion points to the fact that there is an Immutable and Eternal Principle behind the process of the world. The changes going on in the world are not mere capricious variations—"arfu unifn:, samuefn:—(a. a. 2. 1. 33), nor the dances of mad energies, but an advancement, a methodically gradual

progress—"entimentalitational": (ए॰ पा॰ भा॰) which the mundane process involves. This regularity (रवना—ब॰ भा॰) proves the presence and working, throughout the process, of such a principle and it is deeper than any such process; for, the process is always changing in its elements. It is that transcendent Principle behind it which is finding its expression in the process. It is wrong therefore to separate the latter from the underlying Principle taking the process of nāma-rūpa itself to be all-in-all. Such a view is an unreal view, according to Sankara. Sankara thus summarises his final opinion—

"As a player (司Z) taking on successive characters upon himself, enacts on the stage the parts of each of these characters in succession but yet retains his own distinct character; so the underlying Causal Unity (項碼可以第四), retaining its own distinct identity, realises itself successively in each of the changing effects produced" (司 · 司 · 和 · 2.1.18. and 1.3.19.)

Compare also-

"परभ्यर एवं तेन तेन। सना भवतिष्ठमानी तंते विकार स्वति"।

It is He who assumes all these forms, but He does not become changed by these assumed forms under which He appears. For, Sankara quotes here the lines—"यः पृथियो तिष्ठन् एथियोमन्तरो यस्यति &c. &c- इति 'साध्यवाणां' भूतानां प्रवृत्तिं दर्भयति" (त्र॰ भा॰ 2. 3. 13). It is His immanent activity directing and controlling (यस्यति) the process of the world and guiding it in its upward progressive path.

This is the true significance of the term Māyā as applied to Náma-rūpas in the Sankara-Vedānta, and of the term Māyāvi applied to the Supreme Reality, who in connection with the Nāma-rūpas appears in various forms.

Herbert Spencer's conclusion that 'we know only the manifestations, but what is manifested is unknown and unknowable to us'—is entirely opposed to Sankara's idea. In Māndukya-bhāsya Sankara tells us that it is the manifestations which enable us to realise the nature of what is manifested, to a certain extent. Were there no manifestations, the underlying Reality would remain quite shut out from our knowledge and would itself be unreal.—

"कार्येष हि लिङ्गेन कारण-ब्रह्मचानार्थे स्टिश्रुतीनां ...तचेदसङ्गवेत्, न तेन सम्बन्धधीरिति कारणमपि असदेव स्थात्।"—

It is the manifestations that throw light upon what is manifested; they do not serve any independent purpose or use—''खतन्त्रम् अप्रसं"।

The names and forms, to the ordinary people appear, no doubt, as concealing Brahma and therefore to be something quite other (प्रस्) existing on their own account, but the truly initiated know all the while that Brahma itself expresses itself in them.—

''ब्रह्मसद्याद्वगमाय च पाकाशायद्वमयानं कार्यं प्रदर्शितम्'' (तै॰ 2. 6.)

["The effects beginning from the ether and ending in the sheath composed of Anna are to lead to the apprehension of the nature of Brahma. Only for this end, the evolution of the effects is described".]

(7) I should like to point out another important fact in connection with what has just been stated. In section (6) above, we have shown that the object (fau) and the subjective senses (tau & van:ant) are essentially of the same nature. Matter and mind are not antethetical and independent substances having nothing in common. If they were absolutely opposed to each other, how could the subject be aware of the object? Consciousness which is a unity involves the knower and the known and must therefore transcend them and at the same time express itself in the two.

"प्रधाकाधिदैवतयोः परसरोपकार्य्योपकारकत्वात्… …एकस्य मत्यस्य ब्रह्मणः संस्थानविभीषे'

(हु॰ भा•, 5. 5. 2).

'मामेव उभय-रूपेण—त्रेत्र-त्रेत्रज्ञरूपेण—स्थितं विद्यि' (मी॰, 13. 2. नीसकारह). • •

It is thus that the subject is capable of knowing the object, and the object also is capable of coming into relation with the subject. As the same Spirit works in both the subject and the object, the object does not, in reality resist or oppose, but conforms itself to the subject and there is adaptability between the two. As the object or the system of things expresses the Self behind it, it has been possible for our mind to know it, and that nature can respond to the forms of our knowledge, and that nature serves the purpose (पराष्ट्र) of the Spirit. Thus we find that the elements from the inorganic world are absorbed by the organic beings

which become constituents in their life—"भूतानां यरीरारभक्त न उपकारात्" (मध्विद्या in हु॰ भा॰). If we take the object not as परार्थ i. e. not serving the purpose of the Spirit, and not mutually benefitting each other (परसरोपकार्योपकारकतात् 'मध्त'—ह॰ भा॰) but as opposed and independent entities, Sankara would declare it to be unreal and false.

Sankara-Vedanta is not Pantheism.

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From a perusal of Sankara's commentaries, it appears that a kind of Pantheism was current in his time and it went by the name of one Vrittikāra who held it. He reduced unity to multiplicity—Brahma or the Self to the changing nāma-rūpas. In this view, Brahma was looked upon as the whole and the differentiations of names and forms including the finite Spirits, as parts of that whole—as modes of its self-expression—as mere reproduction of the whole. Thus the Vrittikāra made Brahma as composed of parts—uनेकायक i But yet, most inconsistently, he looked upon both the unity and the multiplicity to be equally real. * He failed to develop the logical consequences of his own premises.

Sankara, in several parts of his commentaries on some of the most important Upanishads and on the *Brahma-Sutra* and on the *Gitā* has criticised this theory. He put the theory to severe test and exposing its inconsistency and inaccuracy, exploded it. It cannot, in the face of such criticism, be held that Sankara's own theory is no more than Pantheism, as

^{*} Vrittikara's view has been thus stated by Sankara in कि सा॰, 5. 1. 1.—"एवस हैताहितासक्रमिकं ब्रह्म । यथा किल समुद्री जल-तरक्र-फेन-बुहुदा-सक्त एव; यथा च जलं सन्यं, तदुइवास तरक्र-फेन-बुहुदादय: समुद्रात्मभूता एव.....पर-मार्बस्त एव' &c. &c. So also in other places.

stated by some of his critics. We would quote here the opinions of one or two of such critics:—

The writer of the "Indian Theis" thus observes—
"India has always been recognised as so determinedly Pantheistic in its religious thoughts that 'Indian Theism' will seem to many an unnatural collocation of words. There are some who will maintain that whatever can be so described is really foreign to the Indian spirit."

Yet another—

"The later doctrine of Sankara may be named Pantheism—strange as its pantheism is—for it says that Brahma is all, because all but Brahma is false."

Dr. Flint in his "Ante-Theistic Theories" says-

"In the Pantheism of the Vedānta doctrine the finite is lost in the Infinite. Along with the affirmation of an impersonal God, there is the negation of the reality of the worlds—both of sense and consciousness. In other words, the issue of this kind of Pantheism is a-cosmism. But Pantheism is just as likely to issue in atheism."

Dr. Galloway writes-

"Even the distinction of worshipper and worshipped dwindles and fades, till the Hindu thinker recognised that he was one with All, with Brahma. The very appearance of difference is explained away, it is the product of illusion. The Vedānta is a strict Pantheism".

To show the injustice made by these and other writers of their train, I should like to give here the tenour of Sankara's criticism of this Pantheism from which it will be seen that Sankara can never be held

to be a Pantheist and it was something very different from Pantheism which he preached and wrote.

I have said that the Vrittikāra reduced the unity (Brahma) into the differences of nāma-rūpa. Sankara in his criticism of this theory of the Vrittikāra argues that when the differences emerge, the underlying unity does not and cannot become entirely reduced to them. It retains its unity, its own character, its separate substantial life, behind these differences. As the plurality of the nāma-rūpa arises, the unity does not become something else, losing its own nature in them.

''यहक्षेको यः पदार्थः प्रमाणिनावगतो भवति, स देश-कालावस्थान्तरेष्विप तहक्षेक एव भवति, स चीत् तहक्षेकलं व्यभिचरति, सर्व्वः प्रमाण-व्यवहारी लुपेरत'' (व॰, भा॰, 2. 1. 20).

["When by all manner of proofs a thing is known to be of such and such essential nature, it cannot lose that essential nature, through the change or alteration of its place, time and states. If its essential nature changes, all proofs will lose their validity."]

And also-

''न हि विशेषदर्शनमात य वस्तु न्यत्व' भवति...स एवेति प्रत्यभिष्ठानात्'' (त्र० स्० भा०, 2. 1. 18.)

["The appearance of a thing in, a particular form does not make it something other than it.....it is recognisable as the same identical thing—in this changed form."]

The reason is, says Sankara, that the unity, when it is reduced in its entirety into the multiplicity cannot retain its distinct character, a separate life of its own; for, it is now present in the form of many, it is now present as—unana, something composite, something composed of parts, as unaux

It is forgotten that what is composite, what is सावयव cannot be eternal; for, being composed of parts, it must be perishable—Vikāri—"सावयवस्य प्रनेकालकस्य क्रियावतो नित्यत्वानुपपत्ते:" (व • भा •, 5. 1. 1). The unity of which the Vrittikara still speaks of is an abstract unity, a mere empty logical abstraction-a mere unity of aggregate. For the so-called unity has now no existence except in the form of multiplicity: because it has no nature by which it is recognisable apart from the many. It is a contentless abstract idea in general. Hence, argues Sankara, it cannot be held to be real. It is a mere unity of collection, aggregate of parts. And the parts, -the differences-(of which the whole is a mechanical aggregate of disconnected parts) with no organising principle behind to connect them would be an unreality. For, mere differences, haphazard changes, with purpose-no plan-no end-to govern them and to connect them are unreal, according to Sankara. He says-

''न हि 'निरात्मकं' विश्वित् व्यवद्वाराय चवक्क्वते''___

["What has no self or nature behind it cannot be put to any use in practical life".]

The finite selves also, being, according to Vrittikāra's view, mere phases or reproductions of an indeterminate whole have no real life, no character, of their own. Mere parts unrelated to, and separated from, any organising unity behind them are, in Sankara's opinion, unreal.

In this way, Sankara has shown that both the unity and multiplicity cannot be held to be equally real, as the Vrittikāra supposes in his own theory.

Sankara shows in the following extracts that "it is a self-contradiction to speak of Brahma as possessed of all specific attributes (Multiplicity) and at the same time as devoid of all specific attributes (Unity)"—

"निह एकस्य ब्रह्मणः परिणामधर्मवन्तं तद्रहितत्वञ्च शक्यं प्रतिपन्तुं ... निह सूटस्थस्य ब्रह्मणः ... भनेकधर्मा- त्रयत्वं सन्भवति (ब्र॰, 2. 1. 14).

"विशिष्टशक्तिमस्वप्रदर्भनं विशेषप्रतिषेधस इति विप्रतिषिद्ध" (गी॰ भा॰, 13.12).

"कथम् एकस्य श्रात्मनः श्रग्रनायाद्यतीतत्वं, तदस्त्वश्व —श्रति विक्षध्यसम्बायित्विमिति' (द्व॰ भा॰, ३. ५. 1.)

"न हि एकं वस्तु परमार्थतः कर्जादिविशेषवत्, तक्कृन्यच-इतुरभवधा द्रष्टुं शकाते" (ते॰ 1.12).

But in Sankara's Adwaita-Vāda no such absurdity as noticed above may arise. In his own theory, the One' is the Reality which has a 'nature' of its own, which is self-sufficient and independent (स्व: चिस्र), and which is permanent, eternal and which for ever retains its own uniform character, and it is not subject to any change, any transformation. It is Brahma who has taken upon Himself the various forms of नाम-रूप, who has assumed the form of this world with a view to reveal, to a certain extent, the infinite and inexhaustible' treasure which His nature contains. And the world of nāma-rūpas—although distinguishable from Him, being a partial expression of Himself,—cannet be taken as a separate and independent whole.—

"यदात्राक्षे नामरूपे...यय ताथां नामरूपाथां विलचनः, स्रतो नित्यग्रन-बुजुमुलस्थावः" (२०, भा०, 1. 4. 7).

"न हि सृष्ट' सृष्टु 'र्यान्तरं'; तस्त्रैव तेन तेन द्विष मायाविवत् भवस्थानात्रं (इ० भा॰---भा॰ गिरि, 1. 4. 5).

["Names and forms have their essence in Brahma and are therefore non-different from it......But Brahma is different from these names and forms."]

["The created (world) is not something different and not a separate entity from the Creator; for, it is the Creator Himself who stands in the forms of such and such objects, like a juggler (নাথাৰী) who shows himself under different assumed forms,—without being affected or altered by these objects or forms".]

With a view to impress upon us this fact, the Sruti declares—"रूपं रूपं प्रतिरूपो—'विश्व'—(विश्व—i.e. स्त्रेन पविक्रतेन रूपेण प्राकाणवत्')—कठ॰ भा॰. 5. 10.

"He has Himself assumed the forms of the innumerable Nāma-rupas, but yet He stands beyond them; that is to say—this world is to be regarded as only a very partial and inadequate expression of the infinite and unfathomable depth of His resources, and thus the world is distinguishable from Him, though it is not a separate or a different (प्रा) entity"—

"ध्येव इ ब्रह्मणो जगदुत्पत्ति: यूय्ते, एवं विकारव्यतिरेक्केणापि ब्रह्मणोऽ-वखानं * यूयते" (वर त्र क् भार, 2. 1. 27).

["As the world has come out of Brahma, so also Brahma stands beyond the world distinguished from it".]

^{*} cf. ''यस पातानी ध्यमावात् कार्थ-करणकलापद्धं सर्विनिदं इतवलं विध्यसं भवित विनष्टं भवित, 'सोऽन्यः' सिद्ध पाता।' (कड॰ सा॰, 5.4). Brahma is thus the sustaining ground of the modifications of नाम-इपड, which, if removed from behind them,—will leave all these immediately annihilated.

Sankara asks—"why has Brahma taken upon Himself the various forms of names and forms"?—

"किमधे पुनः प्रतिक्पागमनं तस्य इतुरचते" ?

He thus answers—

1

'बिदि हि नाम-इने न व्याक्तियेते, तदा ऋखात्मनी निक्पाधिकं इपं प्रज्ञान-घनाच्यं न प्रतिच्छायेत।.....यदा पुन: नामक्पे...व्याकृति भवतः, तदा श्रस्य इपं प्रतिच्यायेत'' (३० भा०, 2. 5. 11).

["If there were no unfolding of the names and forms in the world, there would be no manifestation of the Absolute which is eternal consciousness in its nature...Through the unfolding of the names and forms, His nature became manifested, His consciousness found its expression."]

The TIME of Brahma cannot, therefore, be independently real; but they are real only in connection with the unity of Brahma of which they are the expressions. It follows, therefore, that the 'unity' is the true reality. A thing cannot be both 'one' and 'multiple' in its true nature. If it be one, it cannot be manifold. If it be manifold, it cannot be one. The relation between the unity and the multiplicity—is not like the temporal relation of succession which obtains between the antecedent and its consequent phenomena. The unity stands unaffected amidst the multiplicity. It is a relation, says Sankara, like the relation of a piece of rope and the serpent appearing upon it.—

"रक्कादेवरगाद्यैः सम्बन्धवदस्य दृश्यसम्बन्धः"

(Sankara's Swātma-Nirupana, 72).

Also-

"रज्जामिव सर्पः" (खे॰ भा॰, 1.6).

That is to say, Sankara's idea is that there is an intimate relation between the two, yet the unity stands behind the multiplicity of names and forms unaffected by it. The unity connot be reduced to the multiplicity. The Vrittikāra, Sankara thinks, was possessed by a feeling of Divine immanence, rather than Divine transcendence. The world, to him, was the direct representation of the Divine. He was satisfied with looking upon unaffected (relation of identity or co-ordination) between God and the world.

(1) Sankara in numerous places has employed certain illustrations to bring out the relation between the Absolute Reality Brahma and its appearances of anage: Some of the illustrations are—the sea-water, and the forms of waves, billows, ripples, bubbles &c., the clay and its successive transformations, viz: the (powders) fragments (and), the lump (fuz), the pot (az) &c.; the tree and its successive developments in the forms of sprouts, branches, flowers, leaves etc. We are not to understand by these illustrations the ordinary phenomenal relations which subsist between the antecedent and consequent states of things.

''न हि जननमरणाद्यनर्धश्रतसहस्रभेदसमाकुलं समुद्रवनादिवत् सावयवं भनेक-रसं ब्रह्म—ध्येद्रले न घोयले न वा स्रुत्मा उपदिष्यते" (३० 5. 1. 1.).

['Nowhere the Sruti holds the nature of AM as composite, as consisting of thousands of differences and distinctions, such as the ocean composed of billows, foams, waves, or as the forest consisting of trees, bushes &c. &c. Such (composite) AM is neither to be known nor to be worshipped," 1

The main purpose of these illustrations is to show that as the real causal substance stands unaffected behind, untouched by the changes; so Brahma as the true causal power remains unaffected as the sustaining ground (अधिष्ठान) of the perpetually changing world of नामक्ष.* This is the relation between the two.

(2) Every true cause is a centre of power; it is a source of power which is liberated on the occasion of its stimulation by something else. As a cause it is a source of power, but this power is manifested gradually in its activities in successive stages. These activities are its effects which are the result of relation between the Subject and the Object—"विषयेण विषयिणः सामानाधिकरण्योपचारात्" —वृ॰ 1. 4. 7.—"विषय-विषयिलचणम् श्रनेकात्मभावगमनम्" -u. 4. 5. Both are more than these activities which cannot exhaust them. The Subject or the Object is present in all its manifestations which cannot be resolved into mere changes and which is more than the sum of the changes. Phenomena by themselves are not true causes. Every phenomenon arises out of something which is not a phenomenon. It is wrong to phenomena as causes of phenomena and ignore the non-phenomenal power underlying them. Sankara has pointed our attention to this transcendental cause as the true cause. I He is not willing to regard the invariable antecedent phenomena as the true causes of the consequent phenomena. He remarks——

 ^{&#}x27;'बनिकधादश्रेनापवादाश्च 'स्त्यो: स सतुरमाप्नीति य इड्ड मानेव प्रस्ति' इति...
 भिन्दितलात् न द्रष्टव्य'' (३० ५. १.)

"नासावुपस्यमाना पूर्व्वावस्था उत्तरावस्थायाः कारष-मभ्युपगस्यते, भनुपस्यसमानानामेव भनुयायिनां (continued identity) वीजाद्यवयवानां भक्षुरादिकारणभावा-भ्युपगमात् (ब॰ स्१, 2. 2. 26).

"After the disappearance of the antecedent state, the consequent state is produced; but we do not wish to regard the former as the cause of the latter. The true cause rather is that which cannot disappear or change its character, which remains identical with itself, and is constantly present in all the stages."

The phenomenal cause is no true cause; for, what we call as cause is really the effect and not a cause at all. It is rather the expression in time of the true cause which transcends time-order, which is beyond time. It can originate effects in nature by itself, not as a result of, or determined by, any antecedent in time-series. In empirical effect, its ground must always be a past phenomenon, but the true transcendental cause does not follow the order in time. It is outside the time-series.

(3) The relation of the underlying principle to the objects is not the same as the relation of one of the objects to others. The principle of unity through which the objects are related to one another is not one of them and is not itself subject to the relations of which it is the source. The phenomenal causal determination is determination from without; but Brahma is not external to the vorld and cannot, therefore, be the cause or effect of it. Brahma and the world are not external to each other; but the world is the aspect of the nature of Brahma; neither

of these has the nature of its own apart from the other—"स्पति साक्षनः प्रविभक्ते वस्तुन्तरे, स्पति च साक्षनि ततः प्रविभक्ते"—ह• 4.3.31. The world is a self-expression of Brahma and is, therefore, non-different (सनन्य) from it, has no real existence apart from Brahma—"सतीऽन्यत्वे सन्तत्वम"।

(4) Here in this connection I would invite your attention to the story found in the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad of king Ajāta-satru and Vālāki. Ajāta-satru of Benares was a real বুলার: he corrected the misconception of a Brahmin youth named Vālāki who like a Pantheist seems to have resolved all individuals into a mere tissue of relations and qualities within a whole. He divided the objects of the world into three main classes—মাধিতীবন (cosmic), মাধি-भौतिक (physical or material) and प्राध्यात्मिक (psychical); and he seems to have thought that a general mind (पाच) is entirely immanent in all objects and minds. and so, it means that apart from its presence in the minds of the individuals, it would have no existence. nor can individuals have any being in themselves apart from the general mind. You cannot say that "I" have an individuality of my own or a definite purpose of my own; for, "I" am nothing else than a particular modification of Prana-the whole, and "I" represent Prana in some difinite aspects. The individuality of myself as well as of others is only apparent -the result of reciprocal relation and connection which give a meahing and place within the whole. All those objects—the sun, the moon, the cow, the man &c. which, in this view, are mere phases of the gra-war are but the manifestations of one Prana in

some determined phase. For it is the Prana which is entirely immanent in each of us. In this way, Vālāki took all the objects as mere phases of Brahma or Prāna. Ajāta-satru corrected this view. In our opinion. Sankarāchāryya did not appear to have abolished the individuals. Sankara in his criticism of the Nyaya theory of causality, has incidentally shown that all objects have a was u and a arm-su or HEREU:—that is to say, the objects must be something for themselves ere they can be something to one another. The connection of individuals shows that they all depend on a common ground and this makes possible that interaction among themselves--- "परस्परोपकार्य्योपकारकत्व' तदेकसामान्यात्मकं एककारणासकल' इष्टम"। If you assume, like the Pantheists, that the individual is simply its relations, then it may be deprived of any being for itself (asy) in one Identity—in the whole -which comprehends all, where all the elements are determined in relation to one another and to the whole. But, if in one sense, the qualities or universal relations belong to the Reality as a whole. these are grounded in the various activities of individual objects. In this immanent view, the distinctive differences which separate the experiences of one Self from another would be unintelligible. the Transcendental Principle does not reduce these individual centres to mere appearances, but connects and correlates them so that each may serve the purpose of the whole; yet it allows to each its own functions and activities, as it distinguishes itself

from them and is not *lost* in the elements it unifies and connects.

(5) Now, we shall invite your notice to some of the places where, and the manner in which, the theory of Pantheism is described and criticised and refuted by Sankara—

(a) Brahma-Sutra, II. 1. 14—

''ननु भनेकात्मकं त्रम्न । यथा हची उनिक्याखः, एवमनेक्यक्तिप्रव्रक्तं ब्रद्धा । भतः एकलं नानात्मच सभयमि सख्यमेव । यथा हच इत्येकलं, भाखा इति च नानालं। यथा समुद्रात्मना एकलं, फेननुहुदात्मना नानालं। यथा सद्दात्मना एकलं, फेननुहुदात्मना नानालं। यथा सद्दात्मना एकलं, घटमरावाद्यात्मना नानालं।...नैवं स्थात्, प्रक्रतिमातस्य हप्टाको सत्वत्वावधारणात्। (१) न हि एकस्य त्रम्चणः परिणामधर्मालं तद्रहितलच्य मक्यं प्रतिपन्तं। न हि कूटस्थ्रस्य त्रभ्रणः...भनेकधर्माण्यलं सभ्यवित । (२) न च यथा ब्रह्मणः भाव्यक्तेकत्वदर्भनं मोचनाधनं, एवं जगदाकारपरिणामिलदर्भनमिप स्वतन्तमेव कस्योचित् फलाय अवकत्यते। न हि परिणामिव व्यविद्यानात् परिणामवत्त्वमात्मनः फलं स्थात्'।

We give the sense of the above-

It is the cause which transforms itself into effects. It is the cause which is 'one', but has divided itself into 'many' forms and appeared as the world of THEQS! The sea is one, but it has taken the forms of wave, bubble, ripple &c. The clay is one, but it is many in the form of plates, pots &c. The tree as tree is one, but it has manifested itself as twig, branch, flower &c. The Absolute Reality (Brahma) has appeared as the world of many qualities, forms, activities &c. That is to say, this world is His nature; there is no other nature than this world which may be said to be separate from the world. For, Brahma has entirely

manifested Himself-His nature-in the changing forms.

Describing in this way his opponent's view, Sankara criticises thus—

A thing cannot be one and also many at the same time. If the 'one' be real, the 'many' must be unreal. Again, if 'many' be real,—if you regard the various changing states to be real, in that case, the 'one' cannot be real. When an object is changed into various forms and qualities, it loses its one-ness, it is now composed of many forms &c. Since it was one, which is now present in the shape of many forms; its unity has now disappeared; Brahma is thus something composite, manifold (अनेकासक) in its nature. This is the view of Divine immanence; there is thus a सामानाधिकार we between बद्धा and the world. This is द्विताकार's idea.

Sankara then goes on to state his own theory, thus—

These manifested changes, no doubt, constitute the world; but Brahma transcends them all, and hence it is separate, and distinct and distinguished from them. Brahma has got a nature of its own different from the changing objects—names and forms. It has appeared as the world, has assumed the forms of air-sq, remaining unaffected by these, in its own nature. No finite form can adequately manifest Him. The world cannot reveal the depth of the Divine nature. It exists beyond all changes, all transformations. It is not its entire nature that has appeared in the form of the world. In and through all changes, the identity of its essence can

be recognised. You cannot, therefore, look upon the nature of Brahma as composed of these changes.

(b) Sankara thus observes in हु॰ 2. 1. 20.—"यदि च ब्रह्मण्डित्वपट्टत् हचसमुद्रादिवच उत्पच्चायनेकधमेविचित्रता विजयाद्दयिता, एकरमं पनन्तरमवाद्यां दित नोपमंद्रित्यत्…'य दृष्ट् नानेष पद्यति' दित निन्दावचनच्च न प्रायोच्यत"। "His unity does not become composite by the productions of नामक्ष्य, like a tree composed of its branches, flowers; and a cloth dyed with variegated colours. Then ब्रह्म would not have been described as of uniform nature (एकरस)".

Pantheism, as we have stated above, reduces the finite Self also to certain states and activities; certain relations. The sum-total of these qualities, relations, senses etc. constituted the nature of the individual Self. But Sankara has shown that the real essence (and) of the finite, empirical Self is what underlies these relations and qualities, unaffected by them—

"शरीरस्य ब्रह्मात्मलसुपदिस्यते । ब्रह्मात्मलमभुप्रपास्यमानं, स्वाभाविकस्य शरी-रात्मलस्य वाधकं सन्पद्यते" ।.....न भनेकात्मकब्रह्मतस्यनावकाशोऽस्ति ।"

(c) Brihadāranyaka, II. 1. 20-

''चनेताद्रव्यसमाद्वारस्य सावयवस्य परमात्मनः पूर्वसंस्थानावस्यस्य वा परस्य एकदेशो विक्रियते; सर्व्य एव वा परः परियमित्। चय नित्यायतसिद्वा-वयवानुगतः चवयवी पर चात्मा, तस्य तदवस्यस्य एकदेशो विक्रानात्मा—तदापि सर्व्या-वस्ववानुगतत्वात् चवयविन एव चवयवगतो दोषो गुणो वा इति विक्रानात्मनः संसारित्वदोवेष पर एवात्मा संवध्यते—इयमपि चनिष्टकस्पना।''

"Some hold the view that Brahma is the whole, and what constitutes that whole must be its parts. What we find in the form of manifestations, must necessarily be the parts of Brahma—the

whole. He has divided Himself into several parts and the manifested names and forms constitute those parts. For, the sum-total of the parts gives us the whole. How can the parts then exist apart from the whole? The faults and merits belonging to the parts must necessarily affect the whole. For, how can the whole exist apart from the parts constituting it? The finite Selves also being the constituent parts of Brahma—the whole, must affect Brahma when they are affected by pleasure or pain. But the pain which I feel cannot, at one and the same time, be my pain and a part of God's perfect experience."

Sankara also remarks here that it is the essence of the conscious Self to be for Self, to distinguish itself from all other things. How can the finite minds as consciousness, interpenetrate or merge into one enother? But in the Pantheistic view, the finite Self would lose his own esq; for, it would merge in God's consciousness.—

'एकदेशैकदेशिकत्यना च त्रक्राणि चनुपपत्रा ।.....एतेषु पचेषु चनिर्मीच-प्रसङ:, स'सार्थात्मत्नानित्रत्तः, निवत्तो वा सक्पनाशमसङ:।'

(d) Brihadāranyaka, IV. 3. 30——

'यत के बित् व्याचचते—चात्मवस्तुन: स्तत एव एकलं नानालख। यथा गोद्रव्यतया एकलं साझादीनां धर्माणां परस्परतो भेदः। तथा निरवयवेषु असूर्यन् वस्तुषु एकलं भानालख अनुस्यम्।...न, चन्यपरलात्।....न च निरवयवेषु अनेकात्मकता श्रकाते कर्णायतुं। सा च किया नैव चित्रपेषे सम्भवति, तथा अर्थभेदाः।' (Also vide —ह० भा० 5. 1. 1.)

"Atmā", the Pantheists say, "is one and many in its nature; as a cow in its character as a cow is one, and also in its various qualities (such as having

dewlap, colour &c.) is many. But this, says Sankara, cannot hold good in Atmā which has no parts (निरवयव). Atmā cannot be 'many'—composite—i. e. manifold in its qualities or actions which really belong to नामक्ष,—not to the underlying nature of the Atmā".

When my Self comes in contact with certain objects beyond it, it stimulates in myself certain reactions (through my senses and mind). All these reactions in the form of my states, feelings &c. cannot really affect or change the Self. My प्रतःकार is transformed and as such I falsely identify my consciousness with those mental transformations. But it is not प्रमाध, cf. "सर्वो दि लोकव्यवद्वारः सद्याप्येव कल्पितः, न प्रमाधः" (ह॰ 1. 4. 10). My consciousness seems to be changed. But really my consciousness remains unaffected by these.—"न ब्रूमः……ज्ञाणि भतदभाष्यारीयणा नास्तीति" (ह॰ 1. 4. 10.) *

The idea is that through the changes of the states, activities &c. the real substratum of these changes, the real essence of the Soul does not at all change. Sankara humourously illustrates the fact thus—

"न हि लोके गौस्तिष्ठन् वा गौभैवति; श्रयानस्तु भ्रम्बादिजात्यन्तरिमिति। यहभैको यः पदार्थः स्म देश-कालावस्थान्तरेष्विप तहभैक एव भवति।'

"The essential nature of a thing is not subject to change or alteration, under the changes of its states, actions, place and time. You call a cow a cow,

^{*} i. e. The Reality is Reality; but we refer this or that predicate to it.

when she is sleeping; but when she gets up and begins to walk, can you call her a horse?"

Thus it is that what constitutes the essential nature of Brahma remains the same, is not changed and affected, under the appearance of the changes of नाम-इत्। As soon as the modifications of नामइत् appear, our Avidyā imagines the underlying unity of Brahma as entirely reduced to these नाम-इत्युड, as if Brahma has become सावयव i. e. composed of parts.—"न हि प्रविद्याक स्थितेन इत्यभेदेन सावयवं वस्तु सम्पद्यतं" (ब॰ स्॰, 2. 1. 27). But in reality Brahma retains its own unity. It is our वृद्धि, says Sankara, which imagines Brahma to be सावयव (composite) through changing नामइत्युड imposed on it—"वृद्धिक स्थितेम्य: सावयवेम्य: विकार-संख्यानोषयत्तेः" (क्षा॰ भा॰ 6. 2. 2.).

- (6) Other arguments used by Sankara in disproof of Pantheism may be noticed here.
- पागन्तक—are produced by stimulating causes ("पिन्धान्तिसाधनापेसता"—इ॰ भा॰) and therefore, they are not permanent. How can these constitute the nature of the Self which is eternal and permanent ("नित्या-भिष्यात")? They are manifestations of its nature; they represent that nature very inadequately and partially; they always change their character.
- (b) For this reason Sankara has remarked more than once that no co-ordination (सामानाधिकरका) * is possible between "तत्" and "सर्वम्"—Brahma and

^{*} समानाधिकरण—occupying the same level (समानायय)। नामरपड really occupy a lower level (than नदा's level). For, they are incomplete manifestation and निषय (not निप्तयो). Vide—Lec. I, P.12.

the world (Vide. 30 40 11.3.1). How can then 'one' and 'many' both constitute the nature of the Self, as the Pantheists want us to believe? If there be सामानाधिकार between one and many, the theory would be like that held by the Stoics—spiritual would be material—no distinction.

(c) Then again Sankara asks—what is the final emancipation (nfm)? To get rid of 'many'—pleasure, pain and other changes—is to be free from their power. But if they constitute the nature of the Self, how can they be got rid of? For, you cannot rob a thing of its essential nature—

"न हि स्वाभाविकेन धम्मे य कस्यविदियोगो दृष्टः" (व. 4. 3. 8).

and-

"एकस्य अनेकस्मभावानुपपत्ते: (त्र॰ सु॰, 3. 2. 21).

(d) It is proved, therefore, that the real nature of a thing is what lies behind the changing states &c. unaffected by them, and the latter very inadequately express that nature. A thing cannot have more than one nature. All these changing states, far from constituting the nature of the Self, are rather the 'object' (au or fauu) and being 'object', * the Subject or the Self must be different from it. It is only the ignorant who look upon them as constituting the nature (ut) of the Self.——

[&]quot; ''समं कर्षभूतं सत्, अर्गृस्तदपद्धिविशेषसम् (धर्षः) स्थात्? कर्षा हि अर्गृ-स्तिसमा व्याप्यमानं भवति ; चन्यम न्यापंत्र, भन्यत् न्यापकं ; न तेनैव तत् न्याप्यते।'' (इ॰ सा॰, 4, 4, 6.)

"शब्दाबाकारावभासाः ... तस्त्रेव 'विषयसूता' उत्पद्ध-मानाः ... पाकान एव 'धन्ता' विक्रियारूपा इत्यविविकिभिः परिकस्पान्ते" (तै॰, 2. 1).

"पनाकानं देहिन्द्रियादिसंघातं पाकानो दृश्यमानमपि (i. e. "object—श्चेय") घटादिवत्, पाकाले न... ग्रह्माति …मायया मोमुश्चमानः" (कठ • 3. 12).

- i. e. They are presented as 'knowable objects'. Only the ignorant people construe them as 'essential qualities' of Atmā.
- (e) Another point noticeable is—they being परार्थ (we have already dealt with it), they work in the interest of the Self which must be other than these. They cannot, therefore, be held as constituting the nature of the Self. The 'object' cannot affect the real nature of the Subject—"न हि यस यो विषय:, स तेन होयते वहेते वा।" (मा॰ का॰ 5 on 6 मन्त्र).

We cannot understand how, in the face of these arguments advanced by him, the charge of Pantheism could have been found possible to be levelled at Sankara's poor shoulders by some of his modern critics and interpreters!

The Subject and Its true Character.

The Subject (न्नेन) and the object (न्नेन) are but two different aspects (संख्यानविश्रेषो) of one Reality—

''बध्याताचिदैवतयी: चन्चीन्योपकार्योपकारकतात्,...एकस सत्यस प्रश्चातः संद्यान-विशेषी''—(३० भा०, 5. 5. 2.)

["Both the Subject (মঙ্যান্ম) and the object (মধিই বন including মধিমূন) are aspects of one Truth—one Reality (ছবাৰ বন্ধন বন্ধন বন্ধন :)"]

The separation between thought and thing is a separation within the unity of thought; the object is not something outside thought, unknowable. The Commentary on the Gitā states—

''खेब-चेबजी येन जानेन विषयीकियेते हृत् जानं सम्यक् जानं'' (गी॰ भा॰, 13, 2).

["That knowledge is the real and perfect knowledge which comprehends within itself both the Subject and the object."]

It is the funity of the Absolute which expresses itself in the finite subject and the object—

"मामेव उभयक्षेष स्थितं विदि, उभयाका श्रहमैव" (गी॰ भा॰, नीसककुं s gloss, 3. 2). The finite Self, as pointed out before, is rooted in the Infinite, and it is the Infinite which is bifurcated into, and expressed in, both the Subject and the object. Each of the Selves, in their negative relation to the others, is finite; but in virtue of the presence, in every one of these Selves, of the unity of the Universal Self, complete and undivided *, in which each of them shares, is also Infinite. Every Subject and object are, therefore, at once finite and infinite, one and many, universal and particular. The subject and the object are thus correlated elements within the unity of the ultimate Principle which, as their sustaining ground, brings them into relation, yet transcends them.

The unity of the Universal Spiritual Principle which is present in each of us is the true Subject (MINI or MINI) in which we share, and which, as Universal, cannot be restricted to a particular object but goes out to other objects.

Thus, there is correlation among the finite objects and subjects of the world—"विषय-विषयि-सचर्ष 'पनेकाका-भाव'-गमनं"—(प्र• 4.5), but yet both the Subject and the object are more than these relations, as each of them, as we have pointed out above, shares in the unity of the Infinite which is completely present in each—

"श्यपि कार्ष्याताना चद्रिचते.....तमापि यत् पूर्वे सद्दं तद्र जदाति..... पूर्वनेव चद्रिचते" (इ॰ भा॰, 5. 1. 1.)

^{* &#}x27;'सनीऽइं सर्वस्तेषु'' and ''विभक्तं विभक्तेषु''—ती॰। ''नवि सर्वाचि भूकति।''

[i. e. The mind, senses &c. &c. are all modifications of Prakriti. All these set a sort of limit to the Subject and are therefore called in Vedānta as its *Upadhis* or adjuncts. These are all its *objects* of cognition or experiences and cannot therefore form the essential properties of the cogniser.]

'शावत् किश्वित् चेवज्ञस्य दु:खितत्वादिदीषजातं श्रविद्यमानं (i.e. not inherent to it) भासञ्जयति, तस्य ज्ञे यत्वीपपत्तेः, चेव्रधर्मात्वमैव, न चेवज्ञ- धर्मात्वं। न च तैन चेवज्ञी दृष्यति : ज्ञे येन ज्ञातुः संसगीनुपपत्तेः'

(गी॰ भा॰, 13, 2).

["What is perceived (क्ये) is an attribute of Kshetra (matter); and Kshetrajna, the cogniser cannot be vitiated by the blemish due to it. Whatever blemish—not inhering in Kshetrajna—you ascribe to Him, it comes under the cognised and therefore forms a property of Kshetra, not a property of Kshetrajna. Nor is Kshetrajna really affected by it, since association (चंचगे) of the cogniser and the cognised is impossible."]

(a) The Empirical Self described—

In one of our previous Lectures, we sauch there is mention of Prāna-continuum which Sankara stated as Parināmi-Nitya. This is Māyá or Prakriti under the control of Brahma, out of which the five elements (प्राभूत) and the four successive types of beings gradually arose; and this Prāna-continuum is the connecting link of all these—(एकसामान्याक्षक). This may be called generally as Non-Ego or विषय which constitutes the environment of the Ego or the Subject or विषय). There is interaction between the Subject and the object, and all the experiences (विशेष-विद्यान) of the Subject are the result of this interaction. The empirical Self is described in Vedānta as 'भूतमावासंसर्गीत ज्ञाविश्वविद्याविद्यान" (इ॰ भा॰, 4. 5. 13);

because it is a part of nature or विषय which has equipped it with its organs of senses and the nervous system, and in connection with which it receives all its experiences or विशेषविद्यान।

"'अधिन् गरीरे प्राणः पश्चनितः इन्द्रियमनोद्विद्युतः प्रजात्मा विज्ञानिकया-ग्रातिदयसं मुर्च्छितात्मा युत्तः" (का० भा०, 8. 12. 3).

[i.e. "In this body, Prana, together with mind and Buddhi which mean "Conscious Ego" covered by the two faculties of cognition and action is attached."].

"सदात्मनः प्राच-सम्बन्धमामभव...जीवत्वभदकारणं.....म प्राचिवियुक्तस्य जीवत्वस्पपद्यते" (का॰ 5. 10. 2).

["It is its connection or relation with the Prāna which constitutes the empirical Subjects and their differences from one another".]

This Empirical Self is composed of five Koshas or spheres—the श्रवसय, प्राचमय, सनीमय, विद्वानमय and In each of these spheres, the Self चानन्टमय । identifies itself with the particular sheath and looks upon it as the true Self. The lowest function discharged by the Soul or this physical Ego (प्रवस्य) is the nutritive function—the desire felt by the Soul is hunger and thirst (अग्रना-पिपासे). The next form is the sensory Ego which is called as such as locomotion, excretion &'. The functions which stand higher are classed under the mind and heart and it is the mental Ego or सनीसय। Higher than these are far 1742—intellectual activities. At the top stands— आनन्दसय—which is contemplation of Divine bliss and it is the sphere of feeling or enjoyment. The Soul composed of these five sheaths

with these five varieties of functions is the Empirical Self. It is merely a bundle of passive states and feelings and possesses a fund of impulses and passions. This Self, according to Sankara, is with चपरमार्थ:, i. e. it is not the real Self at all. All its experiences (कच् ल-भोज्ञल) produced by these functions in relation with its environment or favo or not-Self may be regarded as effects; for, all its experiences (कत्तु त्व-भोज्ञुखादिविशेषविद्वान) are changes or Vikāras caused by its relation with its object (विषय) —"बयं (object) बहं (Subject)—इति सामानाधिकरखो-पचारात्" (g. 1. 4. 7). Sankara's idea is, because the Self erroneously identifies or confounds itself with the body, the senses, the states, feelings &c., it experiences the qualities born of the Prakriti, manifesting themselves as pleasure, pain &c; it thinks—"I am happy, I am miserable" &c. Its identification with what it experiences (বিমাবহিয়।ৰ). forgetting that the true Self lies beneath these five sheaths and is distinct from these experiences. forms its Samsara-state and is the main cause of its birth. The Psychologists discover only the laws of these states or its experiences (विशेषविद्यान), -how they are connected with the antecedents and consequents. The antecedent condition undergoes destruction in being replaced by subsequent condition-

"सम्बें द्विकारणं कार्यसत्पादयत्। पूर्वित्पन्नस्य भात्मकार्यस्य तिरीधानं क्राचित कार्यान्तरसत्पादयति" (ह० भा० 1. 2. 1.).

This is merely the description of the changing

The antecedent phenomena are held to be the productive cause of the consequent phenomena. Hence the whole of the Soul changes from its antecedent condition to its subsequent condition in time; and the Soul is nothing more than the sum-total of its phenomena or experiences. This is equivalent to saying that becoming is everything and that there is no being which is becoming or manifesting. But the real Self is more than its experiences. The real Self cognises, feels, wills with the help of these five vehicles. It is this Self which has manifested itself in these successive spheres and identifies itself with each of these sheaths and is limited by these.

The true Self is conscious of its three states—sing, say and usin—in all of which its true character can be detected. During our wakeful hour, our sense-organ are exposed to the influence of the external objects (faulf-zunfam), and they become affected by the latter. Thus acted on, we wake up and actively compare the similar with dissimilar impressions and thus form concepts and make the sensations our objects of knowledge—

"निष्कृष्य समानासमानजातीयेथ्यो इदलदिमि विवेचनम्" (है॰ भा॰ 2. 6.)

During our *dreaming* moments, when the environment no longer acts on, and produces relations from, our sense-organs and the mind, it is our inner sense (द्वार), which remains engaged with the reminiseences of the impressions left upon it during the wakeful hour and these the mind recollects.

"The intellect is kept engaged, during dream, with the relics (बायना) of waking presentations, and these become the objects of the Self. The Subject being always distinct from its object, its luminosity is not destroyed.—"

''मनसि कामकर्मनिमित्तीङ्ग तवासनावति...वासनाः...चन्यदिव पञ्चतः... द्रष्ट्ः वासनाभ्योऽन्यत्वे न खयंन्योतिष्टं...न वारयितुं श्रकाते'' (प्र० 4. 5.)

During deep slumber, all these activities not being aroused by external or internal stimulus cease, and they merge undifferentiated in Prāna.——

''सं इतानि करणानि 'स्वास्यर्थानि' परतन्त्राणि च आयदिषये। स्वापेऽपि सं इतानां 'पारतन्त्रे नैव' कियां श्चित् सङ्गतिन्यांया। आयत्-स्वप्रन्यापारादुपरताः सनः प्राणे सय्यगेकीभृताः...विवेकान्द्री भवन्ति'

["All the senses combined together work for the Lord—the Soul—dependent on him during our waking states and hence the coalition of all the senses etc. in One is reasonable even in Sleep, because of their dependence on, and acting in co-operation on behalf of,—some Lord. Waking and dreaming activities having ceased they blend indistinguishably in the Prāna]."

This undifferentiated Prāna in which all activities of the mind have merged in deep sleep is the seed—root-cause—of both the dreaming and waking states. For, when we wake up, from this seed the different activities (of the mind) become aroused by the action of the environment. This undifferentiated Prāna is not an independent entity apart from the Self; it cannot be explained without referring to the Subject whose energy it is. Under no conditions Prāna exists separated from the Subject.

''सुषप्तावस्थायां विशेषविज्ञानाभावसेव दर्शयति, न 'विज्ञातारं' प्रतिषेधित''

["During dreamless slumber, the experiences merge in Atmā but we do not deny the existence of the Cogniser]."

We thus find from the brief description given above, that the Self in its three states is an active Subject and not merely an abstract indeterminate principle.—

''बवस्थावयसाची.....घवस्थावयेष व्यक्षिचारिया न संस्पृशाते" (i. e. cognizer of 3 states)—इ॰ २० २. 1. 9.

(b) The true Idealistic Self described—

That the passive empirical Self (which is merely the aggregate of states, feelings &c. &c.) described above is not the true Self is very clearly brought out by Sankara in several places. We shall collect together some of his arguments about the nature and the distinction of the true Subject from the empirical Self.

"Men and others are called as endowed with Atmā not only because they possess the five sheaths (una-ring given above), but they are known as endowed with Atmā because they possess that self-existing, eternal, changeless Atmā...who is beyond these five Sheaths". Here are the lines—

'प्वं मनोमधादिभिः पूर्वे-पूर्वेत्यापिभिः पानन्दमधानः पाकाशादिभूतारकः... 'पातावनः' सन्वे प्राणिनः । तथा खाभावितेनापि पाकाशादिकारणेन नित्ये नावि-क्रितेन...पञ्चकोषातिगेन 'पातावनः'...(तै० भा०, 2. 3).''

Thus we find the empirical ordinary knower and doer is subject to change (विश्वत), but the true character of the knower and doer—which is the real essence of the former—is not subject to change. Sankara emphasises this truth in another passage in

another way. He says there that the "I" (अइ) is two-fold. The empirical "I" is subject to change (family), but the real "I" is what underlies the former which is its essential nature, since the empirical "I" is the result of the confounding of the Self with its body, the senses, states, actions &c. &c. I quote the passage here——

- (i) "त्रहंकारेण देहादिम घातोऽपि त्रादिश्यते त्रविवेकिभि: !...
- (ii) द्रष्ट्रमन्यत्वदर्धनार्धे भूमैव निर्द्दिखते चहंकारिय, 'चहनेवाधस्तात्' इत्यादिना'' (का॰ भा॰, 7. 25. 1.)

["The indiscriminate people describe the body, the senses &c. as "I"...but with a view to point out that the Infinite is non-different from the Seer or the Subject, it is described as "I"—'the I below' &c. &c."]

Here it is to be particularly noted that the real underlying "I" is stated as 'द्र्य'—i. e. active Subject or Knower. In the Taittiriya-bhāsya also Sankara shows that what we call as the knower (विद्या) is not the true character of the knower. What is true knower lies deeper, it is the Absolute itself—"विद्याः विद्यां ब्रह्म"—ते॰ 2. 1.

In the Katha-bhāsya, we find-

"केवलसामान्यविज्ञानवान् सर्व्यतो यातीनः। विशेषविज्ञानस्य:, स्त्रेन रूपेण स्थित एव सन्" (कठ० भा०, 2. 21.)

Here two facts stand clear before us:

Underlying or accompanying our particular experiences which we ordinarily know as our Self, there is the true Self; and this is the true knower and agent.

In the Chhandogya also the same truth is brought out thus—

''बात्मनेति वचनात् खात्मनीऽव्यतिरिक्ते न... 'बविश्रष्टे न' इति दर्ध्यति''।

Also

''तेजीऽवद्रसंसर्गेन 'लब्धविशेषविज्ञाना' &c.'' (का॰ 6. 3. 2).

["By means of that Self partaking of the character of Intelligence and as such not differing from the real Self—is indicated,"]

Also

["Having obtained specific consciousness by contact with fire, water, food, manifest" &c.]

Here also we find that when the true Subject comes in contact with the external objects, special experiences (विशेषविद्यान) are produced in it, and this is our ordinary Self. We confound the true underlying Subject with these experiences. But the underlying Self is the true Self which has these experiences.

The Brahma-sutra also gives us the same

''ब्रह्मची जीवात्मना चवस्थानं, ब्रह्मात्मना च'' (ब्र॰ भा॰, 2, 3, 17).

["Behind the empirical Jiva, the Infinite Brahma is present"].
Again——

"चिधन् निरुपाधिके चात्मनि, प्राणाद्युपाधिकाता 'विश्वेषाः' प्राचादिकर्या-जनामाभिषेद्याः" (३० सा०. 1. 4. 7).

["When there is relation with Prana and others, in the real Self certain particular activities are produced or manifested."]

The aggregate of these manifested activities and states is our ordinary empirical Self; but the real Self lies deeper which we ignore.

(c) The true Self is the real cognizer and Doer (i. e. active conscious Subject):—

In all these passages, we come to realise the important fact that Sankara everywhere reminds us that although to us the aggregate of the specific conscious states &c. constitutes the empirical knower, the *real knower* is the Intelligent Self underlying the specific states etc.

Similar is the case with the *Docr* (কর্মা) which is two-fold in its character. This fact has been brought out by the mention of two kinds of vision—হছি।

''दृष्टिरिति दिविधा भवित — जीकिकी, पारमार्थिकी च। तम, खीकिकी... सा कियते इति जायते विनय्यति च। या तुमात्मनी दृष्टिः...सा तु दृष्टुः स्वरूप-लात् न जायते ईविनय्यति च। सा क्रियमाणया...संस्ष्टेव स्वपदिय्यते'

(ह॰ भा॰, 3, 4, 2).

['The vision is two-fold: one is ordinary vision—it is produced, and it is destroyed and thus it is liable to *change*; the other is the true character of the Subject (zer) and that is eternal, not changeable. We ordinarily confound or identify the latter with the former and describe as zer or Doer."]

Sankara gives the true character of the Doer in the following Bhāsya——

''चविपरिक्षप्तस्वभावया हृष्ट्या नित्यया 'दृष्टे ति' उच्चते''

(To, 4, 3, 23,)

["The eternal unchangeable Vision is the real 'Doer' (दूरा) |"]

The reason is given below-

"न च द्रष्टु निंखें व द्रष्टिरित्ये वं विद्याते द्रष्ट्रविषयां द्रष्टिर नामाकाङ्गते... तद्यभावात्...न च सद्यविषयाकाङ्गा सस्येव" (इ॰ भा॰, 1. 4. 10.) A similar idea is given in the Brahma-Sutrabhāsya also. (2. 2. 28.)

The sense of the above quotation is this. When it is realised that the activity of the Subject is unchangeable and eternal, this eternal activity is itself its own Subject (ET). For, if you still ask what is the Subject of this activity, Anavasthā—regressus ad infinitum would be the result. Sankara puts the idea more clearly thus—

''यो दृष्टे 'द्र' हा' स 'दृष्टि'येद भवति, नित्यमेव प्रथाति दृष्टि',.....तव दृष्ट्र हुं ह्या नित्यया भवितव्यं'' (व॰ 1. 4. 10).

[i.e. The eternal activity of the Atmā is itself the *Doer*, that is to say—the real character of the Subject (set) is the eternal unchangeable activity (set).

In his Vākyavritti, Sankara states the fact thus-

''बनापत्रविकार: सन प्रयस्तान्तवदेव य:।

्र बुद्यादीन् चालयेत् प्रत्यक् सोऽइमित्यवधारय" ॥ (S1. 19.)

["Let you bear in mind this fact that 'I' am the true inner Subject who remaining unaffected and unchangeable in itself moves or impels the intellect, the senses &c. &c. like a load-stone".]

All these discussions prove the fact that in Sankara-Vedānta the Subject is the true Knower and it is not affected by the object of knowledge; and the Subject is also the real Doer who remains unaffected by its object of action and the activities—"न हि यस यो विषय: (object), स तेन होयते वह ते वा' (सा॰ का॰ सा॰). It is only the empirical knower and doer (कत्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वादिविश्रष्ट:) who is dependent on and is affected by its object.—

"न डि नैवलालनो 'भोकृत्व', युद्धग्रादुग्रपाधिकतनेव 'भोकृत्व' (कठ॰ भा॰, 3, 4.)"

And also___

''कर्त्तृ लभीकृलयोः 'विकिययोः' विभेषानुपपत्तिः'' (प्र॰ भा॰, 6. 3.)

[i.e. "There is no difference virtually between ৰাষ্ট্ৰ and মীলুৰ; for, both are the changing states of the Atmā and they produce changes in it. These are in reality the modifications of the Intellect (বৃদ্ধি)".]

It is to be borne in mind in this connection that wherever in his commentaries Sankara has refused to ascribe 'Agentship' * to the Self, it is such agentship as noticed above which is really a sort of changing state of the Self. The real character of the Subject, in Sankara-Vedānta, is that it is the original source of activity and of knowledge. There are some critics who have misunderstood Sankara's real position in this respect and they have made Sankara's Self as merely an abstract, indeterminate principle,—"a sort of action-less, consciousness-less void".

As the topic is very important, we would quote here the explanation given by the famous Tikā-kāra Rāmatirtha in his gloss on Sankara's Upadeshā-sāhasri which will, I am sure, support my contention. I would give the purport of what he says there—

^{*} cf ''क्रिया नामक्पसाध्या प्राणसमवायिनी'' (ह॰ 1. 4. 7).

Also—''प्राग् भोगोत्पत्ते: विवलिक्सावस्य प्रकास्त्र 'भोक्तृत्व' नाम 'विश्वेषी' भोनकाले चेक्सायते, निव्वत्ते च भोगे तक्षिण्यादपेत:...इति 'विशिष्टविक्रिया' कस्माते'' (प्र० 6.3,)

"The external objects produce modifications in our inner sensory (अन्त:करण); and these are the states of consciousness produced in the Self, and the conscious Self is reflected in these states. Thus the Self becomes identified with its states, and the aggregate of these estates is looked upon as the real Subject. This is the empirical "knower" or cogniser (जाता or प्रमाता)".

Again-

"The Prāna acts in various ways within the body, and its activities are stimulated by the organs of action (coming in contact with the external world). The Self accompanies all these activities and we fail to distinguish the Self from these activities. In this way, the Subject becomes the Empirical "Agent" (कर्मा)".

But, Rāmatirtha concludes that-

- But as the real Subject is always distinct and distinguished from these states and activities, it is the witness of all states and activities, it is the eternal cogniser and Agent". *
- ''चन्त:करणवृत्तीनामाविर्भाव-तिर्दौभावधर्मावस्वात् तिहिश्यण्यया स्कुरणमङ्गीकत्य, विषयस्यचैतन्याभेदेन प्रकाशमानवृत्ति-तत्स्याभासाययतया भासमान चात्मा—'प्रमाता' (जाता) द्वत्यचिते।''

''कम्प्रे न्द्रियाख्यविष्ठाय क्रियावत्-प्राणप्रधानान्तःकरणलिङ्गगताभासाविवेकात् 'कर्चा' इति च उच्यते।''

''एता सर्वामेन चित्तविलासावस्थां 'सक्पचैतन्यानुगम'-माने य, साचादवभासयम् इव भासमान: प्रजुप्तप्रकाश:...साची लपल्या 'ज्ञाता' इति च व्यपदिख्यते.....'निर्विकार' एव ('कर्चा') कृटस्थ:।''

We thus come to the conclusion that the Subject (as well as the object) is the real Seat of Power—the active Source—which produces states and activities—its manifestations—in interaction with each other.

The true character of the Subject then is দ্বারা and কর্মা।

We may conclude then that everywhere, there is the empirical causality and the nœmenal causality simultaneously present in each situation. Thus both the Subject and the object have a double character: an empirical and a nœmenal character. The empirical character is the expression in time of the nœmenal character which is not in time but expresses itself spontaneously and freely.

- (d) We now proceed to collect particular instances where the Self is shown to be a true cogniser and active agent, which will bring out the fact that the Subject with Sankara was never a mere abstract, indeterminate principle:—
- (I) "No presentation coming to the Self can remain unknown or unperceived. It is absurd to suppose that an object (faux) is there, but it is not known by the Self (faux)".—

"बस्तुतस्वं भवति विचित्, न जायते—इति च चनुपपन्नं...... इपच दृश्यते, न चाक्ति चचुरिति यथा। व्यभिचरित ज्ञेयं, न ज्ञानं व्यभिचरित कटाचिटिप ज्ञेयं। ज्ञेयाभावे ज्ञेयान्तरे भावात् ज्ञानस्वं' (प्र० भा०, 6.2.)

["Whatever be the nature of the object of cognition, there is always the consciousness to cognise it." When one object is

replaced by another, when one object is removed and another is placed in its stead, the consciousness cognising them does not cease to exist, but continues unchanged behind it'.

"सद्यस्मिचारिषु पदार्थेषु चैतन्यात्यभिचारात्, यथा यथा यो यो पदार्धः जायते, तथा तथा जायमानलादेव, तस्य तस्य चैतन्यात्यभिचारिल'' *

["The objects may change, but the consciousness is constant to cognise and hence the cogniser does not change"].

The passages quoted above show that the Self whose nature is consciousness is always a conscious Subject (Int or cogniser) in reality.

Consciousness may exist where there is no object to be known, but an object can never exist without being cognised by the consciousness. The reason is—"The consciousness, if it does not exist, how can there exist a knowable? Where there is no consciousness, there can be no knowable".

- (2) In our every-day changes of three states, viz: our waking state and also our dreamless state, and the dreaming state,—the one and the same identical Intelligence (ইননা) continues to be present, and it is the cogniser (মানা) of all these states. This shows that the Self is a conscious Subject.—
- (i) Even when the Self falls asleep in deep slumber (सुवृत्ति), the conclusion of Vedānta seems to be that although there is apparently no knowable

^{*} Lf ''बाल्यादिष्वपि जागदादिषु तथा सन्त्रांखवस्त्राखिष, व्यावत्ताखनुवर्त्तमान'मह'-मित्रन्तःस्व्रनं सदा'' (दिष्वामृति' •, 7),

present in that state, the Self must, says Sankara, be regarded as cognizant, inasmuch as the absence of the knowable being itself a fact to be known; but that cannot be known in the absence of a cognizer (no mo, 6.2). The Brihadāranyaka agrees with this view—

"विद्यमानखैव खयंनीतिष्यु स्य (ज्ञाटलस्य) सुष्ठमे त्यष्ट्यमेकीभाषाद्वे ती:... सम्बस्यमातीतमेतदूपं" (4. 3. 22).

The expression एकी भाव gets its elucidation from Chhāndogya-bhāsya thus—"द्रष्ट्र न्यत्वेन प्रभावात्, मृताः न प्रश्नित च" (8.12.2-3)—i. e. In the सुष्ठम stage or in the final release (मृत्ति) the cognizant Subject is present. Only because the knowables do not appear as different from or apart from the cogniser, he seems to be non-cognizant of anything knowable—"सुष्ठमावस्थायां……न 'विद्याताः' प्रतिपेशति' (त॰ स॰ भा॰, 1.3.19).

(ii) During our dreaming state, although the sense-organs cease to operate, our mind (जन:करण) is active in that state with the waking reminiscences which are aroused. These reminiscences are to be regarded as its knowable which the Self cognizes—

''खप्रेऽपि 'द्रष्ट्'-; cognizer)-रेबोपर्दशः !...वद्यपि खप्रे स-धौः भवति (चात्मा).....जायदासनाश्रया 'हश्रीव' धौर्भवति इति न 'द्रष्टुः' सर्थ-न्योतिष्ट्रवाधो भवति' (छा० भा०, 8, 12. 1,)

(iii) During our waking state, when we perceive the objects of the external world, the Self is proved to be an actively conscious Subject. This is shown below:—

(3) No perception can be had unless the Self exercises its power of discrimination and assimilation, and active comparison of the sense-impressions aroused by the action of the external objects in the Self—

"इस्तस्यायं स्पर्ण:, जानीरयिमिति विषेतेन (Discrimination) प्रति-पद्मते...लष्ड मात्रे य ज्ञती विवेकप्रतिपत्ति: ?"

''सम्बों हि खोको मनसा पश्यति (Attention)..., शानं भवति'' (इ॰ 1. 5. 3.)

["The surface of the body (लक्) itself cannot make or comprehend the difference between the two kinds of impressions excited in the body by the hand and the knee respectively, unless the Self attends to those impressions (and institutes comparison between them). This attention shows the active nature of the conscious Subject."]

(i) The Self as real দ্বারা (conscious Subject)—

''चच्चषा रूपं विजानाति, श्रोते य मन्दं विजानाति, रसनेन रसं विजानाति ... इति सर्व्यते च 'विज्ञानश्रद्ध'वाच्यतासेव दर्शयति... इति 'प्रज्ञानस्वसावतैव' (उ० सा०, 4. 3. 2-30.)'' ''यो 'वेद' इदं सन्वानौति,... इदं जिल्लायोति, 'वेद'... इति सर्व्यत प्रयोगात् 'वेदन'मस्य स्वरूपं (का० सा०, 8. 12. 4-5).''

[i.e. "A mental act in which the Self is known implies, like every other mental act, a perceiving Subject. In every act of cognition, in each case, I am immediately conscious of myself as seeing, hearing thinking &c." Thus the Self is inferred to be a conscious Subject.].

(ii) The Self as real कर्ता (active Agent)-

''इश्रेनादि-क्रिया-(different functions)-निर्दे खर्चानि तु चचुरादि-न्र्यानि...इटच षस्य 'सामर्घात्' (Active power) चवनस्यते ।...षात्रानः स्त्रामात एव 'कर्त्तृ'ल',' नदु स्थाप्तत्रत्या'' (का॰ 8, 12, 4-5) ["The organs of sight, of smell &c. are for fulfilling the functions of seeing, smelling &c. This fact is inferred, because the Self possesses the capability, because the Self is an active Power. This agentship (ৰম্বল) of the Self is to be understood not as if the Self is actually occupied with the particular functions of the organs; i. e. the Self is active without being affected by those activities."]

Thus, the Self is inferred to be an active Subject. From these, we find that in the perception of the objects of the external world, the Self is proved to be not merely as an abstract intelligence, but as a conscious and active Subject (Indian and I).

(4) Wherever, in consequence of its relation with the objects of the world, certain states of consciousness are produced in the Self, they are all known by the term 'cognitions' (fame). The aggregate of these cognitions constitutes the ordinary jiva. As these states are all permeated by the consciousness, the ordinary indiscriminate people take, these cognitive states to be the essential properties of the Self. To such people the Self is what is constituted by the sum-total of these states. But, in reality, these states are felt to be the 'knowables' (favorati:) or objects of the Subject.—

"च चुरादिशारै विषयाकारिय परियामिन्या (बुर्जे :) ये शब्दादाकारावभासाः भात्मविज्ञानस्य 'विषयभूता' उत्पद्ममाना एव, भात्मविज्ञानेन व्याप्ता उत्पद्मने ।"

But to the ordinary people these states are regarded as the vais i. e. the essential properties of the Self.——

(तै॰ भा॰, 2. 1.)

^{&#}x27;'भातान एव धर्मा विक्रियाह्या इत्यविवेकिसि: परिकल्पानी''

This is the ordinary empirical Self consisting of these modifiable and changing states, which the ignorant people take as stat and with. But this Self is merely the "bundle of sensations, appetites, desires, affections which constitute its experience. It is resolvable into the series of its conscious states."

But this is the Psychological account of the Self. There is another account of the transcendental or idealistic Self which is its true nature.

Here, 1 would draw your notice to certain terms. We have seen that the true character of the transcendental Self which underlies the cognitive states is not subject to modification. Although these states are its manifestations and belong to it, still it is not affected by them. With a view to show this, Sankara has used the word Vijnāna (विज्ञान)—'consciousness'—to indicate its nature—"आसविज्ञानेन आसा स्वायाने".

But as these cognitive states are 'pervaded' by consciousness and are felt to be its 'object', this Self or consciousness must be the conscious Subject.

We would support our position by quoting what Sankara has stated elsewhere.—

"कार्य कार्य स्थातां, दिश्वना व्यापात ? कार्य हि कर्नु क्रियया व्याप्यमानं भवति । अन्यक्ष व्याप्यं, अन्यत् व्यापकं; न तेनैव तत् व्याप्यते"

(#º MIO, 4, 4, 6).

["The object is always pervaded by the activity of the Subject. And the pervader is distinguished from, other than, the thing which is pervaded by it. A thing cannot be pervaded by itself."]

We find then that here, as the cognitive states are stated as its object, the consciousness mentioned

above to indicate the nature of the Self must be understood to be the conscious Subject (TITI or cogniser).

In connection with this point, the following observations of Sankara must be conclusive—

"दश्च-कर्यालापत्तिनिमत्ता दि जगतः सर्वा प्रवित्तः— 'चड्मिरं भोत्ये' 'पश्चामि'...'एतदर्थमिरं करिष्ये'— बलाया... चनगतिनिष्ठा''

(गी॰ भा॰, 9, 10).

["All the activities of the world have value in so far as they prove useful to the Subject, if the Subject can derive benefit from them, if these activities can be utilised as an object which might serve the purpose of the Em i. e. the Subject".]

- (5) That in the Sankara system, the consciousness is to be taken in the sense of 'conscious Subject' (and 'active agent') can be gathered also from the following——
- (i) The world is divided into two parts—the Self and not-Self.

'धरा हि सर्व्वे 'न्ने यं' कस्यचित्, तदा तदातिरिक्तं 'न्नानं' न्नानंभविति हितीयो विभाग:...इत्यादि" (प्र० भा०, 6. 2.)

"All things can be classified as 'knowledge' and 'knowable'— द्वान-द्वेयगोरन्यत्वम्—and all those who are not Nihilists in their opinion concede only a two-fold classification of 'knowledge' and 'knowable' and do not admit a third kind."

Here we find 'knowledge' (স্থাৰ) has been used for 'cogniser (স্থাৰা) or the Percepient Subject.

(ii) "Those who hold that 'cognition' () is formless and is not known by mediate perocrition must admit that since an object of knowledge is

apprehended through 'cognition', the cognition is quite as immediately known"—Gitā-bhāsya, 18. 50.

Again in the following sentences, note why Sankara makes no difference between eternal 'cognition' and 'cogniser'.

''भप्रसिखं चेत् 'ज्ञानं' ज्ञेयवत् जिज्ञास्त्रेत...न चैतदस्ति । भतोऽत्यनाप्रसिखं (Self-sufficient) ज्ञानं, 'ज्ञातापि' भतएव प्रसिख इति''

["Just as a man seeks to reach by 'cognition' the cognisable object, such as pot, so also would he have to seek to reach cognition by means of another cognition. But the fact is otherwise. Wherefore, cognition is self-revealed and therefore also is the cogniser self-revealed."]

We find in these passages, 'cognition' means really the 'cogniser' or the conscious Subject i.e. there is no distinction between the two.

The reason for using the term cognition for cogniser is to guard against the fact that the *empirical* cogniser or sign with whom we are familiar is always changeable (विकारि-हाता). But the *real* conscious Subject is devoid of change when it cognises its object; that is to say, the *object* of cognition cannot affect him.

(iii) "यदि जायापि जीयसम्बन्धी जायते, भन्यो जाता कल्याः स्थात्, तस्यापि भन्यः। यदि पुनरविद्या जीया भन्यक्षा, जीयं जीयमेव ; तथा जातापि जातेव, न जीयं भन्यतः।

["If the relation between the cogniser and the cognised could be cognised, another cogniser should be supposed to exist, then another and so on. If avidya or anything else is the cognised, then it is always the cognised only () So the cogniser is ever the cogniser &c."—Gita-bha. 13. 2.]

Here the term 'cogniser' is employed, but this cogniser is not like the changing *empirical cogniser*; this cogniser is free from modifications i. e. not affected when it knows its object.

- (iv) ''तस्मात् देशदिलचणान् च इपादीन् एतेनैव देशदिव्यतिरिक्ते नैव विज्ञान-स्वभावेन भास्मना विजानाति'' (कड० भा० 4. 3.)
- ["Atma, whose nature is 'consciousness', cognises the body, the senses &c. composed of colour, sound &c."]

Here, it is to be noted that to denote the 'cogniser', the term 'consciousness' has been employed.

Take the following also-

''सर्वे प्रत्यया 'विषयीभवित्त' यस, स...सर्व्यप्रत्ययद्शें चिष्कितिस्तर्य-मावः ।...सर्व्यप्रत्ययदिश्वें च उपजनापायविर्ज्ञितहक्सरूपता, नित्यत्वं,... निर्व्विश्वेषता, एकत्वश्व...सिड्वं भवेत्'' (केन० भा०, 2. 4).

["All cognitive states (near:) are known by it...the cogniser of all its knowable states is in its nature pure intelligence... That the cogniser of all its states is really eternal, free of particular determinations, one and not subject to changes of states in its own nature becomes well established."]

Here also, the eternal, changeless, 'consciousness' (चित्वक्ष्यमात्रः) is the real "Cogniser of all his cognitive states."

The reason is stated in the following significant line for the employment of the term 'consciousness' for the 'conscious Subject (221)'—

''द्रष्टु हिं हक्षं चर्यानारभूतं.....इति द्रष्टुः, चसङ्गलात् [खयंज्योतिह' (non-affection) सिन्द'" (ड॰ भा॰, 4. 3. 22).

[i. e. "The conscious and active Subject is always to be distinguished from his objects of cognition; for, it is not attached to and not affected by anything."]

I must conclude by calling your attention to the fact that the conscious Subject being distinct from the object, there can be no identity between the consciousness and the being. The consciousness does not create or constitute its object ("पायसमाधियें द्रश्यवानुष्यत्ते:"); but the object is the manifestation of the Being or Power from which it is produced in interaction with the Subject.—

''ज्ञानन्तु प्रमाणजन्यं; प्रमाणख यथाभूत'वस्तु'विषयं। भाती ज्ञानं कर्त्तु मन्त्रया कर्त्तु मग्रक्य '...वस्तुतन्त्रमेव तत्'' (ब्र॰ भा॰, 1. 1. 4. & 3. 2. 21).

It is thus seen that the Intelligence is not constituted of its objects of cognition. The object is 'given'. The object has an existence over and above its presentation to consciousness. The object possesses an identity which is not made by our mind, but persists in its changing modes or activities. This is the fundamental truth in the Subject-object relation. It is thus found that both the Self and not-Self—fava and faval—are known to us intuitively, according to Sankara, in the same act of perception, both being inseparable cor-relatives, although in their essence they are ultimately identical.

Jiva's State of Samsara or False Predication and How to get rid of it?

"नासि लं संसारी,—'श्रमुख पुनलादि-'धर्मेवान्'; किं तिर्हे ? 'सत्' यत् लमसि'' (क्टा॰ भा ॰ 6. 14. 2).

- i. e. "This spatial and temporal world does not enter into the substance of the nature of your Self; nor does any of the states,—say, the state of yourself being somebody's son &c. &c. belongs to you as your essential nature (). What then ? You are really distinct from, and unaffected by, the world or the states;—You are true Being, that thou art."
- (1) We must learn not to take things as they appear to us but as they are in their true character or nature,—not as they appear to our sense-organs and intellect. To perceive things as they are in themselves has been described as—"uniquiation" in Sankara's Sarvavedānta-Siddhānta and as—"anaunan-sia"—in Katha-bhāsya (3. 14). But how do the things appear to our intellect and our senses, and how to perceive them in their true character? "Unless you wake up", says Sankara, there in his Katha-bhāsya, "from the deep slumber of Avidyā into which you are immersed, your look

will not be turned inward into the true knowledge of yourself (श्राक्षद्वान)". Why he speaks of Avidyā, we shall see that later on.

When an object (fava) acts upon the Self by affecting the sense-organs, the impressions produced in the Self it interprets in terms of its own sensations.—

''गन्धादिभिरिप प्राणादिषु चतुररहीतेषु, प्रवृत्ति-निवच्यादवो (Motor and sensory activities) भवन्ति, तेन सैरिप चतुग्रही भवति कार्य-करण-संपातस्य'' (इ० भा०, 4. 3. 5).

Also

"'सन:-संकल्पवशानि हि इन्द्रियाणि प्रवर्षा नी —निवर्ष नी " (ह०, 6, 1, 5,) *

[i. e. "There are action and reaction between the senseorgans and their respective sense-objects; and the result is knowledge of external world and stimulation of impulsive action (মন্ত্ৰিক & নিত্ৰনি)"]

["The Manas is an organ of reflection and volition and will. We have cognition followed by consequent action". (Vide. also, \$\overline{x}\

The true Subject, as we have seen, has a nature () of its own, it has its own reason of being in itself; it determines its own activities for the realisation of the end inherent in it. () 7. 22-23).

That it is active proves its interaction (संसर्भ) with the environment beyond it.

"सतो विशेष: कारकापेष:, विशेषस्य विकार:.....तदभावेऽभावातृ" (तै॰ भा॰, 2.8).

Thus the Subject is related to its own Self (खरूप) as well as to others beyond it (बाह्यरूप or सम्बन्धिरूप,

^{. * &#}x27;'शब्दोन (चित्रमृत) योची न्द्रिये प्रदीप्तो, मनसि विवेक उपजायते, तेन मनसा वाक्षा चेष्टां प्रतिपदाते'' (4. 3. 5.)

— अ॰ भा॰, 2. 2. 17). This self-reference and reference to others constitute its outward characteristics or relations. The object is therefore known to the Self so far as it comes into relation (संग्री) with it.

But the Subject and the object do not derive their whole meaning from the relations into which they come to each other through interaction. Both are something more than their relations; possess a Swarūpa (nature) of their own which come into reciprocal relation.

"उपाधिसम्बन्धकतं विशेषात्मखद्दं &c. &c. सर्वा भृत-भौतिकमाता श्रस्त 'संसर्ग'कारणभृता विद्यन्ते " (ह०, 4, 3, 9 and 2, 1, 18).

["When some object in the environment comes into relation with the Subject, certain particular states and activities (বিষয়ৰ-বিদ্যাৰ) are produced in it'.']

Thus, neither the Subject nor the object can be wholly resolved into these relations.—

''विशेषविज्ञानवन्त्रं परित्यज्य, खेन इपेय प्रभिन्यज्यते" (व्र० भा०, 1. 3. 20).

These relations, or in other words, the particular states and activities &c. of the Self are but its partial or inadequate manifestations.—

''दर्शनयवणमननविज्ञानादुरपाधिषयाँ': (क्रोध्रहपादिप्रत्ययेष) 'पाविर्भूतं' सक्रत्यते (ब्रह्म)''--सु॰ भा॰, 2. 2. 1. But-

''उपाधिपरिच्छित्रसास रूपं लगलां वेत्य'' (केन० भा०, 2. 1).

In these relations, its nature finds partial (unquand and)* expressions; they cannot represent it fully and adequately, as we have considered fully in our previous discussions.

^{*} Vide: Lect. VIII P. 106 & 108.

But such is the habit of our intellect (36) that instead of taking these states &c. as partial expressions of the Subject which underlies them, our intellect takes them to be the component parts, of which the Subject is composed. Thus reducing the nature of the Subject to these parts, or relations, our intellect makes the Subject as stated of these states &c. constitutes the whole nature of the Subject. Here compare what Sankara has stated—

''रज्जादावयवेश्यः सर्पादिसंस्थानवत्, बुद्धि-परिकल्पितेश्यः सदवयवेश्यः विकारसंस्थानोपपत्तः" (का॰ भा॰, 6. 2. 2.)

["Just as the parts of the serpent are assumed in the rope as its own parts, so the modifications are assumed by our intellect as parts constituent of the Being (धत्)".]

Also-

"निर्विभेषे एव पात्मनि सुखिलादयो 'विभेषाः' कल्पिताः (i. e. प्रविद्यक्षाः रिक्सिकाः) ;......पद्यस्य प्रव्यभिचारात्, कल्पनावस्थायामपि पद्यता भिवाः' —सा० भा०, 2. 32.

[i.e. "The determinate states &c. are imagined (by our intellect) in the Self as its qualities or constituent parts (মন্তঃ). But still, even while they are thus imagined, the Self remains unqualified by these (since the Self is unaffected by these and changeless), as it transcends these".]

Sankara elsewhere argues that all these states, viz: pleasure, pain &c. &c. are felt by the Subject to be its *objects*; and being its objects how can they constitute the nature of the Subject?

"सुखदुखयी: विवयधकील', न भारतधकील'। न दु:खेन प्रत्यविवयेष ' भारतमी विशेष्यल'' (३० मा०, 1. 4. 7).

["Pleasure and pain (and all nama-rupas) are the proper-

ties of the object, they cannot, therefore, be the properties of the Subject."]

Another argument advanced by Sankara-

"एकप्रस्ययविषयत्वानुपपत्ते:। न हि सुख-याह्मवेष प्रस्वचिषयेष प्रस्थिन, नित्यानुस्यात्मनो विषयीकरण्सुपप्यति" (ह० भा०, 1. 4. 7.)

["Both the Subject and the object cannot be comprehended by the same kind of knowledge; i. e. they cannot stand in co-ordinate relation. For, the pleasure, pain &c. are the objects of perceptual knowledge, whereas the Self is an object of inferential knowledge".]

There cannot be सामानाधिकरण्य (Identity) between the knowledge of the Eternal Self and the knowledge of its changing states or qualities.

But of the deeper unity of the Subject, our intellect, as we have stated above, perceives only the outer qualities spread out side by side. It sees one object outside another; and in the object also, one point of space outside another point of space. It makes the underlying unity of the Subject as composed of its multiple states, as unament; as if the sum-total of these states constitutes the Subject. Thus the Subject, to the view of the intellect, becomes altogether a new thing (agantha), something other (unity of the object * also, appear to our intellect and our senses. This

^{*} The object is not mere 'manifold,' as Kant thought. It is already a unity and there is orderly connection among its qualities. For, they are the factors of a Purposive Unity, in connection with one another.

view is known in Sankara-Vedānta as the view of Avidyā----

"पविद्यया 'पन्यत्वे न' प्रतुप्रपद्यापितमासीत्...'वस्त्वन्तरिनव' ;...करणादिकतं हि तत्, न पात्मकृतं ; पात्मकृतमिव प्रत्यवभासते'' (३० भा०, 4. 3. 23).

Take in this connection the following wing on the Aphorism ($\pi \circ \pi \circ 3.2.15.$)——

"एवं ब्रह्मापि पृथिन्याद्रापाधिसम्पर्कात् तदाकारतामिव प्रतिपदाते"

As soon as the names and forms become manifested and the objects appear before us, we think as if Brahma has become these forms; Brahma seems to us to be of such and such forms. That is to say, we restrict Brahma to such and such forms, as if Brahma has itself become such and such objects; i. e. in this view, Brahma's presence in the objects is in reality their presence. No distinction exists between the presence of God and the mere presence of objects. But this, says Sankara, is the view of ignorance. The real view is thus stated—

"निराकारमेव ब्रह्म अवधारियतव्य" (ब्र॰, 2. 3. 14.)

(a. 3. 2. 12, 16).

The manifested objects look like Brahma's forms, but they are not really sq. They are not His forms: as if he has been reduced to these forms: as if He has actually become these forms: Brahma has no form at all *.

(a) That such erroneous views are due to our intellect (ৰুদ্ধি) and to our sense-organs will appear

[&]quot;प्रतापाधिभेटं हि समेदमेव ब्रह्मण: यावयति शास्त्रम्"

^भ i... e. ''यत् सब्बें, तद बद्धोति.....च तुयद बद्धा, तत् सर्व्वेभिति" (रत• भ•, 1. 3. 1.)

particularly from the commentary on the Gitā where Avidyā has been said to be an inherent property of our intellect and our senses.—

"It is not right to hold that Avidya is an inherent property (খৰ্ম) of the cogniser. For, we see such diseases as lead to the perception of what is contrary to truth and so on pertain to the intellect, to the eye, to the organ. Neither the perception of what is contrary to truth, nor the cause there-of (viz : the disease of timira) pertains to the percepient Subject &c. &c. (নীত মাত, 13.2.)

I would quote the text here—

"एवं तर्षि जावधमीं तिया ? न ; करणे, चनुषि, वैमिरिकलादिदोषोप-लब्धे:यथा करणे, चनुषि, विपरीतग्राहकादिदोषदर्शनात्... सर्ववै व भग्रहण-विपरीत-संश्र्यादिप्रत्यथा: तिविभित्ता: करणस्थै व कस्यचित् भवितुमर्हति, न जातु: चेवजस्य । संवैदालाच तेषां......न जात्रधर्मालं &c. &c.?'

In the commentary on the Taittiriya-Upanishad, the same conclusion is given——

"विद्याऽविद्ययोसत्तर्यस्तिति चित्? न ;.....दपादिवत् प्रत्यचातुपत्तस्ते व्यक्तः करणस्त्रो" (2-8).

["Knowledge and ignorance (\(\pi \) far () could be \(p \) colour perceived cannot be an attribute of the percepient.......

Therefore knowledge and ignorance, like name and colour, are not attributes of Atm\(\bar{a}\); they pertain to the \(intellect.''\)

"श्विदाा न श्वासनः स्वाभाविको धूर्यः.....न स्वाभाविकस्य एच्छित्तः . बदाचिदुपपदाते" (३० भा०, 4. 3. 20).

["Avidya cannot constitute the essential nature of the ātmā; for, you cannot deprive a thing of its essential nature".]

It is thus seen that our intellect and our senses take only an outward view of things, and they can not go deeper into the inmost unity.—

''पराचि खानि व्यवणित स्वयम्।', तसात् पराङ्कप्रयति, नानारात्मन्'' (कड॰, 4, 1,)

["The self-existent was created the senses out-going. Therefore the perceiver sees the external objects, and not the ātmā within".]

Everything appears to them as composite— अनेका-क्षक, नानाधमाँ विशिष्ट: विचित्र भाका (ब्र॰ भा॰, 1. 3. 1)—composed of parts, as divided into units (सावयव), one outside the other. In the place of the underlying unity a new thing composed of multiple parts (अनेक्सा) is created for the time being——

''एक एव कुटखानित्यः भविदाया...भनेकधा विभाग्यते''

(ब॰ भा॰, 1. 3. 1 9.)

It is therefore the construction of our intellect due to deep-rooted habit it has inherited. due to Avidyā (मिथाजान). This Vedantic knowledge is known as भनिर्व्वचनीय-स्थाति. It superimposes the states of Consciousness upon the unity of the Subject, ignoring or forgetting the fact that the Subject is a unity which it maintains in and through its successive states which cannot be its component parts i. e. cannot be identified or confounded with the real nature of the Subject. They are, in reality, the expressions of its nature, and the Self is distinct from them—"अपृथ्यीवेति" * (मा॰ भा॰, 2.30'); "खतन्त्रो भवति सर्जदा" (कठ॰ 4. 1.). Similarly, simply because God has taken the forms of nāma-rupas Him-"न ब्रमोऽतहकाध्यारोपचा नास्तीति"-He has not actually become these. These forms are to be taken as His expressions: His objects: He is to be found partially expressed, manifested in these. These are authors—indicative of His Swarupa to a certain extent, and hence Ananya (पनन्य)-non-

^{*} cf. "पशान्तोऽपि प्रपचनं सार', प्रमातानी न पश्चित्' (सातानिस्पच, १००)

different from the Self—"इटं सब्दें यदयमासा"—"Everything, all this, is ātmā". This fact is sometimes described by Sankara as—"स्ट्रादिष्ण्यस्य बद्धापति-पस्त्रर्थतां दर्भयति" (ब्र॰, सा॰ 1. 4. 14 & 2. 1. 33.) i. e. the manifestation of the world is for the sole object of leading to the knowledge of Brahma and not for any other purpose. Sometimes this fact is described as —"प्रवश्च-विलय" as in—"प्रविद्याक्षतं कार्थ्य-प्रवश्च 'विद्यया' प्रविद्यापयन्तः तमेवैक'सायतन'भूतमात्मानं जानय (ब्र॰ सु॰ भा॰, 1. 3. 1.). It means that under the influence of Avidyā we used to take the world of nāma-rūpas as something separate, as if the underlying (पायतनस्त') Self has become composed of these náma-rūpas and become something Anya-really other, abandoning its real nature (कार्यप्रपद्मविशिष्ट: विचित्र भावना). But by $Vidy\bar{a}$ (fazz), we are now to take the world (प्रवृद्ध) as the expression of Brahma i. e. nothing but Brahma *; -- that is to say, everything is to be looked upon as revelation of Brahma's nature. not as this or that thing (i.e. 'त्रन्यदिव कार्याकारेण प्रस्तम' -н. 2. 2. 11.). In the Taittiriya-bhásya Sankara himself shows us the way and gives us the indication as to how we are to take the particular objects of nature as Brahma. He says there that-

''उभे पुष्य-पापे...... भात्मक्षेपेथेव, खेन विशेषक्षेय ग्रन्थे स्रवा...... प्रथाति विदान्'' (2.9.)

[i. e. "We are to look upon virtue (yw) and evil (qq),—not as yw and qq in their special forms, but as Paramatma."]

A similar idea is given in the Chhāndogya-bhāsya also—

सर्घाताले दु:खसम्बन्धोऽपि स्थात् इति धेत्? न ; दु:खस्यापि भातालोप-, गमात् भविरोधः" (8, 12, 1) +

[•] cf. ''निखिलं हयाविशेषं, हुन्-६पत्ने न प्रस्तां विद्वां'' (खाळानि६पवन्, 102).

[i.e. "If you object that if everything is to be taken as ātmā, there will then be connection with 'Suffering' (夏语) also;—we reply that even suffering is not to be taken as suffering, but as Atma."]

As there is always an unchangeable sustaining ground in which the modifications of names and forms are rooted (इ॰ भा॰, 1. 3. 1), we are indeed, liable to confound the ground with the Vikāras. But it is a wrong view, view of Avidyā—"न कार्य-प्रपच्चविश्रष्टः, विचित्र भावा विज्ञेयः यथा भनेकात्मको ह्यः"। Māndukya-bhāsya calls this view as चित्तदोष, विकल्पना (fault of the intellect). And Sankara has pointed out that—

"न हि बुद्धिपरिक्तित्यितेन भवयवेन परमार्थतः सावयवं वस्तु भवति" (का॰)

[i.e. "The unity does not really change to multiplicity, simply because our intellect cannot keep the ground separate and it imagines parts (भवश्व) in it i.e. identifies the two erroneously".]

"Can the water of mirage", Sankara asks, "render the saline soil (उपर-देश) miry with moisture" ? (गी॰ भा॰ 13. 2). Again he says— "न तु पहिन्दिकाले, तदपगमकाले च, वस्तुन: कथिदिशेष: स्थात् (त्र॰ स्॰ भा॰, 1. 4.6). That is to say, "when a piece of rope is imagined under the form of a serpent, can that imagined form really make the rope a serpent? It really makes no difference in the rope".

We must make earnest effort to change such intellectual outlook of ours, and try to look upon the world from the stand-point of the Self.—

'सम्बें जगदेकोक्तस्य, घोड्गधा प्रविभन्य, तिस्मन् ब्रह्महिष्धितस्या' (छा॰ भा॰, 4, 4, 1.)

Even when we are confined to this Sameara,

to the world, we are to take it as Atmā, not as something other than $Atm\bar{a}$.

Compare—

''स इष्टेंब ब्रह्म, यदापि देशवानिव सत्त्यते.....यसात् न हि तसा 'सब्रह्माल-परिष्के देशेतवः' कामाः सन्ति।

"'बस्य पासीव, 'नान्य:' कामयितव्य: 'वस्त्वनारभूत:' पदार्थी भवति'

(রু০ মা০, 4. 4. 6).

Nothing ought to appear to him as other than Brahma; but all the differences of nāma-rūpa should now appear as manifestations of the underlying unity which is realising itself in them; for, Atmā is the truth of all differences—"पदावाना विकासणां पर्यक्षं, स्वतस्त अन्तक्षंत्रः"। The differences would no longer appear different (अन्य) from Brahma, as so many self-subsisting things. And all ideas of Separation (भेद-वृद्धि, अन्यक्ष-वोध) due to Avidyā would vanish. This erroneous idea it is which stands between our Self and Mūkti (final freedom).—

"चन्यतापोर्डन संसारीपरमः कर्त्तनः। चितदाया चन्यते न प्रत्युपस्थापित-सासीत्, तत् एतस्मिन् काले एकीभूतं" (ह० भा॰ 4.3.23.)

''चचो डि चनिवत्तभेदप्रत्ययः। स 'चन्त्रत्' प्रस्यन्, प्रणुन्, मन्यानी— इटं क्रता इटं प्राप्नुयानिति डि मन्यते। तस्युप्यं-क्रम्यं तो न ब्रह्मसंस्थता''

(জা॰ মা॰, 2. 23. 1.)

["This Samsāra ought to be got rid of, by means of removing the idea of Anyaiwa i. e. separateness. The idea of separateness is due to Avidyā, has been brought on by Avidyà or ignorance. This separateness is to be supplanted by the idea of Brahma, idea of unity".]

(N. B. The significance of the word 'ग्रकीस्त' is to be found in हा॰ भा॰ 8.12.3. quoted below.)

"The man with whom the idea of difference has not ceased regards (everything as) Anya i. e. different or separate from Brahma. He sees things as different from Brahma, hears and thinks things as different—he also conceives in this way—'by means of this thing I will gain that thing' &c. The man who takes things in this way, cannot be said to be 'resting in Brahma'."

''मतु 'वयमेकः' सन् नात्यत् पद्यति, नात्यत् प्रयोति ।.....वामां य त्राच्य-खौकिकान् पद्यन् रमते दति च विक्जं ?.....नेष दीषः ; द्रष्टु-'रत्यलेन' वामानस्थानात् न प्रशाति'' (काष्ट्र भाष्ट्र, 8. 12. 3).

["How is it that you make two contradictory statements? When the idea of unity will be established, one will see nothing, hear nothing &c. Yet you say that a "Mukta" will see the airs (ideal forms) in Brahmaloka. The reply is this—He does not see these ideal forms as are, as separate from ātmà."]

Here compare what Sankara says elsewhere—

''पविद्याहष्टीनां......'प्रन्यदिव' कार्थ्याकारेष प्रसृतं। प्रज्ञप्रत्ययः सन्बीऽविद्यामावः, ब्रह्मीवैकं परमार्थसत्यं'' (सु० भा०, 2. 2. 11.)

["Those who are affected by avidya view the effects extending on all sides as if they are something other (पन) than Brahma. All ideas that it is not Brahma are nothing but avidya; Brahma alone is the Reality"].

(b) In this connection, I should like to draw your attention to Sankara's theory of "Adhyāropa and Apavāda" (प्रशासि and प्रपाद) which has been resorted to for the purpose of "प्रस्वादोष्ट" referred to above, i. e. for the removal of the idea of separateness प्रस्व-from our mind and to firmly establish the idea of Brahma everywhere. The significance of the Theory is stated here:—When in the Self, through its contact (संदर्भ) with the objects in the environ-

ment, certain particular states and activities are produced, we superimpose (want) these on the Self, and thus confounding the two, we regard as if the sum-total of these particular states &c. constitutes the nature of the Self. This is Adhyāropa. Then Sankara describes the theory of Apavāda. Instead of confounding the states &c, and the Self, we ought to take these particular states &c. as means—sura—for the true knowledge of the underlying Self. Always to look upon the states &c. as a means for self-realisation is the correct view and this Sankara describes as Apavāda. Rāma-tirtha has thus explained this Apavāda theory in his note on the Vedānta-sāra which we should always bear in mind. He explains—

"चपवादी नाम—कार्थस्य कारणमावसत्तावश्रेषणं, कारणसद्भप्यतिरेक्षेण कार्थस्य चसत्त्वावधारणं वा—'चपवाद' इत्युक्तं भवति'।

The lines have been thus translated by A. E. Gough———

"[Rescission or repudiation is the attribution, to the effect, of the being of its cause; or the determination of the non-existence of the effect otherwise than as identical with (i. e. nondifferent from) its cause."]

You will see then that we are not to look upon the effects i. e. the objects of the world or the states &c. of the finite Self, as so many self-subsisting and independent entities, but as having no separate being from the underlying cause or the Self. Sankara regards this view as the means or squa for self-realisation which will remove the idea of separateness or squa Take his illustration given there-

''संख्याखरूपपरिज्ञानाय.....रिखाध्यारीपचं क्रला 'एकेयं रिखा' 'रुग्नेयं' 'बतेयं' इति याइयित, भवगमयित संख्याखरूपं केवलं—न तु संख्याया 'रिखासाल'-मिव।…तथा, स्वत्पत्त्याखने 'कोवाय'माख्याय एकं ब्रद्धात्तत्त्वनाविदितं। पुनः तत्त्-कल्पितोपायन्तितं विशेष'परिश्रोधनार्थं 'नेति' 'नेति' इति तत्त्वोपसं स्वारः क्रतः" (३० भा०, 4, 4, 25).

1t means-

"ऋजुद्दिः किष्यत् रिखामिव षचरं (or संख्यां) मेने। पयात् छपदेशेन रिखायां षचरवृद्धिं (or संख्यावृद्धिं) तत्याज। तदत्...षमात्मानमेव षात्मतया जानीते...तस्मात् दृष्टिं वारयित्वा...तदुपायमादत्ते द्रति.....तन्खद्भपं वोधयति"

(আ॰ गि॰)।

[i. e. "We employ lines, dots &c. to represent the numbers and we call certain line as 'one', another line as 'two' and so on. But simply because the lines are used for numbers, the numbers do not become lines; the lines are to be viewed only as a means for the comprehension of the nature of the numbers. In the same way, the manifested differences of nāma-rūpa and states &c. do not reduce the Self to these differences; but these are to be taken simply as a means of, for the purpose of, the real knowledge of the Self. These differences are not to be mistaken for the Self, simply because they appear in the Self".]

Compare also—

''यनात्मानं देहिन्द्रियादिस'घातं चात्मनी हयामानमपि (i. e. object) घटादिवत्, 'पात्मत्वे न' राज्ञाति...चडो दुरवगाच्चा विचित्वे यं माया''

(कंड॰ भा॰, 3, 12).

["People mistake for the atma the body, the intellect, the senses &c. &c. which are not the atma, but as its knowable objects, like the pot &c. This is due to the influence of the mysterious and marvellous Maya."]

"The true nature of the Self is not tainted by the blemishes of the senses &c.; because the atma is external to the false notion so superposed"—5.11.]

(2) The Sādhanas, means, for the realisation of Brahma—

By the cultivation of moral virtues and other Sādhanas we must purify our mind and the senses—"ātmā is seen by the purified intellect" (कि30 आ0 3.12). The infinite wealth (कार्नेक्ट पानक्) of the inexhaustible (कि21) nature of the Atmā is present in our Self. The realisation by the Ego of the Reality of the Atmā in us is beautifully described in the Brihadāranyaka-Upanishad by the help of the impressive illustration of the union of husband and wife* in deep love and affection. The husband in the embrace of his most affectionate wife forgets altogether the presence of objects near him and loses his separate consciousness and being in the pure and perfect and selfless happiness born of such union.—

''यथा खोके प्रियया इष्टया स्त्रिया सम्यक् परिष्वकः', कामयन्या चामुकः', ं न वाद्यं किञ्चन वेद 'मत्तोऽन्यदस्तुः इति', न च भानत्रं 'बहमिंख सुखौ दुःखौ वेति'; चपरिष्वकस्तु तया विभक्तः जानाति सर्व्वमेव वाद्यं &c.''

(इ॰ सा॰, 4. 3. 21.)

It is thus seen that when the true knowledge arises, the avidyā under whose influence the objects of the world appeared as different from the Supreme Unity will vanish and with it the idea of separateness (परात-वोध) will disappear, and this is जीवस जि— Emancipation.—

^{*} We believe the Vaisnava philosophers borrowed their ideas of सपुर-भाव from this text.

"प्रमुखसावनिवृत्ती...पातामानी भवति ।...सर्व्वातामानी मुक्तिः"

(so mo 4. 4. 6.)

''स'सारिषाः संसारित्वायोचेन ईश्वरात्मत्वं प्रतिपाद्धिवितं"

(वर्ष भार, 4, 1, 3).

["When the idea of (our) separateness (from God) is removed, the idea of (our essential identity with) God will arise. This is Mukti. That we are essentially connected with the world is to be removed, and that we are essentially related with God is to be realised".]

Unless we are able to annihilate this avidyā which has concealed Brahma and created or projected the idea of Anyatwa—separateness—in its place, how can we gain the true character of the Supreme Reality—याधासा-इज्ञेन? Nila-kantha, the reputed commentator of the Mahābhārata and a faithful follower of Sankarāchāryya states that Nirguna Brahma whose nature is Bliss (भानन्द) contains within it infinite wealth of चानेख्य and याज्ञिसीन्द्ये, and it is this wealth which is finding expression in the world. "भानन्द्य नित्येख्ये सायया भिष्यच्यते" *. Sankara himself calls Nirguna Brahma as Sivam (भिवम्) in—

''परमार्थतोऽसपाधिकतं एकमेवाहितीयं...भनमभयं 'शिव'मिष्यते'

(प्र॰ भा॰, 6. 3).

And also-

"भवयता गिवा" (मा॰ का॰ भा॰ 2. 33.)

ं धच चनमस्तमभयं 'श्रिव'महितीयं तत सत्यं स चाता तव''

(इं।• भा • 6, 16, 3).

As the Infinite is within the finite Self, the Infinite দ্বানীয়াইয়—wealth of Wisdom and Power

. Vide : महाभारत-न्त्रनपर्व्य, chap. 213.

and Beauty—lies concealed under avidyā within us.—

"जीव: परमात्मां एव सन्, तिरस्तृतज्ञानैश्वर्यो भवति...जीवस्य ज्ञानैश्वर्थ-तिरोभाव:...दृष्टेन्द्रियबुद्धि-विषयवेदनादियोगात् भवति''

(व म स भा । 3 2 6).

''परमानन्दस्ये व विषय-विषयाकारेण मावा प्रस्ता'' (३० भा•, 4. 3. 33.)

["The finite Self—being like a part of Paramatma,—like a Divine Spark, Infinite মানী মুখ্য—exists concealed within him...The infinite wealth of Wisdom and Power is covered up on account of the connection of the finite Self with his body, sense-organs, the intellect and sense-perceptions and the like".]

["Limited measures of the Supreme Bliss work in the world through the Subject-object relation,"]

At present, we do not even suspect its presence in us, so completely has avidyā concealed, screened it. Our eye is fixed at present upon the names and forms—"नामरूपोपाधिदृष्टिरेन भनति खाभानिको" (ह॰ 3.5.1). But as that screen is gradually removed by our cultivation of moral virtues and other Sādhanas, the Infinite जानेख्य will gradually stand revealed before us.—

"'ज्ञानैश्वर्थाविभव्यति रिप परेण परेण सूथसी भवति" (व॰ भा॰, 1. 3. 30).

To the extent you are able to remove the Screen of Avidyā (Vide, क्र॰ स्॰ भा॰, 1. 1. 12 and 3. 2. 5), to that extent the Infinite Divine Wealth—भगवदेश्वयं —will stand revealed and realised by you. But it requires great effort and Sādhana on your part.——

''मङाप्रयासेन खभावप्रवृत्तिनिरोधं क्रला'' (वाठ० भा०, 4. 1),

(प्र॰ भा॰ 6. 1).

["Our inherent natural impulses must be curbed with intense effort."]

And our success in this direction is also dependent on the Grace of God.

"प्रसिश्वरमभिष्यायतो यतमानस्य... 'ईश्वर-प्रसादात्'...क खिचेदेवाविर्भवति... न स्वभावत: सव्वे वां' (ब॰ स्॰ 3. 2. 5).

["It reveals to only a few of those earnest Spirits who meditate on God, through the Divine Grace."]

These trans are inexhaustible and perfect, they cannot, therefore, be completely revealed here in this temporal and inperfect mundane world, since what is revealed here is but a partial expression of the Divine. To a world beyond this, yet connected with it, we would carry our Soul there with its Sādhana (पूर्वप्रा-ह. 4. 4. 2), and be enabled there to further develop our capacities—

"यतते च ततो भूयः संसिद्धी क्षहनन्दन" (गी॰, 6. 43).

and thus to perfect our character. We are not merely finite and creature of time, but we are also something more—we are also infinite, which raises us beyond time-limitations and makes us one with the Supreme Infinite (uthata) Principle—Brahma, where all strife and defect will end and we would be perfect with the Perfect.—

''वर्ष्यंदुःखविनिर्म्यु क्रचैतन्यात्मकोऽइमित्येष चात्मानुभवः (व्र॰, 4. 1. 2).

"पुर्वे तु...सर्वानयंत्रातातीत प्रतिपन्ने हमाते प्रयोगनं मोचसिन्धः"

(ब्र॰ भा॰, 3, 3, 14).

["The immediate realisation of the atma is "I" which is free from all suffering and evil." "The Supreme End of existence is the realisation of freedom in the Supreme Purusha who is found to be lying beyond all evils and sufferings".]

The Infinite is within us, God's purpose is revealing in the world, and it is our duty to choose that

Good as our Ideal. We may fail to realise it, and in that case there is no advancement. But we are free to a certain extent and there is possibility to adopt it as our End. As God is working in the world and He is the ultimate Agent, He will see that His good purpose is not frustrated and that the world is, as a whole, advancing to the good Purpose. God is within us in possibility and we have actualised that possibility so far in our character. Infinite possibility lies open in our character and it is not something stereotyped. Determinists say that it is our character—unfa-which finds expression in our conduct (बाचरण) - "प्रकृति स्तां नियोच्यति...करिष्यस्यवगोऽपि सन" (गी. 18.59); and it is our character that determines our actions. But our character has been formed by us; it is liable to transformations. Determinists identify the Self with the character which it owns. But the real solution lies in the relation of the Self to the character. The Self is to be distinguished from its content; it has its character, but it is not identical with it. Apart from Self. character is mere abstraction. Hence that our character determines our action really means-it is our Self (which has the character for its content) that determines; and the basal Self being Infinite, infinite possibilities are always open to it. and present life cannot be exhaustive expression of my possibilities; I am always more than my past and present life. Hence, nobody can tell beforehand how our Self will actually express. its hidden possibilities. Sometimes the Self surprises all by its action which is quite unexpected, which

leads to quite a different course of action. Take the case of $Jag\bar{a}i$ of Nadia who broke away from his past, yet he was the same man. But the man sometimes falls when he is expected to stand.

Other Sadhanas for self-realisation—

(a) So long as we are driven helpless to action by the energies of our impulses born of our empirical nature (प्रकृति), we desire objects which are calculated to satisfy these impulses; we are bent on selfish ends and are deluded by 'Egoism'. We must rise above the sway of affection and aversion and restrain these impulses under the law of rational reflection, by "abandoning attachment and the fruits thereof"——

''राग-हेषवियुक्तेस्तु विषयानिन्द्रिययसम् । षात्मवग्रेऽ[र्वेधेयात्मा प्रसादमधिगक्कति'' ॥—

Worldly desires and interests are useless to a man of wisdom. The commentary on the Gitā says—"By restraining the first natural activities one by one and thereby gradually inducing fresh and higher activities, the Sruti teaching works (and any serves to create an aspiration to reach the inmost Soul" (18, 66).

- (b) "I reward the unselfish who do their prescribed duties and seek for Moksha, by granting them knowledge" (Chap. 4). Free from egoism and without attachment for fruits of action, one must meditate on Iswara, dedicating all actions to Him. Devotion to one's duty leads to perfection. "Self-knowledge is the aim of all endeavour."
- (c) Knowledge of the true nature of the Self aided by all favourable conditions of its rise and de-

velopment, viz: purity of mind, humility, inner purity of mind, "Self-control which consists in directing exclusively to the right path the body and the mind which are by nature attracted to all directions", perception of evil in birth, death and old age, in sickness and pain; steady unflinching meditation on the One as our sole refuge &c. &c.—these virtues are to be cultivated (Chap. 13. 7-11.). ज्ञान-निष्ठा consists in an "intent effort to establish a continuous current of the idea of the inner Self (प्रत्यगावा)—chap. 18, 55.

- (d) The Gitā remarks—"The end of knowledge is freedom (मृत्ति). The end should be kept in view; for, it is only when one perceives the end that one will endeavour to cultivate attributes which are the means of attaining that knowledge. The attributes or virtues to be cultivated have been specified in Chap. 13, 7-10.—
- (i) Humility, patience, uprightness, purity, social service, absence of Egoism, society of the disciplined &c. &c.

''बमानित्मदिश्वत्मिष्टंमा चान्तिरार्क्का वं। द्या भूतेष्वखोतुत्र'' &c, &c.

(ii) Cultivation of piety, chastity, right intuition &c. &c. (Chap. 16, 1.)

''चभयं सत्त्वसंग्रद्धिः ज्ञानयोगव्यवस्थितिः। पश्चिम सत्यमकोषः, वर्षेग्रमं'' &c. &c.

- (iii) मैत्री, कर्णा, मुदिता, उपेजा &c. as mentioned by Madhusudana in his Gloss on the Gitā.
- (e) Contemplation of the Beautiful—in "रसोऽ-इसप् कौन्तेय," "प्रभास्ति शश्चि-स्व्यंथोः", "शब्दः खे", "पौक्षं मृषु" etc. etc. (Chap. 6, and 11);

Chap. 5, 25—"सर्वभूतिहते रता:" etc.

(f) Sankara's remarks are very useful in the formation of our ethical character.—

"The good (चेय:) and the pleasurable (प्रेय:) are confusedly presented to the man. The intelligent compare the two; and on mature reflection discern their relative value—their difference—and having thus reflected, they embrace the good as worthier than the pleasurable. Then they adopt means to the attainment of the End chosen" (किउ॰ भा॰). We thus compare, estimate our impulses—they are thus our objects of contemplation. A sum-total of feelings, impulses etc. etc. cannot deliberate, cannot control anymore than each feeling and impulse separately. Only a free Self can do so which has them. In every voluntary action, the Self which is not in time, does and can introduce a new element in time.

(g) कर्म-Work done under impulsive forces and with self-seeking end in view is to be replaced by work done with higher and inner ends in view. Reflection—विचार—guides man in this stage for selecting higher ends. Then lastly, the realisation of the unity of the Self is the highest end and it is the highest activity in life. The meditation of Brahma in and through the manifested objects—"जगतस यस सं तत्-परिज्ञानात् परं त्रेय इति सर्वोपनिषदां निश्चितोऽयः" (प्र॰ सा॰, 6.1)—in order of increasing value—is regarded as meritorious, and it leads man gradually to the highest Goal. The doing of all prescribed duties and leading a life of virtue ("वृद्धे पुरुष्कत् भूत्वा"—ह॰ सा॰ 4.4.9.)—are regarded as necessary aids to the knowledge of Brahma.

It is wrong to hold the view that the Vedānta teaches inertia—inactivity.—

''पूर्व-पूर्वभूमिषु वैराग्य', उत्तरोत्तरभूमी पानन्दपाप्तिसाधनं ; वैराग्यस्य 'तर-तम-भावेन' परमकाष्ठोपपचे:, 'निर्दातश्रयस्य' तस्य (Transcendent good —beyond the series of goods in the scale of existence) 'परमानन्द'प्राप्तिसाधनत्वसभावात्''—(पा॰ गिरि, in ह॰ भा॰, 4.3.33.)—

i. e. Man cannot find satisfaction of his Self in any earthly and temporal order of things. He seeks in Transcendent God the fulfilment of the Good he is trying to realise in his own life. This Good—"athiat"—we find revealed gradually in the order of nature.

ं धव यव विभूत्यायितिशयः, तव तव ईश्वर इति उपाखतवा योत्यते ।

Thus we think of God as a Power in the world—immanent power working in the world and progressively making for Good. The world, as I have tried to show in a previous Lecture, reveals an End or Divine Purpose which is being unfolded stage by stage. The world is striving towards, developing towards, an End and its Goal is out of sight. "Brahma is "anat"—"th"; and this the is what gives pleasure and joy, is well-known in the world as sweet, sour &c. &c. Here, the worldby bliss produced by the presence of external helps (stimulating objects), has been instanced for understanding the Divine Bliss; for, it is by means of this well-known bliss that the Divine Bliss can be understood" (a. M.)

Thus the Ideal Good (आनन्द or साध्वर्ध) which is revealing and working in the worldly objects, of which they are but imperfect manifestations—is the highest

End of human pursuit. The lower and higher objects are, therefore, only the proximate ends and these can be made to be embraced in the Highest Good. The multiplicity of human ends is connected with the Supreme End. But as Brahma transcends the temporal order of objects, we ought not to remain satisfied with these lesser ends, but must move through these for a complete and final satisfaction.—

''जगत्कार बं उपास' ब्रह्म उक्षा, चनुपाधिब्रह्मप्रतिपत्तिः कर्तस्या .. उभयविदेव सम्यग् ज्ञानी । न हि चन्तरस्य तत्त्वे ज्ञाते क्रतक्रत्यता चित्ता' (नीलक्ष्य in the Gita).

In the Gitā, it has been shown that Brahma is to be first worshipped as the Cause of the world—as the Power which carries on and sustains the worldly process—परिपाशि-निद्ध।—"समाग्यासके मधि सचे विशेषाः पोताः"। Then at the same time, Brahma is to be known as a Being which transcends this process—क्टब्स-निद्धः Aiman who has not realised these two aspects of Brahma cannot be said to be able to realise the Highest Good—the Supreme End (गो॰, Chap. 12).

XII

The Source of Adwaita-vada.

While discussing the relation which subsists between the cause and its successive effects. Sankarāchāryya in his commentary on the Brahmaintroduced, as we have stated before, the idea of two stand-points from which this relation can be viewed, viz., the Pāramārthika and the Vyāvahārika. He says that from the former standpoint the effects are to be looked upon as Ananya (पनका)-not distinct-from their cause, although from the Vyāvahārika view, we take them to be Anya (प्राच)—distinct—from the cause. About the exact significance of these two terms-'Anya' and 'Ananya'-much misunderstanding exists in various quarters and we would try in this Lecture to bring out the bearing of these two terms upon his entire theory in the light of what Sankarāchāryya has himself said about them.

We would here explain the idea with the help of an illustration which Sankara himself has used in several parts of his commentaries. समूर्ण (fragments of earth), जिंद (lump of earth), चट (pot) are the effects or transformations or manifestations of the cause स्ताता (clay). Now, what is the nature of the relation that exists between these

successive changes issuing out of the मृतिका-effects produced from the cause? This relation can be explained in two different ways. The ordinary common people of the world regard the successive changes thus produced as self-subsisting entitiesexisting separated or divided from their cause. The clay to their view, has transformed itself as मुच्चणे and the सुझ पे totally transforms itself into सृत्-पिंड, and the मृत-पिंड into the घर or the pot. One form is changed into another and that again into another and so on. One dies and another is produced. preceding forms are looked upon as the causes. successively, of the latter forms. This is the empirical stand-point and our practical life is bound up with this view.

But it is otherwise when these are considered from the Pāramārthika stand-point. This view never regards the effects as separated from or outside of the causal reality. They can never exist separated from their cause, out of relation to their cause. They can never exist separated from their cause, out of relation to their cause. They etc., are not, to this view, so many self-subsisting entities, but only successive manifestations of the one causal reality—Than—lying, hidden behind them. Here, the clay or rather the nature of the clay finds its expression in the successive forms produced out of it. The real essence of the clay is not lost in these forms; it is present behind each of these successive changes; the identity of the cause is not lost but present in each successive change or difference.* It does not itself change with these changing forms;

it does not, in assuming these forms, become something else or प्रम. It is clear then that these successively changing forms do not entirely lose their value * in the eyes of those who are possessed of the पारमाधिकदृष्टि. Sankara has told us that there is really no conflict or opposition (विरोध) between these two views.

''तेषां (हितनां) हैतहरिः, चलाकमहैतहरिः।.....तैः.....चलदीयोऽयं 'अर्व्वानगलात्' पात्मैकलदर्शनपची न 'विरुध्यते' (मा० का॰ भा०, 3. 17-18)".

["They are all Dualists and dualism is their stand-point, but our stand-point is non-dualism. There is no conflict between these two views, as everything is non-different (पनच) from the Self"].

Here compare ग्रानन्दगिरि-

''हैतमहैतकार्थं, न च कारणं तत्कार्थप्रतिभासे विकायते, — कार्यस्य कारणातिरिक्षेण प्रभावात्। पतः हैतपचैरहैतपची विरुद्धी न भवति''।

["All dual forms are the effects of non-dual (Brahma); and there is thus no conflict between the effect and the real cause; for, no effect is really different from the cause.]"

As there is no opposition, the परिणासवाद may be retained even when we emphasise the विवक्त-वाद प.

But there are, unfortunately, several modern interpreters of Sankara's System who think otherwise. They regard all nāma-rūpas—the whole universe—as mere illusion, as unreal and false. But, as we have seen above, Sankara has found no necessity for denying the existence of the world altogether. Sankarāchāryya distinctly declares—

- * Because they are viewed as the manifestation of the underlying cause (not as this thing or that thing.)
- † "अप्रत्याख्याख्याच आर्थ्यप्रपंचं परिणाम-प्रक्रियां च आत्रयति स्वकारः (वेदा॰ भा॰, 2.1.14).

"Nobody has the power to dissolve both the external and internal existences which are presented to our senses and to our consciousness (বিষয়ন:)."

Here is how he expresses this idea :-

"कोऽयं प्रपंच-विलयो नाम ?.....तव यदि तावत् विद्यमानोऽयं प्रपंची देशदिलचण भाष्यात्मिकः, वाश्चयः पृथित्यादिलचणः प्रविलापियतव्य इतुर्विरत्, स पुच्चमावेच भाष्यः प्रविलापियतुमिति, तत्प्रविलयोपदेशोऽशकाविषय एव स्थात्।"

(वे॰ भा॰, 3, 2, 21).

l "What", Sankara enquires of the doubtor, "is your idea about the Dissolution (प्राच-विजय), pray ?..... The world — both in its subjective and objective condition—actually exists (विद्यमानः); nobody is therefore capable of dissolving the existence of such a world. You cannot really mean this by your term प्राच-विजय" &c. &c.]

In a famous passage in the Brihadāranyakabhāsya, he raises a question—

"If you hold all the nama-rupas to be real and not false, what would be the fate of your Adwaita-Vāda? Brahman has been declared in the Sruti as One and without a second. If you hold to this declaration made by the Sruti, you cannot, at the same time, admit the reality of the difference of the nāma-rupa—the changes going on in the world."—

"नामक्पोपाध्यसिलं — 'एकमेवाहितीयं' 'नेह नानासि किंचन' दति युतयो विकथ्ये रन् दत्—न ; सलिल-फेनटक्शन्ते न परिहतलात्'

(ह॰ भा॰, 3. 5. 1).

The reply here suggested by Sankarāchāryya is very important. He says—"No, you need not deny the existence of the changes—the nāma-rūpas. The existence of these does not at all harm, or come into conflict (विशेष), in any way with the theory of Adwaitism. Take the case of the relation between

water and its productions—the waves, bubbles, foams and froth; the relation between clay and its successive transformations in the shape of सूत्र ज़े, सृत्रिंड, घट etc." As it is the cause itself which appears as these changed forms, these are, in reality, non-different (अन्य) from their cause. No necessity arises to deny these successive changes, if we conceive them to be (अन्य) i.e., non-different from their cause. That these are non-different (अन्य) from their cause does not make them different—अय—or independent entities: neither does it abolish their own respective forms. Carefully note also what Sankarāchāryya says in this respect in his Vedānta-bhāsya:—

'न च समुद्रादुदकात्मनोऽनन्यत्वे ऽपि......फेन-तरंगादीनां इतरेतरभावापत्ति-भेवति ।

न च तेषामितरेतरभावानापत्ताविष समुद्रात्मनोऽन्यत्वं भवित।" (वे० भा०, 2. 1. 13).

['i. e. The foams, the waves, the billows &c. are nondifferent from the sea-water (their cause), but they are different from one another in their own respective forms; one form does not pass over into another form'.

"Each of these is different from the other, no doubt; but that does not make them different from the sea-water."]

The sum and substance of Sankara's arguments may be thus stated:—

- (a) Whenever the effects are produced, they are produced from their cause; they can never appear divided—separated—from their cause.*—
- * ''यस्य च यसादात्मलाभी भवति, स तेन अप्रविभक्ती हरूः, विर्धी घटाशीनां सदा'' (ह॰ भा॰)।

^{&#}x27;'विशेषा; सामान्ये उप्ता:, न तत एव निर्भिद्य यहीतुं शकान्ते " •

Can you separate the pot from its cause—the clay? Can you separate the waves from their cause—the water? Can you, placing the waves outside the water, regard them as something self-existent—as something way?

- (b) The effects are, in reality, the manifestations of their cause,—the stages through which the causal reality expresses its nature. It is the cause which without forfeiting its own identity differentiates itself in these forms. It is the cause which holds these forms, sustains them. It is like the identity of the thread which holds the manifold flowers together and forms a piece of garland.* Then how is it possible to abolish these successive changes or to separate them from their cause which holds them?
- (c) The cause does not, in assuming these forms, lose itself in them. The movements of my hand, the walking, the uttering of words—all these are my states; they are mine, they belong to me. If you separate these from me, they lose their substance, they die; for, it is the cause alone which binds its effects. One can, without difficulty, recognise the identity of the cause in its different changing states or manifestations. A cow, when lying in repose and ruminating, is called a cow; but when it gets up and walks, will it now be called a horse, and not the same identical cow †?

^{* &#}x27;मिंघ सर्विनिंदं प्रीतं, स्वे मिष्णिणा इव'' (गी॰)।

^{† &#}x27;'न हि खोंके गौलिष्ठन् गच्छन् वा गीभ विति प्रधानस्त अवादिशाल्यसरम् इत्यादि" (इ॰ भा॰, 2. 1. 20).

The cause is thus the same throughout all its changing differentiations and does not lose its identity and *become* something *different* from its own self.

Throughout all these changes, the cause remained as it was in itself. Thus Brahma exists apart from relationships, as well as in and through relations. It transcends the universe of Māyā, but in its transcendence it does not throw away Māyā;—Māyā being but no other than Brahma (itself), revealing and hiding itself. When we (pot) disappears it hides itself in clay; for, it was nothing but clay; when it appears as a pot, it is nothing but clay; for, it hides its nature as clay in we (pot) | Sankara thus expresses the idea—

''दिनिनि दाविकारे, दाव तिरीभवति ; सोऽपि तत्रैव । जगित तथा परमात्मा, परमात्मचिप नगत् तिरोधत्ते''॥ (स्तात्मनिवपण, 94.)

["The wood lies hidden in the form of the elephant, (when it is) made of wood, and the form of the elephant when disappearing also hides itself in the wood. So the Supreme Self lies hidden in the universe (when manifested) and the universe (when disappearing) lies hidden in the Self".]

Brahman or the underlying Reality is not thus in any way affected or changed by the changing nāma-rūpas. It is the universe in which the Reality is expressing its nature, so that you need not deny the reality or the existence of the universe. There is, therefore, no opposition (are) between the world and its causal source. * It is in this way that in

Vide: Ananda-giri quoted at p. 193.

Sankara-Vedānta the uftur has been retained, while emphasising the fart. It is most erroneous to suppose, as has been done by many, that in order to retain the unity of Brahman, Sankarāchāryya has abolished the world as false.

Sankara's Adwaita Philosophy is founded upon this relation of the cause and its effects. From the discussion given above we arrive at the conclusion that one cause is present behind its different manifestations in the world; that the cause itself is gradually realising itself in the different forms of nāma-rūpa. It will be a mistake to think the effects produced from the cause as something different from it.

One Reality manifests itself in the multiplicity of nāma-rūpas, and the true nature of this Reality has not been reduced to these successive effects. It is the connecting link of all these differences, and its own nature realises itself in and through these differentiations. There is no need in Sankara's System to declare the unreality* of these differences, or to separate these from the underlying causal reality taking them as self-sufficient entities.

If the Māyā and its products are not Brahma itself, but something else, other than an (पर्य); (if they do not form part of Brahma) then the result would be violation of Adwaita-Vāda—a dualism would ster in. Sankara avoids this dualism by pointing out non-difference (पन्यक्त) of effects

^{&#}x27;'सदात्मना विकाराणां सत्यत्नं, खतस्तु भन्नतत्वनेव'' (छा० भा०)

from their cause. He has not abolished the objects of the world, he only looked upon them—as Brahma, as the expression of His nature. This was his utunfum view; he looked upon the world from this higher stand-point. The following quotations will also support our position—

''बनवमत-काञ्चनानां, भूषण-धीरेव भूषचे हैंमे ।

एवमविवेक्तभाजां, जगित तथा न तात्त्विकी धिषणा॥''

(खाका-निक्पण. 83.)

["Those who have not realised the gold, look upon a golden ornament as an ornament only (but not as gold); so too those who have no realisation of truth, do not perceive the world as Brahma, but as world only."]

वह्रभि: विसीभवक्तै:, षहमेवेटं चराघरं विश्वं। श्रीकर-फेन-तरङ्गा:, सिन्धोरपराणि न खलु व सूनि ॥ (145)

["All this universe sentient and non-sentient is Brahma, is "I". Foam, wave and spray &c. are not, in reality, substances different (অব, অবং) from the ocean."]

''मासोवैक' जगत सम्बें, मासानो 'त्यात्' न किश्वन । खदी यहत् घटादीनि, स्त्रमानं सर्वमीचते ॥'' (मासावीम, 48).

["As one sees pots &c. as mere clay; so all this universe (ডকা) is only the Self, there is naught other than Self."] •

It is our deliberate opinion—and this opinion has been formed by a careful and scrutinising study of the Rig-Veda itself—that the relation between

the cause and its effect as expounded by Sankarächāryya, the true import of which we have given above, owes its origin to the Rig-Veda. The popular conception that the hymns of the Rig-Veda are addressed to the grand and remarkable natural forces which captured the imagination of the primitive Aryan settlers of India, in the shape of the Sun the Moon the Dawn the Sky etc., is altogether erroneous. We have, on the contrary, found ample material in the Rig-Veda which unmistakably proves that the theory of Non-dualism as interpreted by Sankara in his Vedānta System of philosophy runs throughout this stupendous work from the beginning to the end. This may sound strange to many ears. but would it not rather be regarded as remarkably strange that an intelligent race of people like the Hindus should exhibit such a lamentable lack of common-sense in allowing the hymns and Mantras addressed to inert (লভ) non-intelligent natural phenomena to form an essential part of their Even at the present day, their daily devotions and prayers to God are performed by a hymn of the Rig-Veda. If the Rig-Veda contains nothing but certain measured lines meant to be addressed to the fascinating objects of nature calculated to inspire awe and admiration, then its value and importance are considerably diminished. To our view, the importance of the Rig-Veda lies in the fact that it is the original store-house of the Indian Idealism which supplied the materials of Adwaita-Vāda which subsequently gave rise to the admirable System of Vedanta.

We have found above that it is an important feature of the Vedantic causal theory that the effects produced by the cause can never remain separated from the cause and be regarded on their own account, to be independent and self-sufficient entities; and that the causal reality in assuming these forms, does not become something else (पन). losing its own nature. It is only the nature of the causal reality which finds gradual expression in and through these visible forms. * Now, this is also the position of the Rig-Veda itself. The Vedic Rishis worshipped this causal Reality which operates behind these visible forms, knowing full well that these visible forms by themselves have no value at all. For, they can never be separated from the underlying causal reality and dered on their own account, as if they are the only The Vedic Rishis did not remain satisfied realities. with these visible forms but behind the shifting scenes of nature they always tried to seek for and discovered a constant causal Reality which they worshipped. It is the quest of changeless which is in the midst of changes.

There are quite a number of arguments by which this position has been established in the Rig-Veda. We would, in this Lecture, content ourselves with presenting only one set of arguments collected from different places of the Rig-Veda. If, to the Vedic Rishis the gods were no more than so many visible

^{* &#}x27;'.....तथा मनुष्यादिन्दं व हिरस्याम पर्यन्ते वु ज्ञानैश्रयां यभिष्यक्तिरपि परेस्य परेस सूत्रसी भवति''। (वे० भा०१-३-३०).

Vide : also बी॰ भा॰, १५-१२.

objects as they appeared to the senses, we would not have found mention of the dual nature of each of the Vedic gods so clearly and distinctly, as has been done in the Rig-Veda. The Agni, the Sunyva, the Aswins, the Soma, -in fact every Vedic god we find described as possessing a dual form, a dual nature of his own. As Brahman has been described in the Upanishads as प्राणस्य प्राणः, मनसी मनः. सर्यास्य सर्याः etc.. so in the Rig-Veda, under the visible forms of the gods there is, in each case, an invisible form which constitutes the true nature of these gods. In the Vedic state of society, people were not wanting whose cultured minds were busy discovering the presence of an invisible causal power working behind nature which they contemplated and worshipped, taking the shifting phenomena of nature as mere external expressions of that hidden causal power. The very mention of the dual nature of the Vedic gods unmistakably bears witness to the fact that the actual visible forms of the gods were never recognised in the Rig-Veda as the only realities. are all different facets of one and the same shining light different types of manifestation of one unity. different names for one Reality.

We would now quote here the hymns from which readers would find how the *dual nature* of the gods has been brought out in the Rig-Veda.

(1) Take the case of the Agni-

It is stated about Agni—the fire-god—that the visible, material form of Agni has within him another invisible, internal form, and this internal form—

स्मगानाचिन, i. e. the fire kindled on cremation ground for burning the dead body is thus addressed :—

''क्रव्यादमिपं प्रहिणोमि दूरं, यमराज्यं गच्छतु रिप्रवाहः। बह्नेवायमितरो जातवेदा, देविध्यो हव्यं वहतु प्रजानमृ'।

["The material form of the fire, the form which is devouring, consuming the body of the dead, we do not want; let this form be removed from us. But here, within this visible fire, there is another fire, and this fire it is which knows everything born in the world. It is this fire which always conveys oblations to the gods."]

Take again the following Mantra:-

''विधेम ते परमे जन्मन्नग्रे, विधेम सीस्रविर सपस्ये। यसाद योनेस्दारिया, यजे तम्।''

["The fire has two-fold birth-places—the place of its manifestation. The one is the superior place, and the other inferior or the gross place. We desire to worship, O Fire! that place—that source—that wifn—from which thou hast sprung".]

That the invisible form of the fire is nothing but its causal nature has been very well brought out by the term ulfa. This invisible causal substance of the visible fire is also referred to in another hymn in this manner:—

"विद्याते नाम परमं गुष्टा यत्। विद्यातमुखं यत पालगन्य"॥

["The fire has got a most hidden name, and we have been able to learn of this hidden name of the fire. We know, too, the source—sa—from which thou hast sprung up, O Fire!"]

In another hymn we find this address:

"Over and above this material body, the fire has a most auspicious body; carry by that body this dead man to the higher region of heaven (10-16-4)." Exactly similar prayer we find addressed to the Sun in the Isa-Upanishad: "Withdraw, O Sun! these Thy visible rays, I desire to see that auspicious form of thine which lies concealed within those rays,"

(2) Suryya——

The Rig-Veda in similarly unmistakable terms refers to the underlying hidden causal substance existing behind the visible form of the Sun.

''हेते चक्रो स्यों', ब्रह्माच चरत्या विदुः। चयेनं चक्रे यर गुष्ठा, तरध्यातय इत् विदुः' ॥

["To the Sun belong two wheels (বন্ধ). One is gross, visible to all; but the other is hidden, invisible- নুয়া।"]

["Who knows this invisible hidden चन्न of the Sun? Only to those who are of contemplative turn of mind, who meditate inwardly within, this यूद चन्न reveals its essence; others cannot know this."]

This description leaves no doubt in our mind as to the real nature of this invisible wheel of the Sun. It is the causal substance which underlies the *visible* gross form of the Sun. The presence of this causal substance within the visible Sun has been brought out in another form in a hymn which the 50th Sukta contains in the first Mandal.

The Sun is thus described there-

"There are three states or forms of the Sun. The one state is termed as eq; the other is eq+qq, and the last is eq+qq. That Sun is called as "eq", whose beam falls upon this earth. The Sun which spreads its beams upwards in heaven is termed as "eqq". Besides these two, there exists the "eqq" Sun who never sets, never rises". This beautiful description gives us an idea of the visible gross form of the Sun, as well as its invisible causal form, and also the form which lies even beyond the causal state (which in the Upanishadic nomenclature may be called as qual state). Sankara in his commentary on the

Vedānta has explained that the light (क्योति:) of the Sun which is sent up to heaven is no other than the being of Brahman—''प्रय यदत: परो क्योति: दीप्यते", etc., etc., (वि॰ भा॰, १-१-२४). By the 'light' mentioned here in the Sruti we are to understand the Being of Brahman which is to be found underlying all the visible existences as their causal substance. *

The Rig-Veda, too, in describing the invisible subtle state of the Sun clearly refers to that underlying causal substance. In the Chhāndogya-Upanishad, the Solar Disc has been described as a bee-hive and it is there stated that the real Sun does not rise or does not set—"न निक्काच, नोदियाय।" This line is exactly similar in its idea to the Sun described in the Rig-Veda as the उत्तम Sun 'which never rises, never sets'.

These descriptions clearly bring out the fact that the Rig-Vedic Sun and the Fire also are not merely visible gross natural objects.

(3) We shall now consider how the सोम has been described in the Rig-Veda. This is stated about the Soma (सोम)—

''सीमं मन्यते पपिव श्रन्थात्, संपिषन्ति श्रीषधिं। सीमं यं ब्रह्माची विदुः, • न तस्त्राश्राति क्रस्वन'' ॥

["When the people press the सोम and squeezing from it its juice drink it off, they think they have quaffed the सोम but to those whose minds are inwardly turned, the fact stands clearly comprehended that nobody can ever drink of the true, real सोम।" "न ने समानि पाथिन:"—"No mortal man of the earth can drink Thee, Soma!"]

 [&]quot;विकारे चनुगतं जनत्-कारणं त्रक्क निर्दिष्टम्" (वि• भा॰, 1, 1, 24-25).

You will see that as in the case of the Sun and the Fire, here also we find the two-fold forms of the TH;—the one is its gross form which the people ordinarily press and drink; but "who is to drink the subtle invisible form of TH, its hidden causal substance which the material form of TH contains within it?" It is for this reason that elsewhere it has been stated of the TH that the "eternally existent Soma has got two kinds of beams extending both ways:—

''लभयतः पवमानस्य (सीमस्य) रश्मयः, भ्रुवस्य सतः परियन्ति केतवः''। And also—

> "बिता न्यूर्णन् सम्तरस्य धाम, खर्विदे भवनानि प्रथम्म"।

[i.e., "सोम which is the source of प्रस्त has its two parts covered by its rays,"]

It is also stated that the "Soma has a place within it which lies hidden and invisible to the ordinary gaze of the people and it is in this hidden place where exist the thirty-three gods" and that "to this real place become centred all the prayers of the devotees"—

"तव स्थे सोम पवमान निन्धे, विश्वे देवास स्त्रय एकादशास: ।"
"तव सत्थं पवमानस्थ पस्त. " यव विश्वे कारव: सवसन्त्र" ।

If the सोम were merely the सोम plant, how could it be addressed as the "inexhaustible navel (नासि:) of the earth," as "the seed (रेत:) from which all the objects have been produced"?

As we have seen above in the case of the Sun, the सोम also has been stated to have a "तुरीय" place
—"तरीय' धाम महिषो विवंत्ति"।

(4) We now come to Indra.—

Indra has got two forms; one of these forms constitutes his gross, visible form and the other is the causal form behind the former into which it is inter-woven, and that is his invisible subtle form. These dual forms of Indra find expression in several ways—

"दूरे तद्वाम (शरीरं) गुद्धां पराचैः ।......महत् तद्वाम गुद्धां पुरुस्यृक्, येन सूर्तं जनयो येन भव्यं । प्रवं जातं ज्योतिर्थदस्य प्रिथम्" ।

["Indra possesses dual bodies. One of these bodies is most hidden; and this hidden body is very large and it extends over—touches - large spaces. By this body, Indra has brought into being the past and the future (objects) and created those bright objects he desired to create."] This body, you are requested to mark, has been called 'मन' ज्योति: and 'प्रस्कृ' i.e., it is 'the most ancient light,' and 'exists in touch with all the objects of the world.' Can it be anything else than the causal substance which interweaves itself into the visible form? The poet of the Mandal V has clearly indicated this causal form when he declares that "he has come to learn the most hidden place (परं) of Indra"—

"भवाचचचं पदमस्य सस्त, वर्ग निधानु रन्वाय मिक्कन्। भश्चक्रमत्यान्तत ते मे भाइ:, इन्द्रं नरो बुवुधाना भश्रम"।

["Among the performers of the sacrifices, only those are able to know this hidden पर of Indra who are ৰুম্বানা:, i.e., those who could see into the depth of things."]

Unless we take the invisible causal form of Indra into our consideration, the description that "Indra has created the heaven and the sky (द्यादा-पृथ्वि", that "Indra has planted milk into the bosom of the cow"—becomes inconsistent and insignificant. Such descriptions lose their value and become

useless when only the gross, visible, phenomenal form of Indra is taken.

As we have seen while considering the form of the Sun, the Fire and the Soma that each of these Vedic gods possesses a तुरीय form; in the case of Indra also, a तुरीय पद, besides the two Padas already stated, is mentioned—

"छभे नि पासि जन्मनी। तुरीयादित्य इवनं त इन्द्रियमातस्थावसतं दिवि।"

And this त्रीयपद has been described as पश्त पद।

(5) In the description of Visnu, we find a statement about a use Visnu has been described to "contain three Padas, viz., the one extending over the earth, the other over the sky and the third the heaven. But nobody, it has been stated, can ever see the hidden use of Visnu—which is used—undying, and which is filled up with honey—

''बीबि पदा विचक्रमें विश्व गोंपा भदाभ्य:....

तिषांसी विषयावी जाग्यवांसः समिखने, विषार्थेत् परमं पदम्"।

["Only those who are wake ful ever alive to the real nature of things—who are thoughtful—only such people can see the परम पर of Visnu."]

- (6) Of the aug—the Wind-god—also, we find a similar description of its two-fold forms. The one is its aug—gross, visible form and the other its deep-laid subtle invisible form which the former contains behind it.—
 - बाहिमी वाती ;—वात चा सिन्धीरा,परावत: ।
 दसंते चस्य चावातु, परान्धी वातु ग्रहपः '' ।

["The wind is two-fold: one form blows from the sea; but the other comes from a place very far off (परावत:), i.e., a place

lying beyond (the visible world). The first form gives us strength; but the other has the power to drive out sin."] What has been described as the killer of sin can never be the gross बाद; it must be the causal reality existing behind all the visible objects. This subtle form of the बाद्य is known as भावित्या in the Rg-Veda. Now, the भावित्या is the source of all sorts of activities. It is from this source that the visible बाद्य—vibratory motion—has sprung. In the 168th Sukta, in Mandal I, we also find two-fold strength of Maruts—"दिवा भवः!" "From which region the Marut is coming?"—it has been asked. The reply given is,—"Is it coming from the inferior (भवर, i.e. खूज) region? Or is it blowing from a region lying beyond the visible places?"—

This enquiry shows us clearly the visible and invisible forms of the Maruts. It is with reference to this invisible underlying and, that such statements become consistent as these—"It is within the lap of the and that all the gods perform their respective functions." It is clearly the causal reality which is present behind the visible motions or activities which has been referred to by these descriptions. It is of this and we find it stated that "it is the Maruts who "have extended the objects of the earth and the shining objects of the sky"—

''भा ये विश्वा पार्थिवानि पप्रयत् रोचना दिवि''।

The term fares in connection with the Maruts indicates its three states—the visible, the causal, and the causal and the causal and the causal are all of these Maruts have only one source from which they have all sprung has been beautifully described by a metaphor.—"As the spokes are all centred and fixed in the navel of the wheel, so they are all come from one identical source"-

''रबानां ये घराः सनाभयः।'' यददो वात ते रुद्दे चस्तस्य निधिर्हितः''—

This treasure house of una must be the causal substance which sustains the gross visible form and which is its source.

(7) Two kinds of Sky (भानाम) we find described in the Rg-Veda. As in the Upanishads the भूतानाम and the प्रम खोम—both of these are mentioned, of which the latter is the undifferentiated condition of the Prāna-Sakti. The भूतानाम is the visible differentiated vibrations which fill the मानाम। This प्रम खोम lying behind the भूतानाम is also known as प्रापं खं in the Upanishads, while the भूतानाम is also known as वायुरं खं। In the Rg-Veda also, similarly two terms have been employed. The one is खो:,—it is nothing but the भूतानाम। The other is the प्रम खोम। In this प्रम खोम the first manifestation of मातरिखा or Prāna-Sakti appears.

We need not quote further passages. These would amply show that each and every god mentioned in the Rg-Veda has, in addition to his visible form, an invisible causal form which underlies the former. To exhibit this two-fold form in general terms, all the gods have been collectively also described or defined as famour

(8) The same fact irresistibly comes to our mind, when we follow the description of Varuna (वर्ष). It is said of him—

[&]quot;'हिजनानो ये स्टत्यापः सत्याः'।

[&]quot;वासां (चपां) राजा वदणी याति मध्ये, सत्यादते चवपश्चन जनानां"!

["There travels, within the flowing water, Varuna who watches the truth and untruth—the merit and demerit—of all the beings in the world."]

This seer of truth and untruth which is present within the water cannot but be the causal universiting within all. Take again such description as this—

"Varuna knows two kinds of प्र—one visible (दर्भनीय) and the other invisible (प्राचीन) Pada." This प्राचीन प्र must be the causal substance lying behind its visible प्र or form. And this hidden प्र is otherwise referred to when the Vedic Rishi declared that "Varuna has revealed the secret of a hidden Pada to a worthy intelligent devotee"—

"विहान पदस्य गुद्धान ऋवोचत्. यगाय (योग्याय) विष्र उपराय शिचन्" ।

The following stanza about Varuna becomes consistent only when we take the causal form of Varuna; otherwise it will be meaningless. It is the causal substance alone which works differently in different objects.—

''वनेषु व्यन्तरीचं ततान, वाजमर्व्वतृत्तु, पय उद्मियातु । इत्ताु कतु वक्षो, त्रम् प्रियं, दिवि स्थमद्यात् सोममद्रौ ।''

["It is Varuna who has placed strength in the horse, milk in the cow, fire in the water, sun in the sky, Soma in the mountain and Varuna has spread the firmament overhead."]

Sankarāchāryya has shown by arguments that the effects can never be separated from, and taken outside of, their causal substance, ānd—that they must always be considered in relation with * their underlying cause which finds its own realisation † through them. In giving a clear idea of the invi-

^{* &}quot;तद-युक्तमिखिख वस्तु, व्यवहारियदिन्वत:, चौरे सार्पेरवार्पितम्' (शाक्त-निक्पण)।

रं "...पाविभूतं सत् 'लत्यते' त्रक्ष" (सु॰ भार)

sible but ever accompanying causal reality behind each of the visible gods, the Rg-Veda wants to show that the visible forms of the gods will always put the people in mind of the causal Reality which is ever presnt behind them, and severed from which the gods will at once become unessential and activated.—to use the expression employed by Sankara. They are always to be taken in connection with their causal substance—which is none other than Brahman Itself—of which these gods are so many manifestations. How can the effect be conceived as different (पान्य) from the cause? I would again remind you of the illustration given by Sankara to support his position which was quoted in an early part of our Lectures (Vide: Lect. 1, P. 16).—

"ग्रग्नेहि विस्मुलिङ्गः ग्राग्निरेव"—

"The spark after it comes out of fire is nothing but fire in reality; it is not different from, other (प्रय) than, the fire—its cause."

And also-

"(विस्फृ लिङ्गस्य) प्रागम्ने भ्रें भात् श्रम्ने प्रकलदर्भनात्"—

"Before the spark came out of fire, separated itself from the fire—its cause, it was identical with fire, was no other than fire itself."

The idea of the Rg-Veda is that Brahman is finding its expression through the visible objects—the Vedic gods—mentioned therein. The description of the Equal behind the visible was of these gods serves this great purpose. It would be totally unphilosophical to take the Vedic gods as separated from their causal

source and to treat them as so many self-sufficient, independent beings, which some interpreters of the Rg-Veda have sought to do. Sankara has shown such a procedure to be erroneous. The effects cannot even for a moment stand unrelated to their cause. Neither do they serve any other purpose than the realisation, through them, of the nature of the causal reality. It is in this way that Rg-Vedic gods must be considered. Sankara has stated that one finite object does indeed negate or exclude another finite object, but none of these objects can negate or exclude the idea of their cause which is the infinite existing behind them-"a fs काय्य' नाम वसुतोऽस्ति, यतः कारणवृद्धिविनियने त'। For. the कार्छ is nothing but the transformation (अवस्थान्तर) of the causal reality. How then can a and exclude the idea of its cause? The visible forms or effects have no real value of their own. As these are प्रार्थ they serve the purpose of the realisation of the nature of the causal reality which exists and operates within The causal realities are therefore the ends; but as Brahman is the absolute end, it includes all other lower ends within. * Sankarāchārya has plained this relation between the causal reality and the effects produced out of it. This exactly is the relation which exists between the dual names of the gods described in the Rg-Veda. Forgetting the intimate relation in which the hidden underlying causal reality always stands with the visibly gross

^{* &#}x27;'बनिके हि विलचणा: सामान्य-विजेषा:...तेषासिकव्यिन सक्षामाक्तन्ये पार्वपर्यमत्वा क्रमभीव:'' (ह० मा०)।

forms of natural objects, it is wrong to look upon these as the only objects with which we have any concern in the world. This would be anagifta view as stated by Sankara. But this is not at all the real view; it is the most unphilosophical view which obtains among the ordinary people. We must try to cultivate the real पारमाधिक view and look upon the gods, i. c. the phenomenal objects as manifestations of the causal Reality,—as Brahman Itself sustains them and works within them, and without which and cut off from which they would altogether lose their importance,—would become unreal, unessential. This grand truth the Rg-Veda has inculcated upon us, when it describes the subtle invisible form along with the visible gross form of its gods. Otherwise. such description becomes a meaningless jumble. Yet the modern interpreters of the Rg-Veda have not a word to say about the invisible causal form which accompanies those gods, so clearly described in the pages of the Rg-Veda in connection with each of its gods. We have not said anything about the 3 types of Devatās and three kinds of uss (yajnas) which find ample description in the Rg-Veda. Neither have we referred you to the use of the term Māyā exactly in the sense in which Sankara used in his Vedenta. All these are to be found scattered in the Rg-Veda. Sankara seems to have borrowed his main ideas from the Rg-Veda.

Conclusion: -

This is my last day and this day brings me to my labour's end. I am convinced of one fact: that you really love Sankara and that you take a loving interest in this great philosophy of your own ancient land. Your attendance, day after day, in this cold, chilly, wintry evenings gives ample evidence of that fact. But, I do not know if I have been able to please you—if my presentation of India's great philosopher has proved con-vincing to you. But I have laboured honestly. What I have said, I have tried to support strengthen by ample quotations. For this purpose I have traversed, as you have seen, the whole field-neglecting nothing. Numerous texts from all his commentaries have been put before you to help you to come to your own conclusion. Sankara's theory is not a Pantheism. He has not abolished the things of the world, neither has he declared the finite sitas as so many unrealities. As the world is finite but moving towards the infinite goal, so we - stas - are also finite as well as infinite. Infinite possibilities lie hidden in us and Sankara holds out to us the great promise that we shall one day be able to realise our aspirations, and to fulfil all our possibilities, and that all strife and sufferings will cease in ag. In Sankara-philosophy there is ample scope for and -duties of man. We are self-seeking beings: we must try to be unselfish; and so long as we are not disinterested in our actions and ideas, the augus, Sankara tells us,

will not dawn-we must treat all as our own-not forgetting the great truth that the same नारायण (Nārāyana) is present in us all. We must make sincere efforts to remove suffering from our fellow size, so far as in us lies and unless that is done, how can we help them to realise the नारायण within? All these promises Sankara's philosophy holds before us. 'It is not a philosophy of माया or इन्द्रजाल. He has not woven a net of trans around us to enmesh us within it beyond hope of extrication. Neither it is a mere Theology. And by the way, our Rg-Veda-that great storehouse of Indian wisdom, from which we have derived our all practical religions of every-day life, is 'not a' book of hymns composed by primitive Indian tillers of soil, but it is a store-house of the great Māvā-Vāda too from which Sankara partly borrowed the main ideas of his philosophy. But the time has arrived to take farewell of you however painful it may be, and I do it by offering my good wishes to you all.

I take this opportunity to offer my respectful tribute to the blessed memory of the late Sreegopal Basu Mallick—the great founder of this Fellowship which has given an impetus to the culture and spread of the Vedantic truths.

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
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